CHAPTER III.—STRATEGY.
Definition of Strategy and Tactics.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
ART. XVI.—The System of Offensive
or Defensive Operations.
ART. XVII.—The Theater of
Operations.
ART. XVIII.—Bases of
Operations.
ART. XIX.—Strategic Lines and
Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective
Points of Operation.
ART. XX.—Fronts of Operations,
Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
Positions.
ART. XXI.—Zones and Lines of
Operations.
ART. XXII.—Strategic Lines of
Maneuver.
ART. XXIII.—Means of Protecting
Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic
Reserves.
ART. XXIV.—The Old and New Systems
of War.
ART. XXV.—Depots of Supply, and
their Relations to Operations.
ART. XXVI.—Frontiers, and their
Defense by Forts and Intrenched Lines.—Wars of
Sieges.
ART. XXVII.—Intrenched Camps and
Têtes de Ponts in their Relation to Strategy.
ART. XXVIII.—Strategic Operations
in Mountainous Countries.
ART. XXIX.—Grand Invasions and
Distant Expeditions.
Epitome of Strategy.
[Pg 11] CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS
AND BATTLES.
CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED
CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY
OF TACTICS.
ART. XXXVI.—Diversions and
Great Detachments.
ART. XXXVII.—Passage of Rivers
and other Streams.
ART. XXXVIII.—Retreats and
Pursuits.
ART. XXXIX.—Cantonments and Winter
Quarters.
ART. XL.—Descents, or Maritime
Expeditions.
CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART
OF MOVING ARMIES.
[Pg 12] CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND
EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
CONCLUSION.
SUPPLEMENT.
APPENDIX.
SECOND APPENDIX.
SKETCH OF
THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
INDEX
[Pg 13]
SUMMARY
OF
THE ART OF WAR.
DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.
The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five
purely military branches,—viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential
branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed Diplomacy in
its relation to War. Although this branch is more naturally
and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than
with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be
useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every
general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations
which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various
operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
should have a place in a work like this.
To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct
parts:—
1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the
theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering,—the attack and defense of
fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics.
[Pg 14]It is proposed to analyze the principal
combinations of the first four branches, omitting the
consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.
Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to
be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a
general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is
indispensable.
CHAPTER I.
STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.
Under this head are included those considerations from which a
statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or
indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to
attain the object of the war.
A government goes to war,—
To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as
commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;
To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary
either for the safety of the government or the balance of
power;
To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive
alliances;
To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them
out, or to defend them;
To increase the influence and power of the state by
acquisitions of territory;
To defend the threatened independence of the state;
To avenge insulted honor; or,
From a mania for conquest.
It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence
in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and
operations necessary for the proposed end. The party who has
provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party
assailed may assume the offensive; and there [Pg 15]may be
other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a
war, as,—
1. A state may simply make war against another state.
2. A state may make war against several states in alliance
with each other.
3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single
enemy.
4. A state may be either the principal party or an
auxiliary.
5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its
beginning or after it has commenced.
6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon
that of an ally, or upon its own.
7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or
distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be
bold and adventurous.
8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or
against the enemy.
9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.
War is always to be conducted according to the great
principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in
the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should
depend upon the circumstances of the case.
For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate
the Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not
maneuver as the same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or
any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a French army
fight the guerrillas of Mina as they fought the Russians at
Borodino; nor would a French army venture to march upon Vienna
without considering what might be the tone and temper of the
governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight
in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
circumstances and events.
To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the
management of armies. The name Military Policy is [Pg 16]given
to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to
strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans
both of a statesman and a general.
ARTICLE I.
Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.
When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be
best to enforce them by arms. The public interest must be
consulted before action.
The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted
rights, and which, in addition, promises to the state advantages
commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards
incurred. Unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful
and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon
bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but wars of
expediency. The question of the succession to the Spanish crown
under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by
a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly
contested by all Europe, and produced a general coalition against
the legitimate legatee.
Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought
forward an old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this
province, thus doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke
of genius; and, even if he had failed, he could not have been
much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the enterprise
justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be
justified.
In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and
to profit by every circumstance covers all that can be said.
Offensive movements should be suitable to the end to be attained.
The most natural step would be to occupy the disputed territory:
then offensive operations may be carried on according to
circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the
object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy,
and the means being to threaten [Pg
17]him in the heart of
his own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the
parties may be able to secure with other states, and upon their
military resources. In an offensive movement, scrupulous care
must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other state
which might come to the aid of the enemy. It is a part of the
duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by
making proper explanations and giving proper guarantees to other
states.
ARTICLE II.
Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military
Point of View.
A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely
yields it without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as
is always more honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the
offensive, instead of awaiting the attack on the frontiers.
There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are
also advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A
power with no internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of
an attack by a third party, will always find it advantageous to
carry the war upon hostile soil. This course will spare its
territory from devastation, carry on the war at the expense of
the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the
spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely military
sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own territory,
upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial features
are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.
These plain truths have their application in all descriptions
of war; but, if the principles of strategy are always the same,
it is different with the political part of war, which is modified
by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters
of men at the head of states and armies. The fact of these
modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules.
Military science rests upon principles which can [Pg 18]never
be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful
enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may
demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must
be observed.
For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or
Russia would differ widely from one against the brave but
undisciplined bands of Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are
not able to maneuver well, and possess no steadiness under
misfortunes.
ARTICLE III.
Wars of Expediency.
The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the
Spanish Succession, were wars of expediency.
There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a
powerful state undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for
commercial and political reasons; secondly, to lessen the power
of a dangerous rival or to prevent his aggrandizement. These last
are wars of intervention; for a state will rarely singly attack a
dangerous rival: it will endeavor to form a coalition for that
purpose.
These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than
to war.
ARTICLE IV.
Of Wars with or without Allies.
Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things
being equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed
than two weaker states in alliance against it, still the alliance
is stronger than either separately. The ally not only furnishes a
contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a
great degree by threatening portions of his frontier which
otherwise would have been secure. All history teaches that no
enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any
power, however formidable.
[Pg 19]
ARTICLE V.
Wars of Intervention.
To interfere in a contest already begun promises more
advantages to a state than war under any other circumstances; and
the reason is plain. The power which interferes throws upon one
side of the scale its whole weight and influence; it interferes
at the most opportune moment, when it can make decisive use of
its resources.
There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the
internal affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in
external relations.
Whatever may be said as to the moral character of
interventions of the first class, instances are frequent. The
Romans acquired power by these interferences, and the empire of
the English India Company was assured in a similar manner. These
interventions are not always successful. While Russia has added
to her power by interference with Poland, Austria, on the
contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere in the
internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
Intervention in the external relations of states is more
legitimate, and perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful
whether a nation has the right to interfere in the internal
affairs of another people; but it certainly has a right to oppose
it when it propagates disorder which may reach the adjoining
states.
There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
wars,—viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2,
to maintain the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil
consequences of the war already commenced, or to secure certain
advantages from the war not to be obtained otherwise.
History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by
neglect of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it
permits the immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary
power may become the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight
into the balance at the proper time."
In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden
appear[Pg 20]ance of a new and large army as a third party in a
well-contested war must be decisive. Much will depend upon its
geographical position in reference to the armies already in the
field. For example, in the winter of 1807 Napoleon crossed the
Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg, leaving
Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon
the Oder, it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have
been ended; there is every reason to think that his army could
not have regained the Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she
could raise four hundred thousand men. Two years afterward, with
this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred
thousand men well employed at the proper time would have decided
the fate of Europe.
There are several kinds of war resulting from these two
different interventions:—
1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a
force specified by former treaties.
2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by
defending his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other
soil.
3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the
theater of war,—which supposes the case of a coalition of
several powers against one.
4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in
progress, or interferes before the declaration of war.
When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in
obedience to treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and
has but little voice in the main operations; but when it
intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the
case is quite different.
The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian
army in the Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of
Austria and France: still, it was a principal party in the North
until its occupation of Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and
Soltikoff conducted the army as far as Brandenburg it acted
solely in the interest of Austria: the fate [Pg 21]of
these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
maneuvering of their allies.
Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad
illustrations of this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the military
character of these expeditions.
It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be
endangered by these distant interventions. The counterbalancing
advantage is that its own territory cannot then be easily
invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so distant; so that
what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a measure, an
advantage to the state.
In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a
general who is both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear
stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each
in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective
point which shall be in harmony with the common interests. By the
neglect of these precautions, the greater number of coalitions
have failed, or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power
more united but weaker than the allies.
The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering
with the whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is
more promising than the others. Austria had an opportunity of
this character in 1807, but failed to profit by it: she again had
the opportunity in 1813. Napoleon had just collected his forces
in Saxony, when Austria, taking his front of operations in
reverse, threw herself into the struggle with two hundred
thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in
Germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In
this intervention Austria had not only the political but also the
military chances in her favor,—a double result, combining
the highest advantages.
Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while
the theater was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the
greatest possible display of force, she at the same time
[Pg 22]interfered in a contest already in progress, upon
which she entered with the whole of her resources and at the time
most opportune for her.
This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only
powerful monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a
controlling influence when they know how to profit by it.
Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice
of Saxony boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master
of Spain, Italy, and the German empire, and had been victorious
over Francis I. and held France in his grasp. This movement
carried the war into the Tyrol, and arrested the great conqueror
in his career.
In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring
himself hostile to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in
Italy, and caused the recall of the French army from the banks of
the Adige to the walls of Turin, where it encountered the great
catastrophe which immortalized Prince Eugene.
Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect
of these opportune interventions: more illustrations might be
given, but they could not add to the conviction of the
reader.
ARTICLE VI.
Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.
There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an
adjoining state; the other attacks a distant point, over
intervening territory of great extent whose inhabitants may be
neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,—as
Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon during a portion of his
career, have fully proved. However, there are natural limits in
these wars, which cannot be passed without incurring great
disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus and the
Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
furnish bloody proofs of these truths.—The love of
conquest, however, was not the only motive with Napoleon: his
personal position, and his contest with England, urged him to
enterprises the aim of which was [Pg
23]to make him supreme.
It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he was also a
victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this
world to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His
victories teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness,
and skill; his disasters, what might have been avoided by
prudence.
A war of invasion without good reason—like that of
Genghis Khan—is a crime against humanity; but it may be
excused, if not approved, when induced by great interests or when
conducted with good motives.
The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in
object and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack,
which threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was
fatal to its author; the second, while combating dangerous
principles, fostered the general interests of the country, and
was the more readily brought to a successful termination because
its object met with the approval of the majority of the people
whose territory was invaded.
These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily
all of the same character. The first contributed largely to the
fall of Napoleon; the second restored the relation between France
and Spain, which ought never to have been changed.
Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to
attack than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest
way to check the spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose
it by intervention at the proper time.
An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in
magnitude to the end to be attained and to the obstacles to be
overcome.
An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all
sacrifices and likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a
dangerous enterprise, as was well proved by the war in Spain,
(1808,) and by the wars of the Revolution in 1792, 1793, and
1794. In these latter wars, if France was better prepared than
Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was attacked by all
Europe upon both land and sea.
Although the circumstances were different, the Russian
[Pg 24]invasion of Turkey developed, in some respects, the
same symptoms of national resistance. The religious hatred of the
Ottoman powerfully incited him to arms; but the same motive was
powerless among the Greeks, who were twice as numerous as the
Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and Turks been harmonized,
as were those of Alsace with France, the united people would have
been stronger, but they would have lacked the element of
religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was
formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were
found, while in the interior all was weakness.
When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to
fear from the inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its
course. The popular feeling rendered the invasions of Italy,
Austria, and Prussia so prompt. (These military points are
treated of in Article XXIX.) But when
the invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its
success will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The
first step to insure success will be to secure the sincere and
devoted alliance of a state adjoining the enemy, which will
afford reinforcements of troops, and, what is still more
important, give a secure base of operations, depots of supplies,
and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must have the
same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this
possible.
Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is
not powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile
intervention may arrest the most brilliant successes. The
invasions of Austria in 1805 and 1809 might have ended
differently if Prussia had interfered. The invasion of the North
of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by Austria. That
of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a wise
statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of
intervention.
[Pg 25]
ARTICLE VII.
Wars of Opinion.
Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are
sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate
notice.
Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign,
and, lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or
exterior without being intestine or civil.
Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of
wars of intervention; for they result either from doctrines which
one party desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from
dogmas which it desires to crush,—in both cases leading to
intervention. Although originating in religious or political
dogmas, these wars are most deplorable; for, like national wars,
they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, and
terrible.
The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the
wars of the League, present nearly the same characteristics.
Often religion is the pretext to obtain political power, and the
war is not really one of dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared
more to extend their empire than to preach the Koran, and Philip
II., bigot as he was, did not sustain the League in France for
the purpose of advancing the Roman Church. We agree with M.
Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a crusade in Egypt,
thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of gaining
possession of the Holy Sepulcher.
The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful
ally; for it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a
party. For instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and
Philip II. in France, had allies in the country more powerful
than their armies. It may, however, happen, as in the Crusades
and the wars of Islamism, that the dogma for which the war is
waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the
country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.
[Pg 26]The chances of support and resistance in wars of
political opinions are about equal. It may be recollected how in
1792 associations of fanatics thought it possible to propagate
throughout Europe the famous declaration of the rights of man,
and how governments became justly alarmed, and rushed to arms
probably with the intention of only forcing the lava of this
volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing it. The
means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in
the human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less
duration as it is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for
all bad passions and for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized
nation may bear the yoke of a factious and unrestrained multitude
for a short interval; but these storms soon pass away, and reason
resumes her sway. To attempt to restrain such a mob by a foreign
force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the
powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the
explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent
it and to perish in the attempt.
After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that,
if the Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened
by foreign armaments, they would never have dared to lay their
sacrilegious hands upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis
XVI. The Girondists would never have been crushed by the Mountain
but for the reverses of Dumouriez and the threats of invasion.
And if they had been permitted to clash and quarrel with each
other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of
giving place to the terrible Convention, the Assembly would
slowly have returned to the restoration of good, temperate,
monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and the
immemorial traditions of the French.
In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading
force not only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed
to the attacks of an exasperated people. It may be said that the
violence of one party will necessarily create support for the
invaders by the formation of another and op[Pg 27]posite
one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all the public
resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will
be the support of the faction which possesses no such means? What
service did one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred
thousand Federalists do for the Coalition in 1793?
History contains but a single example of a struggle like that
of the Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the
danger of attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad
management of the military operations was one cause of the
unexpected result, and before deducing any certain maxims from
this war, we should ascertain what would have been the result if
after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of destroying and
capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the commanders of
those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to France, to
her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with two
hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
again, they might never have returned, at least without the
protection of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is
difficult to decide this, since the experiment was never made,
and as all would have depended upon the course of the French
nation and the army. The problem thus presents two equally grave
solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave one; whether the other might
have been obtained, it is difficult to say. Experiment alone
could have determined it.
The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for
national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national
wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified
places besieged and reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in
wars of opinion it is of less importance to subjugate the
country; here great efforts should be made to gain the end
speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly
taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
independence or the integrity of its territory.
The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in
favor of this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It
is true that the conditions were slightly different; [Pg 28]for
the French army of 1792 was made up of more solid elements than
that of the Radicals of the Isla de Leon. The war of the
Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national war, and a
civil war,—while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the
enormous difference in the results.
Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulême was
well carried out. Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in
conformity to the above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to
the Ebro, he there divided his forces, to seize, at their
sources, all the elements of strength of their
enemies,—which they could safely do, since they were
sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed
the instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the
conquest of the country and the reduction of the fortresses
between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to provide a base of
operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission, or at
least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the
national spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that
of 1807.
Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he
comprehended that it was a political operation rather than a
military one, and that it behooved him to consummate it rapidly.
His conduct, so different from that of the allies in 1793,
deserves careful attention from all charged with similar
missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
Cadiz.
If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that
statesmanship was not able to profit by success in order to found
a suitable and solid order of things, the fault was neither in
the army nor in its commanders, but in the Spanish government,
which, yielding to the counsel of violent reactionaries, was
unable to rise to the height of its mission. The arbiter between
two great hostile interests, Ferdinand blindly threw himself into
the arms of the party which professed a deep veneration for the
throne, but which intended to use the royal authority for the
furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
nation remained divided in two hostile [Pg
29]camps, which it
would not have been impossible to calm and reconcile in time.
These camps came anew into collision, as I predicted in Verona in
1823,—a striking lesson, by which no one is disposed to
profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, although history is
not wanting in examples to prove that violent reactions, any more
than revolutions, are not elements with which to construct and
consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful conflict may
emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated from
all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon
the general interests of the country,—a monarchy capable of
rallying to its support this incomprehensible Spanish nation,
which, with merits not less extraordinary than its faults, was
always a problem for those who were in the best position to know
it.
ARTICLE VIII.
National Wars.
National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those
of invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only
be applied to such as are waged against a united people, or a
great majority of them, filled with a noble ardor and determined
to sustain their independence: then every step is disputed, the
army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be
obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are
everywhere threatened or captured.
The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely
seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which
commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that,
for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This
uprising must not be confounded with a national defense in
accordance with the institutions of the state and directed by the
government.
This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The
serfs may rise in a body at the call of the government, and their
masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country,
may set them the example and take the command of them; and,
similarly, a fanatical people may arm under the appeal of its
priests; or a people enthusiastic [Pg
30]in its political
opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its institutions, may
rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most dear.
The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of
a national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of
coast, and are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power
which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not
only on account of the facility of feeding the insurrection and
of alarming the enemy on all the points he may occupy, but still
more by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his
procuring supplies by the sea.
The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the
facility of a national defense. In mountainous countries the
people are always most formidable; next to these are countries
covered with extensive forests.
The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of
Burgundy, that of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the
difficulties encountered by the Russians in the subjugation of
the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, the reiterated efforts
of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the inhabitants of
mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer time than
those of the plains,—which is due as much to the difference
in character and customs as to the difference in the natural
features of the countries.
Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor
this kind of defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so
justly celebrated, proves that any country, even if it be only
traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals, admits of a
formidable defense.
The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions,
as well as in national wars, are very great, and render the
mission of the general conducting them very difficult. The events
just mentioned, the contest of the Netherlands with Philip II.
and that of the Americans with the English, furnish evident
proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary struggle of La
Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain,
Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of
the Morea against the Turks, and of Na[Pg
31]varre against the
armies of Queen Christina, are still more striking
illustrations.
The difficulties are particularly great when the people are
supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The
invader has only an army: his adversaries have an army, and a
people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of
resistance out of every thing, each individual of whom conspires
against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have an
interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their
power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he
encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile
and multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every
step.
These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country
is difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and
their connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who
aids him; the commanders also know the country, and, learning
immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader,
can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects; while the
latter, without information of their movements, and not in a
condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource
but in his bayonets, and certain safety only in the concentration
of his columns, is like a blind man: his combinations are
failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted movements
and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about
to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs
of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote,
he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of
communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it,
surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so
disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a
time.
In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this
kind. When Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped
the companies of the artillery-train between Betanzos and
Corunna, in the midst of four brigades distant from the camp from
two to three leagues, and no Spanish forces had been seen within
fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago [Pg 32]de
Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo,
Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night
the companies of the train—men and
horses—disappeared, and we were never able to discover what
became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report
that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made
away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single division
marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the
Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A
part of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias
marched behind the very heights which inclose the valley of the
Navia, at most but a league from our columns, without the marshal
knowing a word of it: when he was entering Gijon, the army of La
Romana attacked the center of the regiments of the division
Marchand, which, being scattered to guard Galicia, barely
escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to
Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make
them fall more readily into snares.
No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against
such a system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong
enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its
communications, and at the same time furnish an active force
sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. If
this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a nucleus
around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient
to be superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long
lines of communication against numerous bodies?
The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all
the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter
in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all
in arms. What efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did
it not cost the troops of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and
Suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four
hundred thousand armed Span[Pg
33]iards and Portuguese
supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, Blake,
La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and Ballasteros!
If success be possible in such a war, the following general
course will be most likely to insure it,—viz.: make a
display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and
resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in
every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display
courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly,
deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the League,
of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, are models of their kind,
which may be employed according to circumstances with equal
success. The admirable order and discipline of the armies of
Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the late war were also models, and
were not a little conducive to the success of their
enterprises.
The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in
these wars have led some speculative persons to hope that there
should never be any other kind, since then wars would become more
rare, and, conquest being also more difficult, would be less a
temptation to ambitious leaders. This reasoning is rather
plausible than solid; for, to admit all its consequences, it
would be necessary always to be able to induce the people to take
up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be convinced
that there would be in the future no wars but those of conquest,
and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only to
maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public
interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be
known when and how to excite the people to a national war? For
example, if one hundred thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and
entered France, originally with the intention of preventing the
conquest of Belgium by France, and without any other ambitious
project, would it be a case where the whole population—men,
women, and children—of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and
Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every
walled town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder,
[Pg 34]pillage, and incendiarism throughout the country?
If all this be not done, and the Germans, in consequence of some
success, should occupy these provinces, who can say that they
might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of them, even
though at first they had never contemplated it? The difficulty of
answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor of
national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an
invasion without bringing about an uprising of the whole
population and a war of extermination? Is there no mean between
these contests between the people and the old regular method of
war between permanent armies? Will it not be sufficient, for the
efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or
landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments into
service, would regulate the part the people should take in the
war, and place just limits to its barbarities?
I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system
to the cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand
regular French troops, supported by the National Guards of the
East, would get the better of this German army which had crossed
the Vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by many
detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or arriving in Argonne it
would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. To attain this
mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good national
reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive
in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This
system was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809,
and by the whole of Germany in 1813.
I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a
utopian philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire
that wars of extermination may be banished from the code of
nations, and that the defenses of nations by disciplined militia,
with the aid of good political alliances, may be sufficient to
insure their independence.
As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to
organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I
acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good
[Pg 35]old times when the French and English Guards
courteously invited each other to fire first,—as at
Fontenoy,—preferring them to the frightful epoch when
priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder
of isolated soldiers.
ARTICLE IX.
Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.
Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are
generally the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or
religious sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more
frequently the collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are
above all the most deplorable.
We can understand how a government may find it necessary to
use force against its own subjects in order to crush out factions
which would weaken the authority of the throne and the national
strength; but that it should murder its citizens to compel them
to say their prayers in French or Latin, or to recognize the
supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is difficult of conception. Never
was a king more to be pitied than Louis XIV., who persecuted a
million of industrious Protestants, who had put upon the throne
his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are horrible when
mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful when they
are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the
League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is
difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the
time of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so
deplorable a state of brutality.
To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule
upon which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite
the two parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil,
and afterward to reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or
rights. Indeed, the intervention of a third power in a religious
dispute can only be with ambitious views.
Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the
spreading of a political disease whose principles threaten
[Pg 36]social order; and, although these fears are
generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible
that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in
religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could
have had no other object in interfering in the affairs of the
League than to subject France to his influence, or to dismember
it.
ARTICLE X.
Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at
Once.
The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great
wars at the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated
as to spare the necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.
A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two
neighboring states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it
does not find an ally to come to its aid, with a view to its own
safety and the maintenance of the political equilibrium. It will
seldom be the case that the nations allied against it will have
the same interest in the war and will enter into it with all
their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an
ordinary war.
Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and
Napoleon, sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe.
When such contests arise from voluntary aggressions, they are
proof of a capital error on the part of the state which invites
them; but if they arise from imperious and inevitable
circumstances they must be met by seeking alliances, or by
opposing such means of resistance as shall establish something
like equality between the strength of the parties.
The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from
his designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions
which had alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe
he could only oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of
Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who,
indeed, was not slow in [Pg
37]adding to the number
of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the subsidies of
England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different
states, sustained a war against the three most powerful
monarchies of Europe: the division and folly of his opponents
were his best friends.
Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in
1812, it was almost impossible to avoid.
France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in
consequence of the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and
the Utopian ideas of the Girondists, who boasted that with the
support of the English fleets they would defy all the kings in
the world. The result of these absurd calculations was a
frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France miraculously
escaped.
Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign
who has voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even
three, formidable wars,—with Spain, with England, and with
Russia; but in the last case he expected the aid of Austria and
Prussia, to say nothing of that of Turkey and Sweden, upon which
he counted with too much certainty; so that the enterprise was
not so adventurous on his part as has been generally
supposed.
It will be observed that there is a great distinction between
a war made against a single state which is aided by a third
acting as an auxiliary, and two wars conducted at the same time
against two powerful nations in opposite quarters, who employ all
their forces and resources. For instance, the double contest of
Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and Spain aided by England was a
very different affair from a contest with Austria assisted by an
auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter contests belong
to ordinary wars.
It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be
avoided if possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states,
it is more prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered
from one of them, until a proper opportunity for redressing them
shall arrive. The rule, however, is not without exception: the
respective forces, the localities, the possibility [Pg 38]of
finding allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength
between the parties, are circumstances which will influence a
government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.
CHAPTER II.
MILITARY POLICY.
We have already explained what we understand by this title. It
embraces the moral combinations relating to the operations of
armies. If the political considerations which we have just
discussed be also moral, there are others which influence, in a
certain degree, the conduct of a war, which belong neither to
diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We include these under the head
of Military Policy.
Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of
any projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art
and strategy; and, as their number is considerable, a separate
article cannot be assigned to each without enlarging too much the
limits of this work, and without deviating from my
intention,—which is, not to give a treatise on theses
subjects, but to point out their relations to military
operations.
Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation
to be fought, their military system, their immediate means and
their reserves, their financial resources, the attachment they
bear to their government or their institutions, the character of
the executive, the characters and military abilities of the
commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet councils or
councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the system
of war in favor with their staff, the established force of the
state and its armament, the military geography and statistics of
the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the resources and
obstacles of every kind likely [Pg
39]to be met with, all
of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the
government should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of
these details, and that it is indispensable to take them into
consideration in the arrangement of all plans. We propose to
sketch the principal points which ought to guide in this sort of
combinations.
ARTICLE XI.
Military Statistics and Geography.
By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough
knowledge possible of the elements of power and military
resources of the enemy with whom we are called upon to contend;
the second consists in the topographical and strategic
description of the theater of war, with all the obstacles,
natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of
the permanent decisive points which may be presented in the whole
extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the country.
Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his chief
of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty
of cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in
our day, despite the great strides civilized nations have taken
in statistical, diplomatic, geographical, and topographical
sciences. I will cite two examples of which I was cognizant. In
1796, Moreau's army, entering the Black Forest, expected to find
terrible mountains, frightful defiles and forests, and was
greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the declivities of
the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with their
spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level
plain.
The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army
supposed the interior of Bohemia to be very
mountainous,—whereas there is no district in Europe more
level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding it has been
crossed, which may be done in a single march.
[Pg 40]All European officers held the same erroneous
opinions in reference to the Balkan and the Turkish force in the
interior. It seemed that it was given out at Constantinople that
this province was an almost impregnable barrier and the palladium
of the empire,—an error which I, having lived in the Alps,
did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply rooted, have
led to the belief that a people all the individuals of which are
constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and would
defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
that the old regulations which placed the elite of the
Janissaries in the frontier-cities of the Danube made the
population of those cities more warlike than the inhabitants of
the interior. In fact, the projects of reform of the Sultan
Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old system, and there was
no time to replace it by the new: so that the empire was
defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good
army nor a national defense.
Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military
geography and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set
forth in treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote
an essay upon them, in describing the frontiers of the great
states of Europe, was not fortunate in his maxims and
predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he represents as
impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the Tyrol
and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805,
and 1809.
But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives
of the European staff must necessarily possess many documents
valuable for instruction in them,—at least for the special
staff school. Awaiting the time when some studious officer,
profiting by those published and unpublished documents, shall
present Europe with a good military and strategic geography, we
may, thanks to the immense progress of topography of late years,
partially supply the want of it by the excellent charts published
in all European countries within the last twenty years. At the
beginning of the French Revolution topo[Pg
41]graphy was in its
infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and
Prussian staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne
fruit. The charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin,
Munich, Stuttgart, and Paris, as well as those of the institute
of Herder at Fribourg, promise to future generals immense
resources unknown to their predecessors.
Military statistics is not much better known than geography.
We have but vague and superficial statements, from which the
strength of armies and navies is conjectured, and also the
revenue supposed to be possessed by a state,—which is far
from being the knowledge necessary to plan operations. Our object
here is not to discuss thoroughly these important subjects, but
to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
enterprises.
ARTICLE XII.
Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of
a War.
As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a
powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use
their best efforts to allay them. We have nothing to add to what
has been said on this point under the head of national wars.
On the other hand, the general should do every thing to
electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same
enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All
armies are alike susceptible of this spirit: the springs of
action and means, only, vary with the national character.
Military eloquence is one means, and has been the subject of many
a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and of Paskevitch, the
addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and those of
Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of their
different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by
very different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a
general who inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful
means of electrifying an army and [Pg
42]conducing to
victory. Some dispute the advantages of this enthusiasm, and
prefer imperturbable coolness in battle. Both have unmistakable
advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm impels to the
performance of great actions: the difficulty is in maintaining it
constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it, disorder easily
results.
The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of
the armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be
submitted to rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider
the intrinsic value of their troops, and that resulting from
their organization as compared with that of the enemy. A Russian
general, commanding the most solidly organized troops in Europe,
need not fear to undertake any thing against undisciplined and
unorganized troops in an open country, however brave may be its
individuals.[1] Concert in action makes
strength; order produces this concert, and discipline insures
order; and without discipline and order no success is possible.
The Russian general would not be so bold before European troops
having the same instruction and nearly the same discipline as his
own. Finally, a general may attempt with a Mack as his antagonist
what it would be madness to do with a Napoleon.
The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies
influences the boldness of their operations. A general whose
genius and hands are tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles
distant cannot be a match for one who has liberty of action,
other things being equal.
As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain
pledges of victory, all other things being equal. It is true that
great generals have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an
exception does not make a rule. An order misunderstood, a
fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy all the
chances of success which a skillful general had prepared for
himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which cannot be
foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on [Pg 43]that
account to deny the influence of science and principles in
ordinary affairs? This risk even proves the triumph of the
principles, for it happens that they are applied accidentally by
the army against which it was intended to apply them, and are the
cause of its success. But, in admitting this truth, it may be
said that it is an argument against science; this objection is
not well founded, for a general's science consists in providing
for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the
number of battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the
number due to accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.
If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of
victory, it will readily be seen that the judicious selection of
generals is one of the most delicate points in the science of
government and one of the most essential parts of the military
policy of a state. Unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so
many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party spirit,
jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest
and justice. This subject is so important that we will devote to
it a separate article.
FOOTNOTES:
[1]
Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of the
greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting
communication, &c., and may—as in the case of the
French in 1812—make a retreat very disastrous.
ARTICLE XIII.
Military Institutions.
One of the most important points of the military policy of a
state is the nature of its military institutions. A good army
commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great
feats; a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an
army will certainly do a great deal more if its own superiority
and that of the general be combined.
Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect
army:—
1. To have a good recruiting-system;
2. A good organization;
8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal
duties as well as those of a campaign;
5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
[Pg 44]subordination and punctuality, based on conviction
rather than on the formalities of the service;
6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite
emulation;
7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well
instructed;
8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy,
both as to defensive and offensive arms;
9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and
having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and
practical education of its officers;
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of
general administration;
11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing
the principal operations of war;
12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the
people.
To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing
and equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the
field of battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the
preservation of the troops; and it is always a great object to
economize the lives and health of veterans.
None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without
grave inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined,
but without national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered
Prussia to fall in fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On
the other hand, it has often been seen of how much advantage it
is for a state to have a good army. It was the care and skill of
Philip and Alexander in forming and instructing their phalanxes
and rendering them easy to move, and capable of the most rapid
maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate India and
Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive love
of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
an army capable of executing his great enterprises.
A government which neglects its army under any pretext
whatever is thus culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it
prepares humiliation for its standards and its country, instead
[Pg 45]of by a different course preparing for it success.
We are far from saying that a government should sacrifice every
thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it ought to make
the army the object of its constant care; and if the prince has
not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case—which is,
unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence—the defect must
be supplied by wise institutions, at the head of which are to be
placed a good system of the general staff, a good system of
recruiting, and a good system of national reserves.
There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always
allow the executive the power of adopting the best systems. If
the armies of the Roman and French republics, and those of Louis
XIV. and Frederick of Prussia, prove that a good military system
and a skillful direction of operations may be found in
governments the most opposite in principle, it cannot be doubted
that, in the present state of the world, the form of government
exercises a great influence in the development of the military
strength of a nation and the value of its troops.
When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those
affected by local interest or party spirit, they may be so
over-scrupulous and penurious as to take all power to carry on
the war from the executive, whom very many people seem to regard
as a public enemy rather than as a chief devoted to all the
national interests.
The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also
contribute to this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible
for the most far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for
a great war, whether it be demanded by the most important
interests of the country at some future time, or whether it be
immediate and necessary to resist sudden aggressions.
In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not
the members of an elective legislature, the majority of whom
cannot be Richelieus, Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit
of economy, allow the institutions necessary for a large,
well-appointed, and disciplined army to fall into decay?
[Pg 46]Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing
themselves and their constituents that the pleasures of peace are
always preferable to the more statesmanlike preparations for
war?
I am far from advising that states should always have the hand
upon the sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a
condition of things would be a scourge for the human race, and
would not be possible, except under conditions not existing in
all countries. I simply mean that civilized governments ought
always to be ready to carry on a war in a short time,—that
they should never be found unprepared. And the wisdom of their
institutions may do as much in this work of preparation as
foresight in their administration and the perfection of their
system of military policy.
If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
governments subjected to all the changes of an elective
legislature are less suitable than others for the creation or
preparation of a formidable military power, nevertheless, in
great crises these deliberative bodies have sometimes attained
very different results, and have concurred in developing to the
full extent the national strength. Still, the small number of
such instances in history makes rather a list of exceptional
cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed under
the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible
measures and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial
power, which overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of
defending them. Here it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and
monstrous usurpation of power, rather than the form of the
deliberative assembly, which is the true cause of the display of
energy. What happened in the Convention after the fall of
Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public Safety proves
this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the dictatorial
power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank of
safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion
that countries controlled by elective assemblies must be
politically and militarily weaker than [Pg
47]pure monarchies,
although in other respects they present decided advantages.
It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of
armies in the interval of a long peace, for then they are most
likely to degenerate. It is important to foster the military
spirit in the armies, and to exercise them in great maneuvers,
which, though but faintly resembling those of actual war, still
are of decided advantage in preparing them for war. It is not
less important to prevent them from becoming effeminate, which
may be done by employing them in labors useful for the defense of
the country.
The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of
the worst possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system
of divisions and permanent corps d'armée seems to be much
preferable. In general terms, the Russian army now may be
presented as a model in many respects; and if in many points its
customs would be useless and impracticable elsewhere, it must be
admitted that many good institutions might well be copied from
it.
As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long
service, and at the same time to open a way for merit.
Three-fourths of the promotions in each grade should be made
according to the roster, and the remaining fourth reserved for
those distinguished for merit and zeal. On the contrary, in time
of war the regular order of promotion should be suspended, or at
least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the other
two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.
The superiority of armament may increase the chances of
success in war: it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a
great element of success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal
to the French at Bylau and Marengo was their great inferiority in
artillery. We may also refer to the great gain of the heavy
French cavalry in the resumption of the cuirass, which they had
for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the great advantage of
the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would not be more
effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a very
different affair. How many [Pg
48]brave cavalry
soldiers have been the victims of the prejudice they bore against
the lance because it was a little more trouble to carry than a
saber!
The armament of armies is still susceptible of great
improvements; the state which shall take the lead in making them
will secure great advantages. There is little left to be desired
in artillery; but the offensive and defensive arms of infantry
and cavalry deserve the attention of a provident government.
The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a
great revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics.
Strategy alone will remain unaltered, with its principles the
same as under the Scipios and Cæsars, Frederick and
Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms
and the organization of the troops.
The means of destruction are approaching perfection with
frightful rapidity.[2] The
Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it is said
the Austrians can now regulate,—the shrapnel howitzers,
which throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a
bullet,—the Perkins steam-guns, which vomit forth as many
balls as a battalion,—will multiply the chances of
destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino, Leipsic,
and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the European
races.
If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to
make the half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in
order to capture with great rapidity these machines; and the
infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its armor of the Middle
Ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed before engaging
the enemy.
[Pg 49]We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all
covered with armor, and horses also will require the same
protection.
While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it
is, however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made
advances which should lead us to think of modifying the deep
formation so much abused by Napoleon. We will recur to this in
the chapter on Tactics.
We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases
of the military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise
government.
1. The prince should receive an education both political and
military. He will more probably find men of administrative
ability in his councils than good statesmen or soldiers; and
hence he should be both of the latter himself.
2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will
be his first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well
supplied. He must confide the glory of his reign and the safety
of his states to the general most capable of directing his
armies.
3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a
respectable footing, but it should be capable of being doubled,
if necessary, by reserves, which should always be prepared. Its
instruction and discipline should be of a high character, as well
as its organization; its armament should at least be as good as
that of its neighbors, and superior if possible.
4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best
footing, and abundant. The reserves should be stored in the
depots and arsenals. National jealousy should not be allowed to
prevent the adoption of all improvements in this matériel
made in other countries.
5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences
should be encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal.
The scientific military corps should be esteemed and honored:
this is the only way of securing for the army men of merit and
genius.
6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in
labors preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its
archives should be furnished with numerous historical
[Pg 50]details of the past, and with all statistical,
geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers
for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be
permanently stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the
war-office should be simply that of the general staff, except
that there should be a secret department for those documents to
be concealed from the subalterns of the corps.
7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the
geography and the military statistics of other states, so as to
know their material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as
well as the strategic advantages of the two parties.
Distinguished officers should be employed in these scientific
labors, and should be rewarded when they acquit themselves with
marked ability.
8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to
prepare, not an entire plan of operations,—which is always
impossible,—but a system of operations in reference to a
prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well as all the material
means necessary to guarantee the success of the enterprise.
9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the
object of the war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature
and resources of the country, the characters of the nations and
of their chiefs, whether of the army or of the state. In fine, it
should be based upon the moral and material means of attack or
defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action; and it
ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may
obtain in favor of or against either of the parties during the
war.
10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among
the chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly
attribute to this condition the importance attached to it by
Frederick the Great in the history of his times. He was probably
right at his epoch, when armies were chiefly recruited by
voluntary enlistment, when the last crown brought the last
soldier; but when national levies are well organised money will
no longer exercise the same influence,—at least for one or
two campaigns. If England has proved [Pg
51]that money will
procure soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of
country and honor are equally productive, and that, when
necessary, war may be made to support war. France, indeed, in the
fertility of her soil and the enthusiasm of her leaders,
possessed sources of temporary power which cannot be adopted as a
general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were
none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of the
cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced
that France was about to break down for want of money, while
Napoleon had 200,000,000 francs[3] in
the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses
of the government, including the pay of his armies.
A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself
very badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is
neither the strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as
much as gold in the scales of military strength. Still, we must
admit that a happy combination of wise military institutions, of
patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and
public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and
makes it best capable of sustaining a long war.
A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances
under which a nation may develop more or less strength, either by
its gold or iron, and to determine the cases when war may be
expected to support war. This result can only be obtained by
carrying the army into the territory of the enemy; and all
countries are not equally capable of furnishing resources to an
assailant.
We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects
which are not directly connected with the art of war. It is
sufficient for our purpose to indicate their relations to a
projected war; and it will be for the statesman to develop the
modifications which circumstances and localities may make in
these relations.
FOOTNOTES:
[2]
It will be recollected that the author wrote this many years
ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery,
which he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone
important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms
is no less marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's
steam-guns; and as yet no civilized army has been organized upon
the plan the author suggests for depriving these destructive
machines of their efficiency.—TRANSLATORS.
[3]
There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall of
Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the
stupendous efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit
in 1811.
[Pg 52]
ARTICLE XIV.
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over
Operations.
Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in
person by the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this
point, it is certain that if the prince possess the genius of
Frederick, Peter the Great, or Napoleon, he will be far from
leaving to his generals the honor of performing great actions
which he might do himself; for in this he would be untrue to his
own glory and to the well-being of the country.
As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is
more fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving
prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our
subject,) we will only state upon this point that, with equal
merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will always have
an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a
state. Leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to
himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty
he has of being able to dispose of all the public resources for
the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will
be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with
the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be
rare and in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient
motives to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess
military capacity and the contest be of a magnitude worthy of
him. But if he possess no military ability, if his character be
feeble, and he be easily influenced, his presence with the army,
instead of producing good results, will open the way for all
manner of intrigues. Each one will present his projects to him;
and, as he will not have the experience necessary to estimate
them according to their merits, he will submit his judgment to
that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and opposed
in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign
might accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but,
[Pg 53]on the contrary, aid him with all the weight of his
influence. In this case his presence might be productive of good
results, but it also might lead to great embarrassment. If the
army were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged
to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not
follow from the presence of the sovereign at head-quarters!
When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the
head of his armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to
assume the supreme direction of affairs, the best course will be
that adopted by the Prussian government with
Blücher,—viz.; he should be accompanied by two
generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive
ability, the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this
trinity be harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the
case of the army of Silesia in 1813.
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign
judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house,
as has frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has
often occurred that the prince possessed only the titular
command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was
imposed upon him. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and
Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward with the Duke of
Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This
system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is
done. It is known that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans
exhibited more sagacity than Marsin, and it became necessary for
the latter to show full secret authority from the king before the
prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost.
So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than
Mack, who was to be his mentor.
If the prince possess the genius and experience of the
Archduke Charles, he should be invested with the untrammeled
command, and be allowed full selection of his instruments. If he
have not yet acquired the same titles to command, he may then be
provided with an educated general of the staff, and another
general distinguished for his talent in execution; but
[Pg 54]in no case will it be wise to invest either of
these counselors with more authority than a voice in
consultation.
We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his
armies in person, his most important duty will be to have the
position of commander well filled,—which, unfortunately, is
not always done. Without going back to ancient times, it will be
sufficient to recall the more modern examples under Louis XIV.
and Louis XV. The merit of Prince Eugene was estimated by his
deformed figure, and this drove him (the ablest commander of his
time) into the ranks of the enemy. After Louvois' death, Tallard,
Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of Turenne, Condé,
and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont succeeded
Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference
for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is
wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means of
making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses
will exercise an influence in one way or another, and artifice
will often carry off the prize from modest or timid merit, which
awaits a call for its services. But, leaving out of consideration
all these influences, it will be profitable to inquire in what
respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even when
the executive shall be most anxious to make it a judicious one.
In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general requires
either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he
should be guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way
to the improper influence of cliques. The embarrassment is
certainly less when there is at hand a general already
illustrious by many victories; but, outside of the fact that
every general is not a great leader because he has gained a
battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is
not always the case that a victorious general is at the
disposition of the government. It may well happen that after a
long period of peace, there may not be a single general in Europe
who has com[Pg 55]manded in chief. In this case, it will be
difficult to decide whether one general is better than another.
Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of their
arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to
their appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled
by appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may
well be deceived in his selections.
One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem
to be in realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon
in Telemachus, by finding a faithful, sincere, and generous
Philocles, who, standing between the prince and all aspirants for
the command, would be able, by means of his more direct relations
to the public, to enlighten the monarch in reference to
selections of individuals best recommended by their character and
abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to personal
affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it
required all the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the
man who afterward shed so much luster upon the Russian arms.
It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but
nothing could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a
Cæsar, when he was ignorant of the great operations of war.
Would it have placed Bonaparte at the head of the army of Italy,
when he was known only by two directors? Still, it must be
admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be
despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the
experience of events.
The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
follow:—First, A high moral courage, capable of great
resolutions; Secondly, A physical courage which takes no
account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements
are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if
great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It is not necessary that
he [Pg 56]should be a man of vast erudition. His knowledge
may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of
war. Next in importance come the qualities of his personal
character. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of
esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and
skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will
always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man.
Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to merit in others
is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always
jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not
realizing that the nominal commander of an army always receives
almost all the glory of its success, even when least entitled to
it.
The question has often been discussed, whether it is
preferable to assign to the command a general of long experience
in service with troops, or an officer of the staff, having
generally but little experience in the management of troops. It
is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and
that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations
skillfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy.
Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon are
instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from
the staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general,
but it will not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a
quartermaster that he will be capable of the supreme command, but
because he has a natural genius for war and possesses the
requisite characteristics. So, also, a general from the ranks of
the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of conducting a
campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question does
not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal
qualities of the individuals; but the following remarks will be
useful in leading to a rational conclusion:—
1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or
artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps
d'armée, [Pg 57]will, with equal chances, be superior
to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special
corps.
2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the
science of war, will be equally fitted for the command.
3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites
in a commander-in-chief.
Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united
the requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge
of the principles of the art of war.
The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to
the formation of a good general staff, which being near the
general may advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence
over the operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of
the most useful of organizations; but care must be observed to
prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this
case it might prove fatal.
Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam,
never thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of
General Ruchel,[4] and
to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for
gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step from
the sublime to the ridiculous!
Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the
general and his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the
latter should be a man of recognized ability, it is also proper
to give the general the choice of the men who are to be his
advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to
create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select
a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; for if
he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital
importance. The best means to avoid these dangers is to give the
general the option of several designated officers, all of
undoubted ability.
It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies,
[Pg 58]that frequent councils of war, by aiding the
commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the
direction of military operations. Doubtless, if the commander
were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find in a
council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority
of the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what
success could be expected from operations conducted by others
than those who have originated and arranged them? What must be
the result of an operation which is but partially understood by
the commander, since it is not his own conception?
I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at
head-quarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value
of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council
of war that such a part is absurd. The greater the number and the
higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council,
the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth
and reason, however small be the amount of dissent.
What would have been the action of a council of war to which
Napoleon proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the
Saint-Bernard, the maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The
timid would have regarded them as rash, even to madness, others
would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all
would have concurred in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary,
they had been adopted, and had been executed by any one but
Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures?
In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and
can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander,
in which case they may give him more confidence in his own
judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants,
being of his opinion, will use every means to insure the success
of the movement. This is the only advantage of a council of war,
which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no
further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should
be difference of opinion, it can only produce unfortunate
results.
[Pg 59]Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the
best means of organizing the command of an army, in default of a
general approved by experience, is—
1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in
the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger.
2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability,
of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander
there may be perfect harmony. The victor will gain so much glory
that he can spare some to the friend who has contributed to his
success. In this way Blücher, aided by Gneisenau and
Muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have been able
to do of himself. It is true that this double command is more
objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable
system.
Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another
means of influencing military operations—viz.: that of a
council of war at the seat of government—deserves notice.
Louvois for a long time directed from Paris the armies of Louis
XIV., and with success. Carnot, also, from Paris directed the
armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and saved France; in
1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired
his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and
Carnot individually controlled the armies, and that there was no
council of war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often
intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the
armies; and there has never been but one opinion in Europe as to
its fatal influence. Whether this opinion is right or wrong, the
Austrian generals alone are able to decide. My own opinion is
that the functions of such a body in this connection should be
limited to the adoption of a general plan of operations. By this
I do not mean a plan which should trace out the campaign in
detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
determine the object of the campaign, [Pg
60]the nature of the
operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to
be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the
reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if
the country be invaded. These points, it is true, should be
discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to
these points should the control of the council be limited; for if
it should not only order the general in command to march to
Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to
indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this
object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and
the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the
shoulders of those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon
themselves the duty of directing the army,—a duty so
difficult for any one, even upon the scene of operations.
FOOTNOTES:
[4]
General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder
in order to form an oblique line.
ARTICLE XV.
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of
Armies.
The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of
an army would be in vain if the government did not at the same
time cultivate a military spirit in its citizens. It may well be
the case in London, situated on an island and protected from
invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich banker
should be preferred to a military decoration; but a continental
nation imbued with the sentiments and habits of the tradesmen of
London or the bankers of Paris would sooner or later fall a prey
to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic virtues and
military spirit fostered by their institutions that the Romans
were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an
honor as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths
and Gauls, the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is
doubtless true that whatever increases the prosperity of the
country should be neither neglected nor despised; it is also
necessary to honor the branches of industry which are the first
instruments of this prosperity; but they should always
[Pg 61]be secondary to the great institutions which make
up the strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the
manly and heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this
point; for, whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more
glorious to confront death in the footsteps of the Cæsars
than to fatten upon the public miseries by gambling on the
vicissitudes of the national credit. Misfortune will certainly
fall upon the land where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the
greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public estimation, above the
uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or
fortune to the defense of his country.
The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to
invest the army with all possible social and public
consideration. The second means is to give the preference to
those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any
vacancies in the administrative departments of the government, or
even to require a certain length of military service as a
qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient
military institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia,
is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it would also be
interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern
theorists, who declare against the employment of officers of the
army in other public functions, and who wish for none but
rhetoricians in the important offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public
employments demand a special course of study; but cannot the
soldier, in the abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for
the career he would prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his
country in the profession of arms? If these administrative
offices were conferred upon officers retired from the army in a
grade not lower than that of captain, would it not be a stimulant
for officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them,
when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than in
the theaters and public clubs?
[Pg 62]It may be possible that this facility of transfer
from the military to the civil service would be rather injurious
than favorable to a high military spirit, and that to encourage
this spirit it would be expedient to place the profession of the
soldier above all others. This was the early practice of the
Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were bought at the age
of about seven years, and were educated in the idea that they
were to die by their standards. Even the English—so jealous
of their rights—contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the
obligation for the whole length of their lives, and the Russian,
in enlisting for twenty-five years, does what is almost
equivalent. In such armies, and in those recruited by voluntary
enlistments, perhaps it would not be advisable to tolerate this
fusion of military and civil offices; but where the military
service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people, the case is
different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
spirit,—particularly in this age, when the attainment of
material comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant
passion of the people.
However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
government, it will be a wise part to honor the military
profession, in order to encourage the love of glory and all the
warlike virtues, under the penalty of receiving the reproaches of
posterity and suffering insult and dependency.
It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the
people, but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in
the army. Of what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in
the land and it be regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while
the military virtues are wanting? The forces would be numerous
but without valor.
The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two
quite different things, and should not be confounded, although
they produce the same effects. The first is the effect of
passions more or less of a temporary character,—of a
political or religious nature, for instance, or of a great love
of country; while the latter, depending upon the skill of the
commander and [Pg 63]resulting from military institutions,
is more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should
be the object of the attention of every far-seeing
government.[6] Courage should be recompensed
and honored, the different grades in rank respected, and
discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions rather
than in external forms only.
The officers should feel the conviction that resignation,
bravery, and faithful attention to duty are virtues without which
no glory is possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness
amid reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in
success,—since courage alone is necessary to storm a
position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat
before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposing to
him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet with a
reward equal to that given for a great victory.
By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from
stagnation in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their
superiority over their enemies, without depreciating too much the
latter, by inspiring a love for great exploits,—in a word,
by exciting their enthusiasm by every means in harmony with their
tone of mind, by honoring courage, punishing weakness, and
disgracing cowardice,—we may expect to maintain a high
military spirit.
Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman
legions: those formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque,
buckler, and cuirass in the times of the Scipios under the
burning sun of Africa, found them too heavy in the cool climates
of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was lost.
I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great
contempt for the enemy, lest the morale of the soldier
should be shaken if he encounter an obstinate resistance.
Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes' troops, praised the Prussian
cavalry, but promised that they would contend in vain against the
bayonets of his Egyptians.
The officers and troops must be warned against those
[Pg 64]sudden panics which often seize the bravest armies
when they are not well controlled by discipline, and hence when
they do not recognize that in order is the surest hope of safety.
It was not from want of courage that one hundred thousand Turks
were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at Kagoul by
Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because
they fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army
seized with panic is similarly in a state of demoralization;
because when disorder is once introduced all concerted action on
the part of individuals becomes impossible, the voice of the
officers can no longer be heard, no maneuver for resuming the
battle can be executed, and there is no resource but in
ignominious flight.
Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to
panics; and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful
leaders can remedy it. Even the French, whose military virtues
when well led have never been questioned, have often performed
some quick movements of this kind which were highly ridiculous.
We may refer to the unbecoming panic which pervaded the infantry
of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle of Friedlingen,
in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after the
victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade,
fifteen hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon
of cavalry. Two days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond
by one of the most vigorous assaults mentioned in modern
history.
Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that
death comes more quickly and more surely to those who fly in
disorder than to those who remain together and present a firm
front to the enemy, or who rally promptly when their lines have
been for the instant broken.
In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by
all others. The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats
is due in equal degrees to the national character, the natural
instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent dis[Pg 65]ciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity of
imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of
disorder: the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the
lack of precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this
order contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the
indifference of most generals on this point. Not only did they
not deign to take the slightest precaution to give the proper
direction to small detachments or scattered men, and fail to
adopt any signals to facilitate the rallying in each division of
the fractions which may be scattered in a momentary panic or in
an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were offended that
any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still, the
most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often
be powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a
great degree obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the
different divisions. There are, it is true, cases where all human
resources are insufficient for the maintenance of order, as when
the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been so great as to
render them deaf to all appeals, and when their officers find it
impossible to do any thing to organize them,—which was the
case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these exceptional cases,
good habits of order, good logistical precautions for rallying,
and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not in
preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.
It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only
desired to trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of
subjects which are purely military.
FOOTNOTES:
[5]
For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given
to all colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the
legislature. The most venal deputies will not be those from
military life.
[6]
It is particularly important that this spirit should pervade
the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.
[Pg 66]
CHAPTER III.
STRATEGY.
DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF
WAR.
The art of war, independently of its political and moral
relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy,
Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the
Art of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches,
and begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow
the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared,
who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a
plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the necessary
details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the
formation and handling of a great army.
We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of
its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon
the character of the war: then he must carefully study the
theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations,
taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of
its allies.
The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine
the zone of operations. The general will take a first objective
point: he will select the line of operations leading to this
point, either as a temporary or permanent line, giving it the
most advantageous direction; namely, that which promises the
greatest number of favorable opportunities with the least danger.
An army marching on this line of operations will have a front of
operations and a strategic front. The temporary positions which
the corps d'armée will occupy [Pg
67]upon this front of
operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic
positions.
When near its first objective point, and when it begins to
meet resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or
maneuver to compel him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt
one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary,
may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of
operations, with which they must not be confounded.
To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is
made, lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.
If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops
in annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked
and dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against
the enemy may be carried on without reference to them. If the
second of these courses be pursued, a double strategic front and
large detachments will be the result.
The army being almost within reach of the first objective
point, if the enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if
indecisive, the fight will be resumed; if the army gains the
victory, it will secure its objective point or will advance to
attain a second. Should the first objective point be the
possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. If
the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take
a strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in
1796, which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass
Mantua to enter Austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies
within its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the
double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.
If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its
victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a
second and more important objective point.
If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a
small strategic reserve may be established, which will protect
the rear and also the depots by temporary fortifications. When
the army crosses large streams, it will [Pg
68]construct
têtes de pont; and, if the bridges are within walled
cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the means of
defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.
Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its
base, in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of
troops, or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the
occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the
enemy to halt or to divide his forces.
When winter approaches, the armies will either go into
quarters, or the field will be kept by the army which has
obtained decisive success and is desirous of profiting to the
utmost by its superiority. These winter campaigns are very trying
to both armies, but in other respects do not differ from ordinary
campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and
energy to attain prompt success.
Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will
consider it, while discussing combinations which result from
these operations.
Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:—
1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of
the different combinations of which it admits.
2. The determination of the decisive points in these
combinations, and the most favorable direction for
operations.
3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of
the zone of operations.
4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or
defensive.
5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of
operations.
6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective
point or strategic front.
7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the
different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic
reserves.
9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
[Pg 69]10. The relation between the position of depots and
the marches of the army.
11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for
an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made
and to be covered.
12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont,
&c.
13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments
necessary.
These points are principally of importance in the
determination of the first steps of a campaign; but there are
other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams,
retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters,
the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and
arrangement to strategy.
The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the
different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand
Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the
order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and
supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical
and tactical enterprises.
To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the
art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the
accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the
art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning
upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or
twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and
arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.
Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to
this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the
employment of the troops.
It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic
movements, and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but
this only occurs in the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for
the general case of pitched battles the above definition holds
good.
[Pg 70]Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local
execution, relates to the following objects:—
1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.
2. The offensive in a defensive battle.
3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers
proper for the attack of the enemy's line.
4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected
battles.
5. Surprises of armies in the open field.
6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.
7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.
8. Coups de main.
All other operations, such as relate to convoys,
foraging-parties, skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the
attack of small posts, and any thing accomplished by a detachment
or single division, may be regarded as details of war, and not
included in the great operations.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
It is proposed to show that there is one great principle
underlying all the operations of war,—a principle which
must be followed in all good combinations. It is embraced in the
following maxims:—
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army,
successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and
also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible
without compromising one's own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with
the bulk of one's forces.
3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon
the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line
which it is of the first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown
upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper
times and with energy.
This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism:
one objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the
[Pg 71]mass of the forces upon the decisive points, but
that the difficulty lies in recognizing those points.
This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the
ridiculous to enunciate such a general principle without
accompanying it with all necessary explanations for its
application upon the field. In Article
XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles
from XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to
the different combinations. Those students who, having
attentively considered what is there stated, still regard the
determination of these points as a problem without a solution,
may well despair of ever comprehending strategy.
The general theater of operations seldom contains more than
three zones,—the right, the left, and the center; and each
zone, front of operations, strategic position, and line of
defense, as well as each line of battle, has the same
subdivisions,—two extremities and the center. A direction
upon one of these three will always be suitable for the
attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction
will be wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed
in connection with the positions of the enemy and the geography
of the country, it will appear that in every strategic movement
or tactical maneuver the question for decision will always be,
whether to maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in
front. The selection of one of these three simple alternatives
cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of giving the
proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war.
Executive talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of
events are necessary to carry out any combinations previously
arranged.
We will apply this great principle to the different cases of
strategy and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty
celebrated campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most
brilliant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an
adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a neglect
of it in the other.
[Pg
72]
OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.
ARTICLE XVI.
Of the System of Operations.
War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is,
whether it shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first
explain what is meant by these terms. There are several phases of
the offensive: if against a great state, the whole or a large
portion of whose territory is attacked, it is an invasion;
if a province only, or a line of defense of moderate extent, be
assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive
is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is confined to a
single operation, it is called the taking the initiative.
In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly always
advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the morale of his
army, and generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens
that invasion excites the ardor and energy of the
adversary,—particularly when he feels that the independence
of his country is threatened.
In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and
its bad side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of
operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All
the obstacles in the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers,
defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the
inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being the
instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile. However,
if success be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital point: he
is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek a speedy
termination of the contest.
For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
initiative, the offensive is almost always advantageous,
particularly in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in
throw[Pg 73]ing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this
it will be necessary to take the initiative. The attacking party
knows what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his
masses to the point where he desires to strike. He who awaits the
attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy fall with large force
upon fractions of his force: he neither knows where his adversary
proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel him.
Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they
are less positive, since, the operations being upon a limited
field, the party taking the initiative cannot conceal them from
the enemy, who may detect his designs and by the aid of good
reserves cause them to fail.
The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising
from the obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's
line; on which account the advantages and disadvantages of the
tactical offensive are about equally balanced.
Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or
strategically from the offensive, it may not be possible to
maintain it exclusively throughout the war; for a campaign
offensive in the beginning may become defensive before it
ends.
A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely
conducted. It may be passive or active, taking the offensive at
times. The passive defense is always pernicious; the active may
accomplish great successes. The object of a defensive war being
to protect, as long as possible, the country threatened by the
enemy, all operations should be designed to retard his progress,
to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and
difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own army. He
who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on
the contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by
sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and
fatigues incident to his progress.
An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a
positive inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and
in natural or artificial barriers, the means of restoring
equality by multiplying obstacles in the way of [Pg 74]the
enemy. This plan, when not carried to an extreme, promises many
chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense
not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in his
positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his
adversary; he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and
be constantly upon the alert to improve all opportunities of
assailing the weak points of the enemy. This plan of war may be
called the defensive-offensive, and may have strategical as well
as tactical advantages.. It combines the advantages of both
systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field,
with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all the
advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success
take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to
strike.
During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War
Frederick was the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct
was a perfect model of the defensive-offensive. He was, however,
wonderfully aided in this by his adversaries, who allowed him all
the time he desired, and many opportunities of taking the
offensive with success. Wellington's course was mainly the same
in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most suitable in
his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be
alternately) these two systems, and particularly to be able to
take the initiative during the progress of a defensive war.
ARTICLE XVII.
Of the Theater of Operations.
The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which
the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to
themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn
into the war through fear or interest. When the war is also
maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres,—as has
happened in contests between France and England since the time of
Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must,
not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
other army. The theater of a con[Pg
75]tinental war between
France and Austria may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition,
comprise Germany if the German States take part therein.
Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the
whole theater of operations may be considered as a single field
upon which strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a
definite end. In the second case each army will have its own
independent theater of operations. The theater of
operations of an army embraces all the territory it may
desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to defend. If
the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it
be in danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that
no concert of action has been arranged with the armies operating
on the other fields. If, on the contrary, there be concert of
action, the theater of operations of each army taken singly is
but a zone of operations of the general field, occupied by the
masses for the attainment of a common object.
Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon
which one or more armies operate is composed, for both parties,
as follows:—
1. Of a fixed base of operations.
2. Of a principal objective point.
3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of
defense.
4. Of zones and lines of operations.
5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of
communications.
6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to
oppose to the enemy.
7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is
important, either for the offensive or defensive.
8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the
objective point and the primary base.
9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.
For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading
Austria with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one
commander, and starting from Mayence, from the Upper [Pg 76]Rhine,
from Savoy or the Maritime Alps, respectively. The section of
country which each of these armies traverses may be considered as
a zone of the general field of operations. But if the army of
Italy goes but to the Adige without concerted action with the
army of the Rhine, then what was before but a zone becomes for
that army a theater of operations.
In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own
objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the
objective point with the base, either in the offensive or the
defensive.
It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of
operations par excellence. Now, as such a line must
possess two or three roads to move the army within the range of
its operations, and at least one line of retreat, rivers have
been called lines of retreat, and even lines of maneuver. It
would be much more accurate to say that rivers are excellent
lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of
a good line of operations, but never the line itself.
It has also been maintained that, could one create a country
expressly to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be
avoided, because they facilitate invasion. Every country has its
capital, its rich cities for manufactures or trade; and, in the
very nature of things, these points must be the centers of
converging routes. Could Germany be made a desert, to be molded
into a theater of war at the pleasure of an individual,
commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and the
roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by
the use of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more
favorable for defense than attack, since two divisions retreating
upon these radial lines can effect a junction more quickly than
two armies which are pursuing, and they may thus united defeat
each of the pursuing masses separately.
Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound
in strategic positions; others have maintained that, [Pg 77]on the
contrary, these points are more rare among the Alps than in the
plains, but also that if more rare they are more important and
more decisive.
Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains
are, in war, inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in
speaking of the Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass
wherever a man could put his foot."
Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare
have united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great
difficulty of carrying on a defensive war in such localities
unless the advantages of partisan and regular warfare can be
combined, the first to guard the heights and to harass the enemy,
the second to give battle at the decisive points,—the
junctions of the large valleys.
These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show
the reader that, so far from the art having reached perfection,
there are many points that admit of discussion.
The most important topographical or artificial features which
make up the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this
chapter, be examined as to their strategic value; but here it may
be proper to remark that this value will depend much upon the
spirit and skill of the general. The great leader who crossed the
Saint-Bernard and ordered the passage of the Splugen was far from
believing in the impregnability of these chains; but he was also
far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and a walled inclosure
could change his destiny at Waterloo.
ARTICLE XVIII.
Bases of Operations.
A base of operations is the portion of country from which the
army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it
starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when
necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to
cover the country defensively.
The base of operations is most generally that of
supply,—though not necessarily so, at least as far as food
is concerned; as, for instance, a French army upon the Elbe might
be sub[Pg 78]sisted from Westphalia or Franconia, but its real
base would certainly be upon the Rhine.
When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers,
it may be alternately either an excellent base for offensive
operations, or a line of defense when the state is invaded. In
the latter case it will always be prudent to have a second base
in rear; for, although an army in its own country will everywhere
find a point of support, there is still a vast difference between
those parts of the country without military positions and means,
as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those other
portions where these military resources are found; and these
latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An
army may have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a
French army in Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it
may have others beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent
lines of defense; but if it is driven back across the Rhine it
will have for a base either the Meuse or the Moselle: it might
have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth upon the Loire.
These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel
to the first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may
become necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might
find a good base on Béfort or Besançon, on
Mézières or Sedan, as the Russian army after the
evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern
provinces. These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of
defense are often decisive in preventing the enemy from
penetrating to the heart of the country, or at least in rendering
it impossible for him to maintain himself there. A base upon a
broad and rapid river, both banks being held by strong works,
would be as favorable as could be desired.
The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be
in covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the
army off from it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier
cannot have so favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose
capital is more retired.
A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified
points [Pg 79]of sufficient capacity for the establishment of
depots of supply. There should be a tête de pont
upon each of its unfordable streams.
All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other
points opinions have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect
base is one parallel to that of the enemy. My opinion is that
bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are more advantageous,
particularly such as have two sides almost perpendicular to each
other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a double
base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides
of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart,
and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.
The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great
Military Operations:—
"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have
a great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations,
and, consequently, upon the direction of the bases.
Fig. 1.
"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four
[Pg 80]faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at
the opening of the campaign, may hold one of these
faces,—perhaps two,—while the enemy occupies the
other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable obstacles. The
different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely
different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the theater
of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and that of
Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1, p. 79. In the first
case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the line of the Weser
and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of the Main and the
base of the French army, A C the line of the Rhine, also guarded
by French troops. The French held two faces, the North Sea being
the third; and hence it was only necessary for them, by
maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four faces,
including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the
lines of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.
"The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by
Halle and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea,
represented by the side A B. The result is well known.
"The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give
them such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy
without losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended
position, and the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects
the communications with the base C D; and this is exactly the
maneuvers of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena.
Fig. 2.
"When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is
always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its
frontiers and closes one side of the square. This may not be an
obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be
considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to
retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an [Pg 81]advantage to force the enemy upon it. The soil of a
power which can bring into the field one hundred and fifty or two
hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if
a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut
off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of war should
be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this
theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the
frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,—as was the case with the Prussian army in
1806, with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the
lines of the Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous
frontier of Franconia."
The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the
truth of my opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base
to that of the French army which enabled the [Pg 82]allies
to neutralize the immense advantages which the line of the Elbe
would otherwise have afforded Napoleon, and turned the advantages
of the campaign in their favor. Likewise, in 1812, by
establishing their base perpendicularly upon the Oka and Kalouga,
the Russians were able to execute their flank march upon Wiazma
and Krasnoi.
If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it
will only be necessary to consider that, if the base be
perpendicular to that of the enemy, the front of operations will
be parallel to his line of operations, and that hence it will be
easy to attack his communications and line of retreat.
It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly
favorable in the case of a double frontier, as in the last
figures. Critics may object to this that it does not agree with
what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are salient
toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with
equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a
salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of
operations. On the other hand, a base with two faces by no means
requires that both should be occupied in force: on the contrary,
upon one of them it will be sufficient to have some fortified
points garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the
force rests upon the other face,—as was done in the
campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety degrees
formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions
by his left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the
attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine
divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward
Schaffhausen, which carried him in a few days to the gates of
Augsburg, the two detached divisions having already rejoined
him.
In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and
Main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier
upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his
forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and
[Pg 83]thus intercepted the Prussians at Gera and Naumburg
by reaching their line of retreat.
If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one
of them being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the
best, it is well to recollect that, in default of such a base,
its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of strategic
front, as will be seen in Article
XX.
Another very important point in reference to the proper
direction of bases relates to those established on the sea-coast.
These bases may be favorable in some circumstances, but are
equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what
precedes. The danger which must always exist of an army being
driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of the
establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our
day praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to
the relief of Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better
base than that of Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of
Torres-Vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on
the land side. The sea and the Tagus not only protected both
flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible line of
retreat, which was upon the fleet.
Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of
Torres-Vedras secured for the English, and not tracing effects to
their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend
that no bases are good except such as rest on the sea and thus
afford the army facilities of supply and refuge with both flanks
secured. Fascinated by similar notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas
asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to have posted half of his
army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on
the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that the first
precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon the
front farthest from the sea, so as to secure the benefit
of all its elements of strength, from which it might find itself
cut off if the base were established upon the coast.
An insular and naval power acting on the continent would
pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the
[Pg 84]same principle, viz.: to establish the base upon
those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of
the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat.
A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control
the sea adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an
army of forty or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its
retreat by sea and its supplies could be well assured; but to
establish a continental army of one hundred and fifty thousand
men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined and nearly
equal force, would be an act of madness.
However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in
which it may be admissible to base a continental army upon the
sea: it is, when your adversary is not formidable upon land, and
when you, being master of the sea, can supply the army with more
facility than in the interior. We rarely see these conditions
fulfilled: it was so, however, during the Turkish war of 1828 and
1829. The whole attention of the Russians was given to Varna and
Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan which they
could not have pursued in the presence of a European army (even
with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to
decide upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well
conducted. The army covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of
Brailoff, Varna, and Silistria, and afterward by preparing a
depot at Sizeboli. As soon as its base was well established it
moved upon Adrianople, which previously would have been madness.
Had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army
not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
terminated with the first campaign.
Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon
our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there
are eventual or temporary bases, which result from the operations
in the enemy's country; but, as these are rather temporary points
of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in
Article XXIII.
[Pg 85]
ARTICLE XIX.
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of
War, and Objective Points of Operations.
Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some
receive this title simply from their position, which gives them
all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic
points. Others have a value from the relations they bear to the
positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the
enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are
strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there
are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called
DECISIVE strategic points.
Every point of the theater of war which is of military
importance, whether from its position as a center of
communication, or from the presence of military establishments or
fortifications, is a geographical strategic point.
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not
necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a
contemplated operation. I think differently; for a strategic
point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far
distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may
be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and
thus acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more
accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily
decisive points.
Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or
from their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may
be subdivided as follows,—viz.: geographic lines which by
their permanent importance belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and
those which have value merely because they connect two strategic
points.
[Pg 86]To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of
strategic lines in their relations to maneuvers,—confining
ourselves here to what relates to the decisive and objective
points of the zone of operations upon which enterprises
occur.
Although these are most intimately connected, since every
objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive
points of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction
between them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time
the objective of operations. We will, then, define the first, in
order to be more easily guided in our selection of the
second.
I think the name of decisive strategic point should be
given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked
influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single
enterprise. All points whose geographical position and whose
natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a
front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this
number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance
the first rank among them.
The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds.
The first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is
permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country.
For example, take the case of the French in Belgium: whoever is
master of the line of the Meuse will have the greatest advantages
in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being
outflanked and inclosed between the Meuse and the North Sea, will
be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel
to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the
Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it
to be looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
Those points the possession of which would give the control of
the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief
lines of communication in a country are also decisive
[Pg 87]geographic points. For instance, Lyons is an
important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the
Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications
between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it
would not be a decisive point unless well fortified or
possessing an extended camp with têtes de pont.
Leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at
the junction of all the communications of Northern Germany. Were
it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would
be almost the key of the country,—if a country has a key,
or if this expression means more than a decisive point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that
they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats
of power and government.
In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only
routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive
in reference to any enterprise in this country. It is well known
how great was the importance of the defile of Bard, protected by
a single small fort, in 1800.
The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of
maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both
sides.
When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the
Russian army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack
upon him was Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries
gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and
also from the army intended to support him. On the contrary,
Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same position, expected no aid
from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army of
Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by
Schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of
operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his
supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the
Main. In the same campaign the first objective point of Napoleon
was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the Saint-Bernard,
and to seize his line of communications: hence Saint-Bernard,
Ivrea, and Piacenza were [Pg
88]decisive points only
by reason of the march of Mélas upon Nice.
It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive
points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if
his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his
base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same
danger. The flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred,
because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the
sea. The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and
inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be
made to cut it off from the fleet.
If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much
extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that,
his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and
the fractions may be crushed separately.
The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined
by,—
1. The features of the ground.
2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate
strategic aim.
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on
battles.
OBJECTIVE POINTS.
There are two classes of objective points,—objective
points of maneuver, and geographical objective
points. A geographical objective point may be an important
fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which
affords good lines of defense or good points of support for
ulterior enterprises. Objective points of maneuver, in
contradistinction to geographical objectives, derive their
importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation
of the hostile masses.
In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the
objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the
possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose
loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion
the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. [Pg 89]However, the geographical position of the capital,
the political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors,
and their respective resources, are considerations foreign in
themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately
connected with plans of operations, and may decide whether an
army should attempt or not to occupy the hostile capital. If it
be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might
be a part of the front of operations or line of defense where an
important fort is situated, the possession of which would render
safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For instance,
if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to
gain possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital,
being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal
objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as
the defense of a first line and of the first base of operations.
Thus, for a French army reduced to the defensive behind the
Rhine, the first objective would be to prevent the passage of the
river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in Alsace if the
enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in
besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first
base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,—which might
be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
As to the objective points of maneuvers,—that is,
those which relate particularly to the destruction or
decomposition of the hostile forces,—their importance may
be seen by what has already been said. The greatest talent of a
general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in
the good choice of these points. This was the most conspicuous
merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by
the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of an
adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the
hostile army,—since states and provinces fall of themselves
when there is no organized force to protect them. [Pg 90]To
detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the
different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the
forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to
be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the
enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if
his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he
could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to
cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy
his forces,—such was the system followed by Napoleon in his
first campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of
the very best.
When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long
distances and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not
so successful as in Germany: however, it must be remembered that,
if this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions,
or circumstances, its chances of success are still very great,
and it is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the system; but
this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is
assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the
respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining
states.
The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations
are almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive
points, and in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
of operations.
As to the choice of objective points, every thing will
generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which
political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon
the military facilities of the two parties.
In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all
risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial
advantages,—such as the capture of a few towns or the
possession of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party
has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great
dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as
did Napoleon.
The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army
whose only object is the siege of Antwerp. For [Pg 91]very
different reasons, they could not be recommended to the French
army beyond the Niemen, five hundred leagues from its frontiers,
because there would be much more to be lost by failure than a
general could reasonably hope to gain by success.
There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned,
which are determined more from political than from strategic
considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and
influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be
called political objective points.
Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship
and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military
enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end,
sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. They
frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy. We
cite two examples. First, the expedition of the Duke of York to
Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused
their failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military
view. The expedition of the same prince to Holland in
1799—likewise due to the views of the English cabinet,
sustained by the intentions of Austria on Belgium—was not
less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke Charles from
Zurich upon Manheim,—a step quite contrary to the interests
of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
illustrations prove that political objective points should be
subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has
been attained.
This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would
be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one
which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either
the political objective points should be selected according to
the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be
postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign.
Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will be seen
that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799;
in other words, by uniting all the strength [Pg 92]of the
allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the
frontiers. Expeditions of this kind are generally included in
grand diversions,—to be treated of in a separate
article.
FOOTNOTES:
[7]
I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,—since
a line cannot be a point, and yet I apply to lines the
name of decisive or objective points. It seems almost useless to
remark that objective points are not geometric points, but
that the name is a form of expression used to designate the
object which an army desires to attain.
[8]
This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have
nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.
ARTICLE XX.
Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and
Strategic Positions.
There are some parts of the military science that so closely
resemble each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are
frequently confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such
are fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of
defense, and strategic positions. It is proposed in
this article to show the distinction between them and to expose
their relations to each other.
FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.
When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations,
they generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the
front occupied toward the enemy is called the strategic
front. The portion of the theater of war from which an enemy
can probably reach this front in two or three marches is called
the front of operations.
The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many
military men to confound them, sometimes under one name and
sometimes under the other.
Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates
that formed by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the
army, while the other embraces the space separating the two
armies, and extends one or two marches beyond each extremity of
the strategic front, and includes the ground upon which the
armies will probably come in collision.
When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of
commencing, one of the armies will decide to await the attack of
the other, and will undertake to prepare a line of defense, which
may be either that of the strategic front or more to the rear.
Hence the strategic front and line of defense may [Pg 93]coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and
French, and at the same time their strategic front and front of
operations. This occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless
leads persons to confound them, while they are really very
different. An army has not necessarily a line of defense, as, for
example, when it invades: when its masses are concentrated in a
single position, it has no strategic front, but it is never
without a front of operations.
The two following examples will illustrate the difference
between the different terms.
At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of
operations extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence
it ran along the line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau,
(his right being at Löwenberg,) and followed along the
frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His forces were stationed on this
grand front in four masses, whose strategic positions were
interior and central and presented three different faces.
Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line of
defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a
bend to the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg
were beyond the strategic field, and it would have been fatal for
him to have extended his operations to these points.
The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His
front of operations here really extended from the mountains of
Bergamo to the Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was
upon the Adige, between Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was
upon the Mincio, between Peschiera and Mantua, while his
strategic front varied according to his positions.
The front of operations being the space which separates the
two armies, and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel
to the base of operations. The strategic front will have the same
direction, and ought to be perpendicular to the principal line of
operations, and to extend far enough on either flank to cover
this line well. However, this direction may vary, either on
account of projects that are formed, or on [Pg 94]account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite
frequently happens that it is necessary to have a front
perpendicular to the base and parallel to the original line of
operations. Such a change of strategic front is one of the most
important of all grand maneuvers, for by this means the control
of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving
the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a base
with two faces. (See Art.
XVIII.)
The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau
illustrates these points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw
and Thorn, which made the Vistula a temporary base: the front
became parallel to the Narew, from whence he set out, supported
by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka, to maneuver by his right and
throw the Russians on Elbing and the Baltic. In such cases, if a
point of support in the new direction can be obtained, the
strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It ought
to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other
words, that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic
front, and should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the
Narew by Allenstein upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and
farther from the front of the army the tête de pont
of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications were safe, while
Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line parallel to
the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown back
upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon
Jena and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his
right upon Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and
France, and thereby forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp
at Ulm.
The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular
to the base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few
days' duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to
profit by important advantages afforded by certain localities, to
strike decisive blows, or to procure for [Pg 95]the
army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which
would be almost equivalent to a real base.
It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double
strategic front, either by the features of the theater of war, or
because every line of offensive operations requires protection on
its flanks. As an example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey
and Spain may be cited. In order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro,
an army would be obliged to present a double front,—in the
first case, to face the valley of the Danube; in the second, to
confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less
degree, the same precaution. A French army in the valley of the
Danube will require a double front as soon as the Austrians have
thrown sufficient troops into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise
to any anxiety. Those countries which present a narrow frontier
to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the
frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be
cut off and captured. This necessity of double strategic fronts
is one of the most serious inconveniences of an offensive war,
since it requires large detachments, which are always dangerous.
(See Article XXXVI.)
Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a
national or intestine war the whole country is the scene of
hostilities. Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having
a defined aim would have its own strategic front determined by
the features of the country and the positions occupied by the
large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in Catalonia and Massena
in Portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some
other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
LINES OF DEFENSE.
Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical.
Strategical lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1.
Permanent lines of defense, which are a part of the defensive
system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier; 2.
[Pg 96]Eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the
temporary position of an army.
The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such
as ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the
range of the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of
defense, since the practicable passes are guarded by forts which
would prove great obstacles in the way of an army, and since the
outlets of the gorges in the valleys of Piedmont are protected by
large fortresses. The Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe may also be
considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the
important forts found upon them.
Every river of any considerable width, every range of
mountains, and every defile, having their weak points covered by
temporary fortifications, may be regarded as eventual lines of
defense, both strategic and tactical, since they may arrest
for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to
deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker
point,—in which case the advantage is evidently strategic.
If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an
army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally
and artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On
the other hand, this advantage must not be considered
unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions
which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may be
the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain
that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the
attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In addition to this, since a
position naturally very strong[10] is difficult of access it
will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an
inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets.
This [Pg 97]happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
Wurmser in Mantua.
STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
There is a disposition of armies to which the name of
strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical
positions or positions for battle.
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which
are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of
operations than would be covered in an actual battle. All
positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions
of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of
this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and
Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in Saxony
and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium
before the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the
Limmat and Aar in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter
quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected
by an armistice, are strategic positions,—for instance,
Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily positions taken up by
an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread
out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this
class.
This class also includes positions occupied by an army to
cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army
for the purposes of observation. The different positions taken up
on a line of defense, the positions of detachments on a double
front of operations, the position of a detachment covering a
siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on another point,
are all strategic. Indeed, all large detachments or fractions of
an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions.
The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since
fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally
depend upon a multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite
variety.
[Pg 98]In every case, the first general rule is that the
communications with the different points of the line of
operations be thoroughly assured.
In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and
lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front
formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of
support. The points of support on the strategic front are called
pivots of operations, and are practical temporary bases,
but quite different from pivots of maneuver. For example, in 1796
Verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all Napoleon's
enterprises about Mantua for eight months. In 1813 Dresden was
his pivot.
Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard
points which it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army
proceeds to the fulfillment of some important end; and when this
is accomplished the pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus,
Ney's corps was the pivot of Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth
and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line of retreat. A pivot of
operations, on the contrary, is a material point of both
strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of support
and endures throughout a campaign.
The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it
should be as short as possible, in order to be covered with
facility by the army if it is compelled to take the defensive. It
is also important that the extent of the strategic front should
not be so great as to prevent the prompt concentration of the
fractions of the army upon an advantageous point.
The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations;
for if it be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on
the offensive to make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce
great results, since a short front could be easily covered by the
defensive army. Neither should the front of operations be too
extended. Such a front is unsuitable for offensive operations, as
it would give the enemy, if not a good line of defense, at least
ample space to escape from the results of a strategic maneuver
even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful operations of Marengo,
Ulm, and Jena could not [Pg
99]have produced the
same results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the
Russian War in 1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his
line of retreat, could have found another by adopting a new zone
of operations.
The essential conditions for every strategic position are that
it should be more compact than the forces opposed, that all
fractions of the army should have sure and easy means of
concentrating, free from the intervention of the enemy. Thus, for
forces nearly equal, all central or interior positions would be
preferable to exterior ones, since the front in the latter case
would necessarily be more extended and would lead to a dangerous
division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part of the
troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders
possible rapid concentration at different and successive points
of the front.
An army should never long occupy any strategic point without
making selection of one or two tactical positions, for the
purpose of there concentrating all the disposable force, and
giving battle to the enemy when he shall have unveiled his
designs. In this manner Napoleon prepared the fields of Rivoli
and Austerlitz, Wellington that of Waterloo, and the Archduke
Charles that of Wagram.
When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general
should be careful that the front be not too extended. A
disposition which might be called the strategic square seems
best, presenting three nearly-equal faces, so that the distance
to be passed over would be about equal for all the divisions in
concentrating upon the common center to receive an attack.
Every strategic line of defense should always possess a
tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy
cross the strategic front. For instance, an army guarding a bank
of a river, not being able to occupy in force the whole line,
ought always to have a position in rear of the center selected,
upon which to collect all his divisions, so as to oppose them
united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting a
passage.
For an army entering a country with the purpose either of
[Pg 100]subjugation or of temporary occupation, it would
always be prudent, however brilliant may have been its earlier
successes, to prepare a line of defense as a refuge in case of
reverse. This remark is made to complete the subject: the lines
themselves are intimately connected with temporary bases, and
will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)
FOOTNOTES:
[9]
This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.
[10]
It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the
chapter devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article
XXX.)
ARTICLE XXI.
Zones and Lines of Operations.
A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole
theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the
attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert
with other and secondary armies. For example, in the plan of
campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the right, Bavaria that
of the center, Franconia that of the left army.
A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single
line of operations, either on account of the configuration
of the country, or of the small number of practicable routes for
an army found therein. Generally, however, a zone presents
several lines of operations, depending partly upon the
plans of the campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of
communication existing in the theater of operations.
It is not to be understood from this that every road is of
itself a line of operations,—though doubtless it may
happen that any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become
for the time-being such a line; but as long as it is only
traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the
principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of
operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
the same front of operations, and separated by one or two
marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations, but,
being the communications of the different divisions of the same
army, the whole space bounded by them would constitute but a
single line.
The term zone of operations is applied to a large
fraction of the general theater of war; the term lines of
operations will designate the part of this fraction embraced
by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single or
several routes, the [Pg 101]term strategic lines will
apply to those important lines which connect the decisive points
of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name
to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these
decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which
requires a temporary deviation from the principal line of
operations. Lines of communications designate the
practicable routes between the different portions of the army
occupying different positions throughout the zone of
operations.
For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the
Grand Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one
Bavaria, and another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country
between Dresden, Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of
operations of the mass of the forces. This zone had three
lines of operations leading to Leipsic as an objective:
the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading from the
mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic; the
second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of
Bernadotte from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point.
Each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent parallel
routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of
operations as roads. The principal line of operations is that
followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of
provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over
which, if compelled, it would retreat.
If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
combinations, since there can never be more than two or three
zones on each theater, and the advantages generally result from
the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of
operations, as they are divided into different classes, according
to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to
the communications upon the strategic field, and to the
enterprises projected by the commander.
Simple lines of operations are those of an army acting
from [Pg 102]a frontier when it is not subdivided into large
independent bodies.
Double lines of operations are those of two independent
armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly
equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are
widely separated in distance and for long intervals of
time.[11]
Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one
or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a
direction that the general can concentrate the masses and
maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it
would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater
force.[12] Exterior lines lead
to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which
operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against
several of his masses.
Concentric lines of operations are those which depart
from [Pg 103]widely-separated points and meet at the same
point, either in advance of or behind the base.
Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave
a given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines,
of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army.
There are also deep lines, which are simply long
lines.
The term maneuver-lines I apply to momentary strategic
lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which
are by no means to be confounded with the real lines of
operations.
Secondary lines are those of two armies acting so as to
afford each other mutual support,—as, in 1796, the army of
the Sambre and Meuse was secondary to the army of the Rhine, and,
in 1812, the army of Bagration was secondary to that of
Barclay.
Accidental lines are those brought about by events
which change the original plan and give a new direction to
operations. These are of the highest importance. The proper
occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great and
active mind.
There may be, in addition, provisional and
definitive lines of operations. The first designate the
line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive enterprise,
after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or
direct line. They seem to belong as much to the class of
temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines of
operations.
These definitions show how I differ from those authors who
have preceded me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no
other importance than that arising from their relations to the
depots of the army: the latter has even asserted that when an
army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of
operations.
The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us
suppose two armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in
advance of Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and
that their large depots are immediately behind the
river,—certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous
position for them which could possibly be adopted. These armies
will [Pg 104]have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the
different proposed enterprises.
1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their
positions, will extend to the second line which they are to
cover, and they would both be cut off from this second line
should the enemy establish himself in the interval which
separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] had possessed a year's
supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off
from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
occupied the line of the Po.
2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he
concentrated his forces to defeat these armies successively; it
would be a double exterior line, and the enemy's a double
interior, if the latter divided his forces into two masses,
giving them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all
his forces before the two armies first referred to could
unite.
Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that
an army on its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line
of operations than when on foreign ground; for it finds in every
direction points of support and some of the advantages which are
sought for in the establishment of lines of operations; it may
even lose its line of operations without incurring great danger;
but that is no reason why it has no line of operations.
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION.
At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle,
Prussia and Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and
Italy was included in the theater of war only for purposes of
reciprocal observation, it being too remote for decisive
enterprises in view of the end proposed. The real theater
[Pg 105]extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised
three zones of operations,—the first reaching along the
Rhine from Huningue to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the
center consisting of the interval between the Meuse and Moselle;
the third and left was the frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to
prevent a union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred
thousand men in the zones just described, while Austria had but
thirty-five thousand in Belgium. It is quite impossible to
understand why the French did not conquer this country, when no
effectual resistance could have been made. Four months intervened
between the declaration of war and the concentration of the
allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion of Belgium
would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the King
of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced
him not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of
imposing upon France another form of government?
When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of
July, the French were no longer able to invade. This
rôle was reserved for the allies; and it is well
known how they acquitted themselves.
The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and
fifteen thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one
hundred and forty leagues and divided into five corps
d'armée, and could not make a good defense; for to
paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was only
necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and
could only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line
between the Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less
fortified than the rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the
allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a
base. They wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the execution
was not equal to the conception.
The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for
family reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a
reverse might subject her provinces. For some [Pg 106]reason, difficult to understand, Austria
co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on
the Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she
afterward displayed? and what more useful disposition could have
been made of them than to protect the flanks of the invading
army? This remarkable conduct on the part of Austria, which cost
her so much, may account for the resolution of Prussia to retire
at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very
moment when she should have entered it. During the campaign the
Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for success.
They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a
more serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have
had all the advantage of a concentrated force against several
scattered divisions, and could have prevented their junction and
overthrown them separately. Frederick the Great would have
justified the remark of Dumouriez at Grandpré,—that,
if his antagonist had been the great king, he (Dumouriez) would
already have been driven behind Châlons.
The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still
imbued with the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every
point in order to guard every point.
The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the
Moselle and Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of
losing a village, and how their system led to large detachments,
which are frequently the ruin of armies.
Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting
the strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the
whole length of a frontier to prevent invasion,—which was
exactly the means of rendering invasion upon every point
feasible.
I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez
foolishly abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to
transfer the theater from the center to the extreme left of the
general field. Moreover, he was unable to perceive the great
results rendered possible by this movement, but at[Pg 107]tacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in
front, while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have
thrown it back upon the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and
have destroyed it entirely in a more successful battle than that
of Jemmapes.
The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a
faulty direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious,
and recovered Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended
his front of operations to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the
conduct of the allies deserves praise: the desire of reconquering
these rich provinces justified this enterprise, which, moreover,
was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the long
front of Dumouriez. But after the French had been driven back
under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable
to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a few
towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the
destitution of the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered,
can the parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in
Flanders be understood?
Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the
capital are particularly advantageous. Under the government of a
powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point
is the head-quarters of the army; but under a weak prince, in a
republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the capital is
generally the center of national power.[14] If this is ever doubtful,
it was not so on this occasion. Paris was France, and this to
such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had risen against
the government which oppressed them. If, after having beaten the
French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and
the Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the
Sarre, and the [Pg 108]Moselle, in concert with the
Prussians and a part of the useless army of the Upper Rhine, a
force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with its flanks
protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It is
even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have
performed the duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while
the bulk of the army pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces.
After gaining several victories, however, two hundred thousand
men were engaged in carrying on a few sieges and were not gaining
a foot of ground. While they threatened France with invasion,
they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of troops, defensively, to
cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes and Mayence
capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon the
camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
side and Landau on the other.
It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest
efforts in the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the
general field, they should have shifted them afterward to the
extreme left, so that while the allies were operating in Flanders
they were in no manner seconded or aided by the imposing army
upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this army took up the
offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the Sambre. Do not
these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and Broglie in
1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?
In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French
from a painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The
combinations of this campaign were doubtless well considered; but
it is wrong to represent them as forming a new system of war. To
be convinced of this, it is only necessary to observe that the
respective positions of the armies in this campaign and in that
of 1757 were almost identical, and the direction of the
operations is quite the same. The French had four corps, which
constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
divisions, which composed two armies.
These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading
[Pg 109]on Brussels, as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted
in 1757 on Prague. The only difference between the two plans is
that the Austrian troops in Flanders were not so much scattered
as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this difference is certainly
not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position of the North Sea
was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank the
Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass
of the enemy,—a direction as dangerous and faulty as could
be given to great operations. This movement was the same as that
of Benningsen on the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian
army in 1807. The fate of the Prussian army, cut off from its
communications and forced upon the Baltic, is another proof of
this truth.
If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could
easily have made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver,
which was performed a month before Jourdan was prepared to follow
it up.
The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the
offensive was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one
hundred and six battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons;
upon its right flank Flanders was covered by the corps
d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon the left Charleroi was
covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of a battle
before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis was
found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only twelve
battalions were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and
after the French were known to have been successful, the corps of
the Duke of York marched to Clairfayt's relief; but what was the
use of the remainder of the army before Landrecies, after it was
obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? The Prince of
Coburg threw away all the advantages of his central position, by
allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and to beat all his
large detachments in detail.
Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a
part having been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If,
instead of dividing this grand army, it had been directed upon
Turcoing, there would have been concentrated there one
[Pg 110]hundred battalions and one hundred and forty
squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
between the sea and two fortresses?
The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the
radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The
diversion on Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not
arrive at Charleroi till the 3d of June,—more than a month
afterward. Here was a splendid opportunity for the Austrians to
profit by their central position. If the Prussian army had
maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by its
left,—that is, both upon the Meuse,—the state of
affairs would have been different. By establishing themselves in
the center of a line of scattered forces they could have
prevented the junction of the different fractions. It may be
dangerous in a battle to attack the center of a close line of
troops when it can be simultaneously sustained by the wings and
the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of three
hundred miles in extent.
In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the
principal theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to
Italy,—which opened a new field of glory for the French
arms. Their lines of operations in this campaign were double;
they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Clairfayt,
wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces alternately
upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in the
lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the
Sambre and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and
brought Pichegru back to Landau.
In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from
those of 1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different
results. The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse,
set out from the extremities of the base, on routes converging to
the Danube. As in 1794, they were exterior lines. The Archduke
Charles, more skillful than the Prince of Coburg, profited by his
interior lines by concentrating his forces at a point nearer than
that expected by the French. He then seized the instant when the
Danube [Pg 111]covered the corps of Latour, to steal several
marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the battle
of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
Moreau to retreat.
Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His
plan is to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He
succeeds by the battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two
exterior strategic lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi
and Lodi. A formidable army is collected in the Tyrol to raise
the siege of Mantua: it commits the error of marching there in
two bodies separated by a lake. The lightning is not quicker than
Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons every thing before
Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the first
column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same
ground, and is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire
into the Tyrol to keep up its communications with the right.
Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the
two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, after having
overwhelmed and thrown the first back upon the Lavis, changes
direction by the right, debouches by the gorges of the Brenta
upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to take
refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for
having formed two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have
three upon the Rhine and the Danube. The army on the left
observes the Lower Rhine, that of the center marches upon the
Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia, being occupied by
a third army as strong as both the others. The three armies
could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn, eighty
leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal
forces: he unites them against the center, which he defeats at
Stockach, and the army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate
the Grisons and Eastern Switzerland. The allies in turn commit
the same fault: instead of following up their success on this
central line, which cost them so [Pg
112]dearly afterward,
they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine.
The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the other
trifles at Manheim.
In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which
leaves thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples,
while upon the Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or
received, their force is too weak and meets with terrible
reverses. When the army of Naples returns to the North, it
commits the error of adopting a strategic direction opposed to
Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central position, from
which he derives full profit, marches against this army and beats
it, while some leagues from the other.
In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is
again changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of
lines of operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march
upon the two flanks of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the
Danube and the other upon the Po. This insures the conquest of
vast regions. Modern history affords no similar combination. The
French armies are upon interior lines, affording reciprocal
support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt an exterior
line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. By a
skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve
cuts off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time
preserving its own relations with its base and with the army of
the Rhine, which forms its secondary line.
Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows
the respective situations of the two parties. A and A A indicate
the front of operations of the armies of the Rhine and of the
reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and Mélas; C C C C, the
passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of
retreat of Mélas; H J K, the French divisions preserving
their line of retreat. It may thus be seen that Mélas is
cut off from his base, and that, on the contrary, the French
general runs no risk, since he preserves all his communications
with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
[Pg 113]
Fig. 3.
THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.
To illustrate Maxim 3 on the direction of Lines of
Operations.
The French army moves from its base on the Main, concentrates
in g g, behind the mountains of Franconia; then it
executes a change of stratigic front (h i) in order to cut
off the Prussians (k k from their base on the Elbe, still
preserving its own communications (h g e).
If the Prussians throw themselves between k and
e, they open to the French their direct communications
with the Rhine (m m m).
[Pg 114] The analysis of the memorable events just
sketched shows clearly the importance of a proper selection of
lines of maneuver in military operations. Indeed, discretion on
this point may repair the disasters of defeat, destroy the
advantages of an adversary's victory, render his invasion futile,
or assure the conquest of a province.
By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most
noted campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations
which have led to success have been established in conformity to
the fundamental principle already alluded to,—viz.: that
simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into
action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a
stronger force than the enemy. The student may also satisfy
himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and
permits fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as
well as from that of many others, the following maxims
result:—
1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the
decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible
force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary
means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental
idea in a good plan of a campaign. Napoleon proved this by the
direction he gave his armies in 1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on
Gera,—maneuvers that cannot be too much studied by military
men.
Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole
campaign. The objective point will be determined upon in advance,
the general plan to be followed to attain it, and the first
enterprise to be undertaken for this end: what is to follow will
depend upon the result of this first operation and the new phases
it may develop.
2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the
geographical situation of the theater of operations, but still
more upon the position of the hostile masses upon this
stra[Pg 115]tegic field. In every case, however, it must be
directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. Only
when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating would it be
otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the two
extremities at the same time.[15]
It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy
divide his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the
maneuver-line will be upon his center, but in every other case,
when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the
flanks, and then upon the rear of his line of defense or front of
operations.
The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the
opportunity it affords of taking the line of defense in reverse
than from the fact that by using it the assailant has to contend
with but a part of the enemy's force. Thus, the army of the Rhine
in 1800, gaining the extreme left of the line of defense of the
Black Forest, caused it to yield almost without an effort. This
army fought two battles on the right bank of the Danube, which,
although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction of the
line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by
the Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of
Mélas were still more brilliant.
3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations
is gained, it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by
so doing the assailant in many cases will lose his own
communications. To avoid this danger, the line of operations
should have a geographic and strategic direction, such that the
army will always find either to its rear or to the right or left
a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take advantage of either
of these flank lines of retreat would require a change of
direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)
The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the
[Pg 116]most important qualities of a general. The
importance of a direction is illustrated by these examples.
If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had
marched upon Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo
without having previously protected himself on the side of
Lombardy and of the left bank of the Po, he would have been more
thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat than Mélas
from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points of
Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means
of regaining the Var or the Valais.
In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic,
and had there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he
would have been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of
Brunswick from the Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the
direction of Weimar he placed his front before the three roads of
Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof, which thus became well-covered lines
of communication. If the Prussians had endeavored to cut him off
from these lines by moving between Gera and Baireuth, they would
have opened to him his most natural line,—the excellent
road from Leipsic to Frankfort,—as well as the two roads
which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even
Wesel.
4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same
frontier: such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of
large coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too
numerous to act upon the same zone of operations; and even in
this case it would be better to have all the forces under the
same commander, who accompanies the principal army.
5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with
equal forces on the same frontier, a single line of operations
will be more advantageous than a double one.
6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be
necessary, either from the topography of the seat of war, or
because a double line has been adopted by the enemy, and it will
be necessary to oppose a part of the army to each of his
masses.
[Pg 117]7. In this case, interior or central lines will be
preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the
fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the
enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a
well-combined strategic plan, unite upon and overwhelm
successively the fractions of the adversary's forces. To be
assured of success in these maneuvers, a body of observation is
left in front of the army to be held in check, with instructions
to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as much as
possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
back upon the principal army.
8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided
superiority of force, when each army will be a match for any
force the enemy can bring against it. In this case this course
will be advantageous,—since a single line would crowd the
forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to advantage.
However, it will always be prudent to support well the army
which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the respective
positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
perform.
9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of
two other maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on
interior lines and sustaining each other reciprocally, and
opposing two armies superior in numbers, should not allow
themselves to be crowded into a too contracted space, where the
whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to Napoleon at
Leipsic.[17] The second is, that
interior lines should not be abused by extending them too far,
thus giving the enemy the opportunity of overcoming the corps of
observation. This risk, however, may be in[Pg 118]curred if the end pursued by the main forces is so
decisive as to conclude the war,—when the fate of these
secondary bodies would be viewed with comparative
indifference.
10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more
advantageous than two divergent. The first conform better to the
principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of covering the
lines of communication and supply; but to be free from danger
they should be so arranged that the armies which pass over them
shall not be separately exposed to the combined masses of the
enemy, before being able to effect their junction.
11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the
center of the enemy has been broken and his forces separated
either by a battle or by a strategic movement,—in which
case divergent operations would add to the dispersion of the
enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior, since the pursuers
could concentrate with more facility than the pursued.
12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its
line of operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very
delicate and important step, which may lead to great successes,
or to equally great disasters if not applied with sagacity, and
is used only to extricate an army from an embarrassing position.
Napoleon projected several of these changes; for in his bold
invasions he was provided with new plans to meet unforeseen
events.
At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to
adopt a line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon,
which would have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of
returning by Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country
and from which the Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him
off. Frederick executed one of these changes of the line of
operations after the raising of the siege of Olmutz.
In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver,
but one which was favored by the localities. It was to base
himself upon the fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the
route to Paris open to the allies. If Mortier and [Pg 119]Marmont could have joined him, and had he
possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced
the most decisive results and have put the seal on his military
career.
13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the
geographical character of the theater of operations, exercise a
great influence on the direction to be given to these lines, as
well as upon the advantages to be obtained. Central positions,
salient toward the enemy, like Bohemia and Switzerland, are the
most advantageous, because they naturally lead to the adoption of
interior lines and facilitate the project of taking the enemy in
reverse. The sides of this salient angle become so important that
every means should be taken to render them impregnable. In
default of such central positions, their advantages may be gained
by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front
of the army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form
two interior lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior
lines A B, F G, which they may overwhelm separately by combining
upon them. Such was the result of the operations of 1796, 1800,
and 1809.
Fig. 4.
14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to
influence the direction to be given to the lines of operations,
these latter being naturally dependent upon the former. It has
already been shown that the greatest advantage that can result
from a choice of bases is when the frontieres allow it to be
assumed parallel to the linee of operations of the enemy,
thus affording the
opportunity of seizing this line and cutting him from his
base.
But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive
point, the line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages
of the perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by
referring to the figure on page 79. The
army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it marched toward
F, instead of to the right toward G H, woud lose all the
strategic advantages of its base C D.
The great art, then, of properly directing lines of
operations, is so to establish them in reference to the bases and
to the marches of the army as to seize the communications of the
enemy without imperiling one's own, and is the most important and
most difficult problem in strategy.
15. There is another point which exercises a manifest
influence over the direction to be given to the line of
operations; it is when the principal enterprise of the campaign
is to cross a large river in the presence of a numerous and
well-appointed enemy. In this case, the choice of this line
depends neither upon the will of the general nor the advantages
to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the first
consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was
crossed by Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,—viz., that in
neither case was there the bridge-train necessary for the
purpose, and both were obliged to procure and take up the rivers
large boats, bought by the French in Holland, and by the Russians
at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of Prussia permitted the
ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy was not able to
prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led the French
into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed because
the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula
with only a small detachment and after the principal army had
already arrived at Lowicz.
[Pg 121]When an army is sufficiently provided with
bridge-trains, the chances of failure are much lessened; but
then, as always, it is necessary to select the point which may,
either on account of its topography or the position of the enemy,
be most advantageous. The discussion between Napoleon and Moreau
on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the most curious
examples of the different combinations presented by this
question, which is both strategic and tactical.
Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a
victory is gained, the point of passage will exercise an
influence upon the directions of a few marches immediately
subsequent to the passage. The point selected in every case for
the principal passage will be upon the center or one of the
flanks of the enemy.
A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an
extended line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to
complete the dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to
concentrate, would not think of disturbing the bridges.
If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is
more concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up
after the passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be
better to pass it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw
off the enemy from the bridges. This will be referred to in the
article upon the passage of rivers.
16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to
be noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a
line at home and one in a hostile country. The nature of the
enemy's country will also influence these chances. Let us suppose
an army crosses the Alps or the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or
Germany. It encounters states of the second rank; and, even if
they are in alliance, there are always rivalries or collisions of
interest which will deprive them of that unity and strength
possessed by a single powerful state. On the other hand, a German
army invading France would operate upon a line much more
dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the
first could be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united
in feeling and interest. An [Pg
122]army on the
defensive, with its line of operations on its own soil, has
resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and
even private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily
so abroad.
Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions
offer to the assailants much greater advantages than when in
barren or desert regions, particularly when the people are not
united against the invader. In provinces like those first named
the army would find a thousand necessary supplies, while in the
other huts and straw are about the only resources. Horses
probably may obtain pasturage; but every thing else must be
carried by the army,—thus infinitely increasing the
embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts
of Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of
Pultusk, and actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of
Lithuania.
17. There is another point in reference to these lines which
is much insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than
important. It is that on each side of the line of operations the
country should be cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to
the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might threaten the
line of retreat. This rule is everywhere belied by the events of
war. The nature of the country, the rivers and mountains, the
morale of the armies, the spirit of the people, the ability and
energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by diagrams on
paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy could
be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means
of taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a
campaign in recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene,
which does not contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau
at the gates of Vienna when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol
were in possession of the Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza
when Turin, Genoa, and the Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army
of Mélas? Did not Eugene march by way of Stra[Pg 123]della and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the
French upon the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?
OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES—WHAT HAS BEEN SAID
AGAINST THEM.
Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words
and upon definitions; others have censured where they but
imperfectly understood; and others have, by the light of certain
important events, taken it upon themselves to deny my fundamental
principles, without inquiring whether the conditions of the case
which might modify the application of these principles were such
as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even admitting what
they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a
rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
principles.
In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have
quoted the famous and successful march of the allies upon
Leipsic. This remarkable event, at first glance, seems to stagger
the faith of those who believe in principles. At best, however,
it is but one of those exceptional cases from which nothing can
be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed instances.
Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the
maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish
their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case
of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double
lines of operations as most advantageous, particularly when
concentric and arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at
the decisive moment. Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg,
Blücher, Bernadotte, and Benningsen, this case of decided
superiority is found. The inferior army, to conform to the
principles of this chapter, should have directed its efforts
against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not upon the
center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are doubly
in my favor.
Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden
and the Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the
misfortunes of Culm, Katzbach, and Dennewitz,—in a
[Pg 124]word, to faults of execution, entirely foreign to
the principles in question.
What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important
point with the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary
points to remain on the defensive, in strong positions or behind
a river, until the decisive blow is struck, and the operation
ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the army. Then
the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon other
points. Whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive
shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is
not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.
If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously
pursued the allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the
disaster at Culm, have threatened Prague, and perhaps have
dissolved the Coalition. To this error may be added a fault quite
as great,—that of fighting decisive battles when he was not
present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach his instructions
were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for Blücher,
and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments
over torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and
advanced to meet Blücher. If he had fulfilled his
instructions and Napoleon had followed up his victory, there is
no doubt that his plan of operations, based upon interior
strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line of
operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The
study of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814
shows that he knew how to apply this system.
There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which
shows the injustice of judging central lines by the fate of
Napoleon in Saxony,—viz.: that his front of operations
was outflanked on the right, and even taken in reverse, by the
geographical position of the frontiers of Bohemia. Such a
case is of rare occurrence. A central position with such faults
is not to be compared to one without them. When Napoleon made the
application of these principles in Italy, Poland, Prussia, and
[Pg 125]France, he was not exposed to the attack of a
hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have
threatened him in 1807; but she was then at peace with him and
unarmed. To judge of a system of operations, it must be supposed
that accidents and chances are to be as much in favor of as
against it,—which was by no means the case in 1813, either
in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses
at Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof
capable of destroying a principle the simplest application of
which required these officers not to allow themselves to be drawn
into a serious engagement. Instead of avoiding they sought
collisions. Indeed, what advantage can be expected from the
system of central lines, if the parts of the army which have been
weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall
themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the
enemy who applies the principle, and not he who has the interior
lines. Moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of
Napoleon in Champagne, from the battle of Brienne to that of
Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these maxims.
The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a
strategic question which it would be difficult to answer by
simple assertions founded upon theories. It is, whether the
system of central lines loses its advantages when the masses are
very large. Agreeing with Montesquieu, that the greatest
enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements necessary
to consummate them, I am disposed to answer in the affirmative.
It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred thousand men,
occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of thirty
or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand
strong against [Pg 126]three armies of one hundred and
thirty-five thousand each; and for several good
reasons:—
1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time
necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of
battle, an army of one hundred and thirty or one hundred and
forty thousand men may easily resist a much larger force.
2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one
hundred thousand men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and
effect a junction with one of the other armies.
3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such
a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and
matériel of every kind, that it will possess less
mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of
the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of
obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such
numbers.
4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to
hold in check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand
each must be very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;)
and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious
engagement they will probably suffer reverses, the effects of
which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal
army.
I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or
eccentric system. All my works go to show the eternal influence
of principles, and to demonstrate that operations to be
successful must be applications of principles.
Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or
very bad: all depends on the situation of the respective forces.
The eccentric lines, for instance, are good when applied to a
mass starting from a given point, and acting in divergent
directions to divide and separately destroy two hostile forces
acting upon exterior lines. Such was the maneuver of Frederick
which brought about, at the end of the campaign of 1767, the fine
battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and,
having [Pg 127]pierced the enemy's center or turned his front,
to give them eccentric directions to disperse the defeated
army.[19]
On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two
cases: 1. When they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a
point where it will be sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When
they direct to the same end the efforts of two armies which are
in no danger of being beaten separately by a stronger enemy.
Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so
advantageous, may be most pernicious,—which should teach us
the necessity of detecting the principles upon which systems are
based, and not to confound principles and systems; as, for
instance, if two armies set out from a distant base to march
convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines and
more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a
union before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was
the case with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke
Charles.
In starting from the same points, or from two points much less
separated than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed
to this danger. What was the fate of the concentric columns of
Wurmser and Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two
banks of Lake Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and
Grouchy on Brussels be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to
march concentrically on this city,—one by Quatre-Bras, the
other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington, taking an interior
strategic line, effected a junction before them, and the terrible
disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.
Such events prove better than any arguments that a system
which is not in accordance with the principles of war cannot be
good. I lay no claim to the creation of these principles, for
they have always existed, and were applied by Cæsar,
[Pg 128]Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to
point them out, and to lay down the principal chances in their
various applications.
FOOTNOTES:
[11]
This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise
to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a
question of maneuver-lines, (that is, of strategic
combinations,) and not of great routes. It must also be admitted
that an army marching upon two or three routes, near enough to
each other to admit of the concentration of the different masses
within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three lines of
operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there
was a double line of operations; but a French army of which only
a detachment starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main,
while the five or six other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to
march on Ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the
sense in which I use the term to designate a maneuver. Napoleon,
when he concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by
Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single corps
marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two
arms or radii, but the operation was not double.
[12]
Some German writers have said that I confound central
positions with the line of operations,—in which assertion
they are mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the
presence of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines
of operations: these are two very different things. Others have
thought that I would have done better to use the term radii of
operations to express the idea of double lines. The reasoning
in this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of
operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a
line, it is simply a dispute about words.
[13]
This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct; for
Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the
Po, was unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a
communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would
have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he
had not been reinforced.
[14]
The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and
the French people had, in addition, separated their cause from
his. If he had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he
would have shown that the capital was at his head-quarters.
[15]
The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon
the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their
morale, and the ability of their commander are also very
important elements.
[16]
When the fractions of an army are separated from the main body
by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not
intended to act separately throughout the campaign, these are
central strategic positions, and not lines of operations.
[17]
In the movements immediately preceding the battle of Leipsic,
Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of operations,
and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; but
the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative
of lines of operations.
[18]
I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
combat without running greater risks than would result from a
check; but Macdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage
if he had better understood Napoleon's instructions.
[19]
It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we
reflect that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are
some in which he employed these two systems alternately within
twenty-four hours; for example, in the movements about Ratisbon
in 1809.
ARTICLE XXII.
Strategic Lines.
Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers,
which differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be
well to define them, for many confound them. We will not consider
those strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance
by reason of their position and their relation to the features of
the country, like the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the
chains of the Alps and the Balkan. Such lines can best be studied
by a detailed and minute examination of the topography of Europe;
and an excellent model for this kind of study is found in the
Archduke Charles's description of Southern Germany.
The term strategic is also applied to all
communications which lead by the most direct or advantageous
route from one important point to another, as well as from the
strategic front of the army to all of its objective points. It
will be seen, then, that a theater of war is crossed by a
multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those only
which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
importance. This renders plain the distinction between the
general line of operations of a whole campaign, and these
strategic lines, which are temporary and change with the
operations of the army.
Besides territorial strategic lines, there are strategic
lines of maneuvers.
An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its
zone of operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or
that between the Danube and the Main, or that between the
mountains of Franconia and the sea. It would have upon its zone a
single line of operations, or, at most, a double concentric line,
upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions,—while it
would have successively perhaps twenty [Pg
129]strategic lines
as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might
adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm
on Donauwerth and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or
that which connects Ulm with Nuremberg or Mayence.
It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines
of operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are
necessarily applicable to strategic lines. These may be
concentric, to inflict a decisive blow, or
eccentric, after victory. They are rarely simple,
since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but
when they are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be
interior if the forces be equal, or exterior in the
case of great numerical superiority. The rigorous application of
this rule may perhaps sometimes be remitted in detaching a body
on an exterior line, even when the forces are equal, to attain an
important result without running much risk; but this is an affair
of detachments, and does not refer to the important masses.
Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are
directed against one of the extremities of the enemy's front of
operations.
The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations
holding good for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat
them, or to apply them to particular examples; but there is one,
however, which deserves mention,—viz.: that it is important
generally, in the selection of these temporary strategic lines,
not to leave the line of operations exposed to the assaults of
the enemy. Even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army
from great danger, or to attain a great success; but the
operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of
the line of operations, if necessary, as has already been
referred to.
We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The
Prussian army was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations
extended from Cologne and Coblentz on Luxembourg [Pg 130]and
Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp, and his line of operations
the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack by Napoleon on
Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel to the
English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have
no uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have
a good chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek
a refuge in Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had
not had its powerful maritime allies it would have been
destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and seeking refuge at Gembloux and
then at Wavre, Blücher had but three strategic lines to
choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht, that farther
north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army near Mont
St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
application of interior strategic lines,—which Napoleon
here, perhaps for the first time in his life, neglected. It will
readily be seen that the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to
Mont St. Jean was neither a line of operations of the Prussian
army nor a line of battle, but a strategic line of
maneuver, and was interior. It was bold, because he exposed
fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he sought
a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
principles of war.
A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz.
Leaving Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he
moved to the right to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in
so doing he left his primitive line of retreat exposed to the
attacks of an enemy superior in force. His object was to gain
communication with Napoleon, whose intention was to join him by
Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the beginning have taken
all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing this change of
strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did nothing of
this kind,—either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,—and
the severe losses at Dennewitz were the result.
Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these
different combinations of strategic lines. His general line of
operations extended from the Apennines to Verona. When
[Pg 131]he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo and determined
to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley of the
Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in
reverse. There were but three courses open to him,—to
remain in the narrow valley of the Adige at great risk, to
retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, or the last,—which was
sublime, but rash,—to follow him into the valley of the
Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man
to hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on
the Lavis to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his
forces on Bassano. The brilliant results of this bold step are
well known. The route from Trent to Bassano was not the line of
operations of the army, but a strategic line of maneuver
still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre. However, it was
an operation of only three or four days' duration, at the end of
which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at Bassano: in
the first case, he would open direct communication with Verona
and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall
back either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the
country, which made this march audacious in one respect, were
favorable in another; for even if Wurmser had been victorious at
Bassano he could not have interfered with the return to Trent, as
there was no road to enable him to anticipate Napoleon. If
Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois from Trent, he might
have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian general, previously
beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French army was
doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon
beaten at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if
Davidovitch had advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois
before him, he would there have been surrounded by two French
armies, who would have inflicted upon him the fate of Vandamme at
Culm.
I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation
[Pg 132]of time and distances, joined to great activity,
may lead to the success of many adventures which may seem very
imprudent. I conclude from this that it may be well sometimes to
direct an army upon a route which exposes its line of operations,
but that every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from
profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance
of what is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver,
and only to be adopted under an urgent necessity.
ARTICLE XXIII.
Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases
or Strategic Reserves.
When a general enters a country offensively, he should form
eventual or temporary bases,—which, of course, are neither
so safe nor so strong as his own frontiers. A river with
têtes de ponts, and one or two large towns secure
from a coup de main to cover the depots of the army and to
serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be
a temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of
operations leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon
would have had a good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria
had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this
line was taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations,
favorable indeed for the execution of a single enterprise, but
dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a
serious reverse. As every army which is beaten in an enemy's
country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its own
frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real
bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In
general, we cannot expect to find in an enemy's country safe
positions suitable even for a temporary base; and the deficiency
must be supplied by a strategic reserve,—which is purely a
modern invention. Its merits and demerits deserve notice.
[Pg 133]
STRATEGIC RESERVES.
Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the
executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a
platoon of skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A
wise government always provides good reserves for its armies, and
the general uses them when they come under his command. The state
has its reserves, the army has its own, and every corps
d'armée or division should not fail to provide one.
The reserves of an army are of two kinds,—those on the
battle-field, and those which are intended to recruit and support
the army: the latter, while organizing, may occupy important
points of the theater of war, and serve even as strategic
reserves; their positions will depend not only on their
magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and the
distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an
army takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the
possibility of being compelled to act on the defensive, and by
the posting of a reserve between the base and front of operations
the advantage of an active reserve on the field of battle is
gained: it can fly to the support of menaced points without
weakening the active army. It is true that to form a reserve a
number of regiments must be withdrawn from active service; but
there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing
central depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and
by making them the rendezvous of all detachments going to and
coming from the army, and adding to them a few good regiments to
give tone, a reserve may be formed capable of important
service.
Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his
campaigns. Even in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he
had first Joubert on the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from
the Roman States) in the neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and
Augereau played the part alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria,
and Mortier and Marmont near Vienna.
In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and
[Pg 134]Mortier used them to reduce Hesse. At the same
time, other reserves were forming at Mayence under Kellermann,
which took post, as fast as organized, between the Rhine and
Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed,
with much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe
sixty thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg
against the English and to influence Austria, whose disposition
was as manifest as her interests.
The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle,
but it was badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe
at Wittenberg or Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have
saved the army by giving Prince Hohenlohe and Blücher time
to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.
These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration
of the country leads to double fronts of operations: they then
fulfill the double object of observing the second front, and, in
case of necessity, of aiding the operations of the main army when
the enemy threatens its flanks or a reverse compels it to fall
back toward this reserve.
Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous
detachments, and whenever these reserves can be dispensed with,
it should be done, or the troops in the depots only be employed
as reserves. It is only in distant invasions and sometimes on our
own soil that they are useful: if the scene of hostilities be but
five or six marches distant from the frontier, they are quite
superfluous. At home they may generally be dispensed with: it is
only in the case of a serious invasion, when new levies are
organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under the
protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
indispensable.
The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use
of these reserves according to the state of the country, the
length of the line of operations, the nature of the fortified
points, and the proximity of a hostile state. He also decides
upon their position, and endeavors to use for this purpose troops
which will not weaken his main army so much as the withdrawal of
his good troops.
[Pg 135]These reserves ought to hold the most important
points between the base and front of operations, occupy the
fortified places if any have been reduced, observe or invest
those which are held by the enemy; and if there be no fortress as
a point of support, they should throw up intrenched camps or
têtes de ponts to protect the depots and to increase
the strength of their positions.
All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable
to temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be
doubly valuable if they possess such well-located pivots.
ARTICLE XXIV.
The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of
Marches.
By the system of positions is understood the old manner
of conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their
supplies at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a
city, the other covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire
a small province, the other counteracting its efforts by
occupying strong points. Such was war from the Middle Ages to the
era of the French Revolution. During this revolution great
changes transpired, and many systems of more or less value sprang
up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the French
encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that
this system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one
million men in fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had
neither tents, provisions, nor money. On their marches they
bivouacked or were quartered in towns; their mobility was
increased and became a means of success. Their tactics changed
also: the troops were put in columns, which were more easily
handled than deployed lines, and, on account of the broken
character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they threw
out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances,
at first met with a success beyond all expectation: it
disconcerted the methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well
as their generals. Mack, to whom was at[Pg
136]tributed the
success of the Prince of Coburg, increased his reputation by
directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose an open
order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns
carried the positions.
The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and
nothing more. The principal direction of affairs was in the hands
of Carnot and of the Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes
judicious, but often bad. Carnot was the author of one of the
finest strategic movements of the war. In 1793 he sent a reserve
of fine troops successively to the aid of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and
Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly from point to
point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.
The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of
circumstances, and not a premeditated plan, which brought about
the strategic movement of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre;
and it was this which led to the success of Fleurus and the
conquest of Belgium.
In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they
were imputed to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were
better commanded by Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they
had been by Mack and the Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles,
applying the principle of interior lines, triumphed over Moreau
and Jourdan in 1796 by a single march.
Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been
large,—either to procure subsistence more easily, or
because the generals thought it better to put all the divisions
in line, leaving it to their commanders to arrange them for
battle. The reserves were small detachments, incapable of
redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in overwhelming but
a single division. Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon
made his début in Italy. His activity from the
beginning worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from
useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern
armies. He conquered the Italian peninsula by a series of marches
and strategic combats. His march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but
justified by the necessity of overcoming [Pg 137]the
Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements from the
Rhine.
The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man,
marked a new era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines
of operations. He adopted bold objective points, which looked to
nothing less than the capture or destruction of whole armies. The
orders of battle were less extended, and the more rational
organization of armies in large bodies of two or three divisions
was adopted. The system of modern strategy was here fully
developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the
system of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the
features of Italy not to meet with his approval.
It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is
adapted to all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the
contrary, there can be any return, in the light of the events of
1800 and 1809, to the old system of wars of position. After a
comparison of the marches and camps of the Seven Years' War with
those of the seven weeks' war,—as Napoleon called
the campaign of 1806,—or with those of the three months
which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in
1805 till its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may
easily decide as to the relative merits of the two systems.
The system of Napoleon was to march twenty-five miles a
day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet. He told me that he
knew no other method of conducting a war than this.
It may be said that the adventurous character of this great
man, his personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all
concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person,
whether born upon a throne, or a general under the orders of his
government, would ever dare to adopt. This is probably true; but
between the extremes of very distant invasions, and wars of
position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his
impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. It
is probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a
long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
modified and improved.
[Pg 138]If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of
the system of marches, humanity, on the contrary, loses by it;
for these rapid incursions and bivouacs of considerable masses,
feeding upon the regions they overrun, are not materially
different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes between
the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not likely that
the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has been
demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,—viz.: that remoteness is
not a certain safeguard against invasion,—that a state to
be secure must have a good system of fortresses and lines of
defense, of reserves and military institutions, and, finally, a
good system of government. Then the people may everywhere be
organized as militia, and may serve as reserves to the active
armies, which will render the latter more formidable; and the
greater the strength of the armies the more necessary is the
system of rapid operations and prompt results.
If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,—if
nations, instead of fighting for their existence, fight only for
their interests, to acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the
political equilibrium,—then a new right of nations may be
agreed upon, and perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a
less extensive scale. Then also we may see armies of from eighty
to one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system of
war,—a mean between the rapid incursions of Napoleon and
the slow system of positions of the last century. Until then we
must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of
an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his
indiscretion.
The science of marches now includes more than details, like
the following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column,
the time of departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed
in the march, and the means of communication between the columns,
all of which is a part of the duties of the staff of an army.
Outside and beyond these very important details, there is a
science of marches in the great operations of strategy. For
instance, the march of Napo[Pg
139]leon by the
Saint-Bernard to fall upon the communications of Mélas,
those made in 1805 by Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by
Gera to turn the Prussians, the march of Suwaroff from Turin to
the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that of the Russian army on
Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive operations, not
because of their relation to Logistics, but on account of their
strategic relations.
Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the
great principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the
decisive point; and this point is to be determined from the
considerations given in Article XIX.
What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of
operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front
of the enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of
Ulm and Jena were the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher's
march at Waterloo but an application of interior strategic
lines?
From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements
which tend to throw the mass of the army successively upon the
different points of the front of operations of the enemy, will be
skillful, as they apply the principle of overwhelming a smaller
force by a superior one. The operations of the French in 1793
from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and
1814, are models of this kind.
One of the most essential points in the science of modern
marches, is to so combine the movements of the columns as to
cover the greatest strategic front, when beyond the reach of the
enemy, for the triple object of deceiving him as to the objective
in view, of moving with ease and rapidity, and of procuring
supplies with more facility. However, it is necessary in this
case to have previously arranged the means of concentration of
the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.
This alternate application of extended and concentric
movements is the true test of a great general.
There is another kind of marches, designated as flank
marches, which deserves notice. They have always been held up
as very dangerous; but nothing satisfactory has ever been written
about them. If by the term flank marches are understood
tactical maneuvers made upon the field of battle in [Pg 140]view of the enemy, it is certain that they are
very delicate operations, though sometimes successful; but if
reference is made to ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing
particularly dangerous in them, unless the most common
precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a strategic movement,
the two hostile armies ought to be separated by about two
marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced
guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case
there could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to
another.
There are, however, two cases where such a march would be
altogether inadmissible: the first is where the system of the
line of operations, of the strategic lines, and of the front of
operations is so chosen as to present the flank to the enemy
during a whole operation. This was the famous project of marching
upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on the flank, which
would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. It was
modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the
author.
The second case is where the line of operations is very long,
(as was the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if
this line affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then
every flank movement exposing this line would be a great
fault.
In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank
movements are still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety
may be found in a change of the line of operations. The physical
and moral condition of the troops and the more or less energetic
characters of the commanders will, of course, be elements in the
determination of such movements.
The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank
maneuvers; so was that upon Milan after the passage of the
Chiusella, and that of Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at
Ossiek; and their successful issue is well known.
A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy
is quite a different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this
kind at Dennewitz, and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick
at Kolin.
[Pg 141]Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick
at Leuthen was a true flank movement, but it was covered by a
mass of cavalry concealed by the heights, and applied against an
army which lay motionless in its camp; and it was so successful
because at the time of the decisive shock Daun was taken in
flank, and not Frederick.
In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance,
where line of battle could be formed to the right or left without
deployment, (by a right or left into line,) movements parallel to
the enemy's line were not flank marches, because the flank
of the column was the real front of the line of battle.
The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to
turn the lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that
of Leuthen, and no less successful.
In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and
not strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one
of the greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case
above referred to was a movement made to turn the French camp the
evening before the battle.
ARTICLE XXV.
Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.
The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches
is the commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance
food must be supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous
army in an enemy's country is a very difficult one. It is
proposed to discuss the relation between the commissariat and
strategy.
It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes
subsisted their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a
hard task to supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages,
the Greeks, barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained
considerable bodies of men in that country. Cæsar said that
war should support war, and he is generally believed to have
lived at the expense of the countries he overran.
The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations
[Pg 142]of all kinds, and it would be interesting to know
the numbers of the Huns, Vandals, Goths, and Mongols who
successively traversed Europe, and how they lived during their
marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders would
also be an interesting subject of research.
In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that
the armies of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did
not carry with them large stores of provisions; for armies of
their magnitude, of forty or fifty thousand men, could easily
find provisions in the rich valleys of the Ticino and Po.
Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger;
they fought on their own frontiers, and lived from their
storehouses, which were established as they moved. This
interfered greatly with operations, restricting the troops within
a distance from the depots dependent upon the means of
transportation, the rations they could carry, and the number of
days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
camp.
During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from
necessity. The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany
lived sometimes in the houses of the people, sometimes by
requisitions laid upon the country, and often by plunder and
pillage. To subsist an army on the granaries of Belgium, Italy,
Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and Danube, is
easy,—particularly if it marches in a number of columns and
does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand
men; but this would be very difficult in some other countries,
and quite impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It
may readily be conceived how great may be the rapidity and
impetuosity of an army where every thing depends only on the
strength of the soldiers' legs. This system gave Napoleon great
advantages; but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale
and to countries where it was impracticable.
A general should be capable of making all the resources of the
invaded country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he
should use the local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the
assessments so as to make them uniform and [Pg 143]legal, while he himself should see to their
fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create
provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with
extraordinary powers. The provisions thus acquired should be
collected at the points most convenient for the operations of the
army. In order to husband them, the troops may be quartered in
the towns and villages, taking care to reimburse the inhabitants
for the extra charge thus laid upon them. The inhabitants should
also be required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the
points occupied by the troops.
It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be
prudent to undertake without having previously established these
depots, as much depends upon the season, country, strength of the
armies, and spirit of the people; but the following may be
considered as general maxims:—
1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army
of one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so
far distant from the enemy as to be able safely to recover a
considerable extent of country, may draw its resources from it,
during the time occupied by any single operation.
As the first operation never requires more than a month,
during which time the great body of the troops will be in motion,
it will be sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for
the eventual wants of the army, and particularly for those of the
troops obliged to remain at a particular point. Thus, the army of
Napoleon, while half of it was besieging Ulm, would need bread
until the surrender of the city; and if there had been a scarcity
the operation might have failed.
2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the
supplies obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to
subserve the wants of the army after the success of the
operation, whether it take a position to recruit or whether it
undertake a new enterprise.
3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions
should be echeloned as much as possible upon three different
lines of communication, in order to supply with more facility the
wings of the army, and to extend as much as pos[Pg 144]sible the area from which successive supplies are
to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should be as
well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have
the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of
operations, which will be generally found in the center. This
arrangement has two real advantages: first, the depots are less
exposed to the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them
is thereby increased; secondly, it facilitates the movements of
the army in concentrating upon a single point of the line of
operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the initiative
from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the offensive
and gained some advantage.
4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will
lack its most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this
case, not to advance too far from its depots, and to carry with
it sufficient provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to
fall back upon its lines of depots.
5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy
every thing in their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal,
Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended
by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply
near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a war of
invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of
supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying
them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty,
particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate their
transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable
articles,—as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be
both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It
will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and
to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as
not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to
husband the successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he
habituated to carry with him several days' rations of bread,
rice, or even of flour.
[Pg 145]7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the
transportation of supplies; and the party which is master on this
element can supply himself at will. This advantage, however, is
not absolute in the case of a large continental army; for, in the
desire to maintain communications with its depots, it may be
drawn into operations on the coast, thus exposing itself to the
greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the mass of his forces
upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army advance too far
from the coast, there will be danger of its communications being
intercepted; and this danger increases with the progress of the
army.
8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should
base itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions
independent of its ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the
extremity of its strategic front opposed to the sea.
9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of
operations of the army, render the transportation of supplies
much easier, and also free the roads from the incumbrances of the
numerous vehicles otherwise necessary. For this reason, lines of
operations thus situated are the most favorable. The
water-communications themselves are not in this case the lines of
operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance
from the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back
the exterior flank upon the river,—which might be as
dangerous as if it were the sea.
In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used
for transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed,
and since a small body of men may easily embarrass the
navigation. To render it sure, it is necessary to occupy both
banks,—which is hazardous, as Mortier experienced at
Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages of rivers are
more substantial.
10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an
army may be fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be
found, in populous countries, in numbers to last for some little
time. This source of supply will, however, be soon exhausted;
and, in addition, this plan leads to plunder. The [Pg 146]requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;
and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle
purchased elsewhere.
I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon
which may appear whimsical, but which is still not without
reason. He said that in his first campaigns the enemy was so well
provided that when his troops were in want of supplies he had
only to fall upon the rear of the enemy to procure every thing in
abundance. This is a remark upon which it would be absurd to
found a system, but which perhaps explains the success of many a
rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war differs from
narrow theory.
ARTICLE XXVI.
The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched
Lines.—Wars of Sieges.
Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the
frontiers; secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.
The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat
indeterminate. It is not so for those countries whose borders are
covered with great natural obstacles, and which present but few
accessible points, and these admitting of defense by the art of
the engineer. The problem here is simple; but in open countries
it is more difficult. The Alps and the Pyrenees, and the lesser
ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of Erzgebirge, of the
Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and of the
Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a
good system of fortresses.
Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont
was best covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes
of Argentine, of Mont-Genèvre, and of
Mont-Cenis,—the only ones considered
practicable,—were covered by masonry forts; and, in
addition, works of considerable magnitude guarded the issues of
the valleys in the plains of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy
matter to surmount these difficulties.
These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent
the passage of an army, because the small works which are found
in the gorges may be carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may
find a passage over some other route hitherto [Pg 147]deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by
Francis I.,—which is so well described by
Gaillard,—Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard, and the
Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in the remark of
Napoleon, that an army can pass wherever a titan can set his
foot,—a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of
the man, and applied by him with great success.
Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first
line or as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines,
apparently so well calculated to separate nations without
interfering with trade and communication, are generally not part
of the real frontier. It cannot be said that the Danube divides
Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long as the Turks have a
foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real frontier of
France and Germany; for the French for long periods held points
upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of
Mayence, Luxembourg, and the têtes de ponts of
Manheim and Wesel on the left bank.
If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder,
Vistula, Po, and Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier,
there is no reason why they should not be fortified as lines of
permanent defense, wherever they permit the use of a system
suitable for covering a front of operations.
An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria
from Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the
north by Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by
the three fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg.
Lloyd, with some poetic license, compares this frontier to two
impregnable bastions whose curtain is formed of three fine forts
and whose ditch is one of the most rapid of rivers. He has
exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of "impregnable"
was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800, 1805, and
1809.
The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means
so formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally
open, or consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a
considerable number of points. We propose to [Pg 148]give a set of general maxims equally applicable to
all cases.
When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no
attempt to make a complete line of defense by building too many
fortresses, requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after
all, might not prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It
is much wiser to build fewer works, and to have them properly
located, not with the expectation of absolutely preventing the
ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the impediments to his
progress, and, at the same time, to support the movements of the
army which is to repel him.
If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely
prevents the progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an
embarrassment, and compels the army to detach a part of its force
or to make détours in its march; while, on the
other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to the army which
holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, finally,
is a place of refuge in case of need.
Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military
operations; and we now propose to examine their relations to
strategy.
The first point to be considered is their location; the second
lies in the distinction between the cases where an army can
afford to pass the forts without a siege, and those where it will
be necessary to besiege; the third point is in reference to the
relations of an army to a siege which it proposes to cover.
As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in
the same degree those which are unfortunately placed are
disadvantageous. They are an incubus upon the army which is
compelled to garrison them and the state whose men and money are
wasted upon them. There are many in Europe in this category. It
is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses very close
together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban, who, on
the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great
number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on
this point are as follow:—
1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines,
[Pg 149]and should extend from the frontiers toward the
capital.[20] There should be three in
the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the
third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts,
this would require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to
thirty places.
It will be objected that this number is large, and that even
Austria has not so many. It must be recollected that France has
more than forty upon only a third of its frontiers, (from
Besançon to Dunkirk,) and still has not enough on the
third line in the center of the country. A Board convened for the
purpose of considering the system of fortresses has decided quite
recently that more were required. This does not prove that there
were not already too many, but that certain points in addition
should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too
much crowded, may be maintained since they are already in
existence. Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to
Basel, one from Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in
addition to the totally distinct line of the Pyrenees and the
coast-line, there are six fronts, requiring forty to fifty
places. Every military man will admit that this is enough, since
the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the northeast. The
system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important element
of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is
bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being
hostile, place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the
number above given is what was considered necessary for a state
having four fronts of nearly equal development. Prussia, being
long and narrow, and extending from Königsberg almost to the
gates of Metz, should not be fortified upon the same system as
France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical position and
extent of states may either diminish or increase the number of
fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be
included.
[Pg 150]2. Fortresses should always occupy the important
strategic points already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities,
their sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should
be easy, in order to increase the difficulty of blockading
them.
3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to
their own defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are
certainly those situated on great rivers and commanding both
banks. Mayence, Coblentz, and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are
true illustrations and models of this kind. Places situated at
the confluence of two great rivers command three different
fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for
instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the
Main the fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the
most formidable place in Europe, but it required a garrison of
twenty-five thousand men: so that works of this extent must be
few in number.
4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial
cities, are preferable to small ones,—particularly when the
assistance of the citizens can be relied on for their defense.
Metz arrested the whole power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole
year delayed Eugene and Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times
proved the security of French armies. During the last wars these
places were passed without being besieged by the invading forces,
because all Europe was in arms against France; but one hundred
and fifty thousand Germans having in their front one hundred
thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with impunity,
leaving behind them these well-fortified points.
5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns,
camps, and positions; recently they have been directed only
against organized armies, leaving out of consideration all
natural or artificial obstacles. The exclusive use of either of
these systems is faulty: the true course is a mean between these
extremes. Doubtless, it will always be of the first importance to
destroy and disorganize all the armies of the enemy in the field,
and to attain this end it may be allowable to pass the
fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will
[Pg 151]be unwise to push the invasion too far. Here,
also, very much depends upon the situation and respective
strength of the armies and the spirit of the nations.
If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not
follow in the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it
probable that fifty thousand French will very soon risk
themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in the very heart of Austria,
as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only occur
under exceptional circumstances.
6. It may be concluded from what precedes,—1st, that,
while fortified places are essential supports, abuse in their
application may, by dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding
to its efficiency; 2d, that an army may, with the view of
destroying the enemy, pass the line of these forts,—always,
however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d, that an army cannot
pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine, without
reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order to
secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the
army may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege
other places; and the chances of the reduction of those places
increase as the army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of
hindering the siege are correspondingly diminished.
7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a
friendly people, smaller works are not without importance, not to
arrest an enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially
aid the operations of an army in the field. The fort of
Königstein in 1813 was as useful to the French as the
fortress of Dresden, because it procured a tête de
pont on the Elbe.
In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal
in value to fortified places, because their province is to close
the passes, and not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort
[Pg 152]of Bard, in the valley of Aosta, almost arrested
Napoleon's army in 1800.
8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large
fortresses as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small
posts to facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a
shallow ditch may be very useful in the interior of a country, to
contain depots, hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to
resist the attacks of any small bodies that may traverse the
vicinity. They will be particularly serviceable if they can be
defended by the militia, so as not to weaken the active army.
9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic
positions are a positive misfortune for both the army and
state.
10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a
maritime war, except for depots: they may even prove disastrous
for a continental army, by holding out to it a delusive promise
of support. Benningsen almost lost the Russian armies by basing
them in 1807 on Königsberg,—which he did because it
was convenient for supply. If the Russian army in 1812, instead
of concentrating on Smolensk, had supported itself on Dunaburg
and Riga, it would have been in danger of being forced into the
sea and of being cut off from all its bases.
The relations between sieges and the operations of active
armies are of two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified
places without attacking them, but it must leave a force to
invest them, or at least to watch them; and when there are a
number of them adjacent to each other it will be necessary to
leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single commander,
to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When the
invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to
carry on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder
may either continue its march or take a position to cover the
siege.
Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a
whole army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and
contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and
[Pg 153]expense as the siege itself. The famous case of
the lines of Turin, which were fifteen miles in length, and,
though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French, were forced by
Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough to
condemn this ridiculous system.
Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cæsar in
the investment of Alise may excite our admiration, it is not
probable that any general in our times will imitate his example.
Nevertheless, it is very necessary for the investing force to
strengthen its position by detached works commanding the routes
by which the garrison might issue or by which the siege might be
disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at Mantua, and
by the Russians at Varna.
Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to
beat and pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could
interfere. If the besieging force is numerically inferior, it
should take up a strategic position covering all the avenues by
which succor might arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the
besieging force as can be spared should unite with the covering
force to fall upon the approaching army and decide whether the
siege shall continue or not.
Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill
for the operations of an army of observation.
INTRENCHED LINES.
Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation
referred to above, there is another kind, which is more extended
than they are, and is in a measure allied to permanent
fortifications, because it is intended to protect a part of the
frontiers.
As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge
for an army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the
system of intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of
small extent closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz,
for they may be regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines
many leagues in length and intended to wholly close a part of the
frontiers. For instance, those of Wissembourg, which, covered by
the Lauter flowing in [Pg
154]front, supported
by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed to
fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on
every occasion when they were assailed.
The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine
played the same part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were
equally unfortunate; and those of the Queich and the Kinzig had
the same fate.
The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,)
although intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to
the lines in question in their extent and in the fate which
befell them. However well they may be supported by natural
obstacles, their great extent paralyzes their defenders, and they
are almost always susceptible of being turned. To bury an army in
intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or
forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest
folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another
instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will
treat of their attack and defense.
It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these
extended lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the
advantages to be derived from detached works in increasing the
strength of a besieging force, the safety of a position, or the
defense of a defile.
FOOTNOTES:
[20]
The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the
defiles of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the
Russians would not have reached Adrianople, and the affair would
not have been so simple.
[21]
Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the
Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from
the Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly
important to beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined
him. In view of the circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct
was in accordance with the principles of war.
ARTICLE XXVII.
The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts
with Strategy.
It would be out of place here to go into details as to the
sites of ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by
advanced guards, or upon the advantages of field-fortifications
in the defense of posts. Only fortified camps enter into the
combinations of grand tactics, and even of strategy; and this
they do by the temporary support they afford an army.
It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz,
which saved Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and
Dusseldorf in 1796, that such a refuge may prove of the greatest
importance. The camp of Ulm, in 1800, enabled Kray to
[Pg 155]arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on the
Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the
country between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp
of Shumla.
The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
established on strategic points which should also possess
tactical advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the
Russians in 1812, it was because it was not in a proper position
in reference to their defensive system, which should have rested
upon Smolensk and Moscow. Hence the Russians were compelled to
abandon it after a few days.
The maxims which have been given for the determination of the
great decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched
camps, because they ought only to be placed on such points. The
influence of these camps is variable: they may answer equally
well as points of departure for an offensive operation, as
têtes de ponts to assure the crossing of a large
river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for a
defeated army.
However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be
difficult to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like
the camp of Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the
sea. Whenever it can be passed either by the right or the left,
the army will be compelled to abandon it or run the risk of being
invested in it. The camp of Dresden was an important support to
Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it was outflanked by the
allies it had not the advantages even of an ordinary fortress;
for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps within a few
days for want of provisions.
Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford
temporary support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill
this end, even when the enemy passes by them, provided they
cannot be taken in reverse,—that is, provided all their
faces are equally safe from a coup de main. It is also
important that they be established close to a fortress, where the
depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of the camp
nearest to the line of retreat.
In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large
[Pg 156]tête de pont on the other side to
command both banks, and near a large fortified city like Mayence
or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never be
more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the
enemy, it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on
operations in the open country.
The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are
particularly advantageous to an army at home or near its base of
operations. If a French army occupied an intrenched camp on the
Elbe, it would be lost when the space between the Rhine and Elbe
was held by the enemy; but if it were invested in an intrenched
camp near Strasbourg, it might with a little assistance resume
its superiority and take the field, while the enemy in the
interior of France and between the relieving force and the
intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the
Rhine.
We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic
light; but several German generals have maintained that they are
suitable to cover places or to prevent sieges,—which
appears to me to be a little sophistical. Doubtless, it will be
more difficult to besiege a place when an army is encamped on its
glacis; and it maybe said that the forts and camps are a mutual
support; but, according to my view, the real and principal use of
intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a temporary
refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively upon a
decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a
camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off,
simply to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser,
who prolonged the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition
to this; but did not his army perish? And was this sacrifice
really useful? I do not think so; for, the place having been once
relieved and revictualed, and the siege-train having fallen into
the hands of the Austrians, the siege was necessarily changed
into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by reason of
famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought rather
to have hastened than retarded its surrender.
[Pg 157]The intrenched camp of the Austrians before
Mayence in 1795 would, indeed, have prevented the siege of the
place, if the French had possessed the means of carrying on a
siege, as long as the Rhine had not been crossed; but as soon as
Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in the Black Forest, it
became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the place to its
own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a fortress
occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army to
pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the
object of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and
what place in Europe is upon such a site?
So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the
contrary, it seems to me that a very important question in the
establishment of these camps near fortified places on a river, is
whether they should be on the same bank as the place, or upon the
other. When it is necessary to make a choice, by reason of the
fact that the place cannot be located to cover both banks, I
should decidedly prefer the latter.
To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be
on the bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the
principal danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the
camp in reverse by passing the river at some other point; and if
the fortress were upon the same bank us the camp, it would be of
little service; while if upon the other bank, opposite to the
camp, it would be almost impossible to take the latter in
reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold for
twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the
enemy for a long time if there had been a fortification on the
right bank of the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau
for three months, at Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the
Archduke Charles; while if Strasbourg had not been there upon the
opposite bank his camp would easily have been turned by a passage
of the Rhine.
Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the
fortified place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both
banks would fulfill this condition. The fortification of
Coblentz, recently constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch.
[Pg 158]This system of the Prussians, combining the
advantages of intrenched camps and permanent works, deserves
attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its defects, it is
nevertheless certain that it would afford immense advantages to
an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the
inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they
are only very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they
are exposed to the dangers arising from destruction of bridges
(as happened to Napoleon at Essling,)—to say nothing of the
danger of losing their provisions and munitions, or even of a
front attack against which the works might not avail. The system
of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the advantage of
avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the same bank
as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from attack
at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were
upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an
intrenched camp of field-works on the left bank, there would be
no certainty of security either for the depots or the army. So,
if Coblentz were a good ordinary fortress without detached forts,
a large army could not so readily make it a place of refuge, nor
would there be such facilities for debouching from it in the
presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, which is
intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult
of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the
egress of a force of any magnitude might be vigorously
disputed.
Much has been recently said of a new system used by the
Archduke Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of
Linz,—by masonry towers. As I only know of it by hearsay
and the description by Captain Allard in the Spectateur
Militaire, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know that
the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel
Andreis appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
improvements,—which the archduke seems to have added. We
are told that the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered
by the glacis, have the advantage of giving a concentrated
horizontal fire and of being sheltered from the direct shot of
the enemy. Such towers, if well flanked and con[Pg 159]nected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
camp,—always, however, with some of the inconveniences of
closed lines. If the towers are isolated, and the intervals
carefully covered by field-works, (to be thrown up when
required,) they will make a camp preferable to one covered by
ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous as afforded by the
large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number thirty-two,
eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right
bank, some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference
of this line is about twelve miles. The towers are between five
hundred and six hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in
case of war, by a palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of
three tiers of guns, with a barbette battery which is the
principal defense, mounting eleven twenty-four pounders. Two
howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those towers are placed
in a wide and deep ditch, the déblais of which
forms a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot;
but I should think it would be difficult to protect the artillery
from direct fire.
Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a
complete bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of
the first rank, would have cost; others maintain that it has not
cost more than a quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it
subserves, besides, an entirely different object. If these works
are to resist a regular siege, they are certainly very defective;
but, regarded as an intrenched camp to give refuge and an outlet
upon both banks of the Danube for a large army, they are
appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war like that
of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the
capital.
To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better
to encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have
built seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the
mouth of the Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a
half miles, so as to have included for the camp only the curved
space between Linz, the Traun, and the Danube. Then the double
advantage of a fortress of the first rank [Pg 160]and
a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even if not
quite so large, would have answered for a large army,
particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of
Perlingsberg had been preserved.
TÊTES DE PONTS.
Têtes de ponts are the most important of all
field-works. The difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a
large one, in the face of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the
immense utility of such works, which can be less easily dispensed
with than intrenched camps, since if the bridges are safe an army
is insured from the disastrous events which may attend a rapid
retreat across a large river.
Têtes de ponts are doubly advantageous when they
are as it were keeps for a large intrenched camp, and will
be triply so if they also cover the bank opposite to the location
of the camp, since then they will mutually support each other. It
is needless to state that these works are particularly important
in an enemy's country and upon all fronts where there are no
permanent works. It may be observed that the principal difference
between the system of intrenched camps and that of têtes
de ponts is that the best intrenched camps are composed of
detached and closed works, while têtes de ponts
usually consist of contiguous works not closed. An intrenched
line to admit of defense must be occupied in force throughout its
whole extent, which would generally require a large army; if, on
the contrary, the intrenchments are detached closed works, a
comparatively small force can defend them.
The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a
subsequent part of this volume.
ARTICLE XXVIII.
Strategic Operations in Mountains.
A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of
war, under four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of
the war, or it may be but a zone; it may be mountainous
throughout its whole extent, or there may be a [Pg 161]line of mountains, upon emerging from which the
army may debouch into large and rich plains.
If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of
Turkey and Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the
European countries the mountains are in single ranges. In these
cases there is but a difficult defile to cross,—a temporary
obstacle, which, once overcome, is an advantage rather than an
objection. In fact, the range once crossed and the war carried
into the plains, the chain of mountains may be regarded as an
eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and find a
temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed
is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of
retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the
Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of
this nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest,
and the Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains
cover the whole country as far as the Ebro: if the war were
limited to this province, the combinations would not be the same
as if there were but a line of mountains. Hungary in this respect
differs little from Lombardy and Castile; for if the Crapacks in
the eastern and northern part are as marked a feature as the
Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary obstacle, and an army
overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of the Waag, of
the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of Mongatsch,
would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss for
a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,
which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in
Hungary there are none of much value. In its northern part, this
chain, though not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to
belong to that class of fields of operations which are wholly
mountainous; but, as its evacuation may be compelled by decisive
operations in the valleys of the Waag or the Theiss, it must be
regarded as a temporary barrier. The attack and defense of this
country, however, would be a strategic study of the most
interesting character.
When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or
Switzerland, is but a zone of operations, the importance of
[Pg 162]these mountains is secondary, and they must be
observed like a fortress, the armies deciding the great contests
in the valleys. It will, of course, be otherwise if this be the
whole field.
It has long been a question whether possession of the
mountains gave control of the valleys, or whether possession of
the valleys gave control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles,
a very intelligent and competent judge, has declared for the
latter, and has demonstrated that the valley of the Danube is the
key of Southern Germany. However, in this kind of questions much
depends upon the relative forces and their arrangement in the
country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on Bavaria in
presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter should
throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace
them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be
difficult for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving
so large a force on its flanks masters of the outlets of
Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and Lofers. But if the French force
were one hundred and twenty thousand men, and had gained such
successes as to establish its superiority over the army in its
front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to mask the
passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as
Linz,—as Moreau did in 1800.
Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as
only accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields
of operations, the strategic problem seems to be more
complicated. The campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in
instruction on this branch of the art. In my account of them I
have endeavored to bring out their teachings by a historical
exposition of the events; and I cannot do better than refer my
readers to it.
When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of
Switzerland by the French Directory, and its fatal influence in
doubling the extent of the theater of operations and making it
reach from the Texel to Naples, we cannot too much applaud the
wisdom of France and Austria in the transactions which had for
three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland. Every
one will be convinced of this by carefully studying the
interesting campaigns of the [Pg
163]Archduke Charles,
Suwaroff, and Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau
in 1800. The first is a model for operations upon an entirely
mountainous field; the second is a model for wars in which the
fate of mountainous countries is decided on the plains.
I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow
from this study.
When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the
principal theater of operations, the strategic combinations
cannot be entirely based upon maxims applicable in an open
country.
Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of
operations of the enemy here become always very difficult, and
often impossible. In such a country a considerable army can be
maneuvered only in a small number of valleys, where the enemy
will take care to post advanced guards of sufficient strength to
delay the army long enough to provide means for defeating the
enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate these valleys will
be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for the passage
of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small bodies
of light troops.
The important natural strategic points will be at the junction
of the larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and
will be few in number; and, if the defensive army occupy them
with the mass of its forces, the invader will generally be
compelled to resort to direct attacks to dislodge it.
However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more
rare and difficult, it by no means follows that they are less
important. On the contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining
possession of one of these centers of communication between the
large valleys upon the line of retreat of the enemy, it will be
more serious for the latter than it would be in an open country;
since the occupation of one or two difficult defiles will often
be sufficient to cause the ruin of the whole army.
If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must
be admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the
necessity of covering all the outlets by which an [Pg 164]attack in force may be made upon the decisive
points, and of the difficulties of the transversal marches which
it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points. In
order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and
the difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon
did in 1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was
facilitated by the hundred roads which cross Swabia in all
directions, and if it would have been impracticable in a
mountainous country, for want of transversal routes, to make the
long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to Memmingen, it is also
true that Mack could by these same hundred roads have effected
his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been
entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol,
from which there was but a single outlet.
On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level
country concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy
scatter to occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may
retire, it will be easy for the latter to crush these isolated
bodies; but in a very mountainous country, where there are
ordinarily but one or two principal routes into which other
valleys open, even from the direction of the enemy, the
concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious
inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys
be not observed.
Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic
defense in mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we
are involved when we attempt simply to give advice in such
cases,—to say nothing of laying down maxims for them. If it
were but a question of the defense of a single definite front of
small extent, consisting of four or five converging valleys, the
common junction of which is at a distance of two or three short
marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be easier of
solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the
construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily
turned point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts,
a few brigades of infantry should be stationed to dispute the
passage, while half the army should be [Pg
165]held in reserve
at the junction, where it would be in position either to sustain
the advanced guards most seriously threatened, or to fall upon
the assailant with the whole force when he debouches. If to this
be added good instructions to the commanders of the advanced
guards, whether in assigning them the best point for rendezvous
when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to
continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the
general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks
to the many difficulties which the country offers to the
assailant. But, if there be other fronts like this upon the right
and left, all of which are to be defended, the problem is
changed: the difficulties of the defense increase with the extent
of the fronts, and this system of a cordon of forts becomes
dangerous,—while it is not easy to adopt a better one.
We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the
consideration of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799.
After Jourdan's defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from
Basel by Schaffhausen and Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence
by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had enemies in front of Basel, at
Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch, and at Chur; Bellegarde
threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian army menaced the
Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend such a
circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great
valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura,
toward Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the
mouth of the trap in which the French army was placed. This was,
then, the pivot of the defense. But how could he leave
Schaffhausen unprotected? how abandon Rheineck and the
Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the approach by Berne,
without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the Coalition?
And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would be
his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching
force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate
the masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would
surrender the keys of the [Pg
166]country, and,
besides, it is not easy to say where an inferior army could be
concentrated without compromising it.
After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and
Zurich, it seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to
defend was the line of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon
the Albis,—a line shorter than that of the Rhine, it is
true, but exposed for an immense distance to the attacks of the
Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into Lombardy by the
Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with the
archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to
prove that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable
for defense in a tactical point of view, it is different in a
strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the
troops. This can only be remedied by giving them greater mobility
and by passing often to the offensive.
General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective,
maintains, on the contrary, that, movements being the most
difficult part in this kind of war, the defensive party should
avoid them, since by such a course he might lose the advantages
of the local defenses. He, however, ends by demonstrating that a
passive defense must yield under an active attack,—which
goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in
mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this
point, it ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in
Switzerland, where he sustained himself only by attacking the
enemy at every opportunity, even when he was obliged to seek him
on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard. Napoleon's course was
similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed to Wurmser and
Alvinzi.
As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended
by reading the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the
Saint-Gothard upon the Muttenthal. While we must approve his
maneuvers in endeavoring to capture Lecourbe in the valley of the
Reuss, we must also admire the presence of mind, activity, and
unyielding firmness which saved that general and his division.
Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the Muttenthal, Suwaroff was
placed in the same position as Lecourbe had been, and extricated
himself with equal ability. [Pg
167]Not less
extraordinary was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who
with four thousand men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by
more than thirty thousand allies, and yet succeeded in
maintaining himself behind the Linth after four admirable fights.
These events teach us the vanity of all theory in details,
and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will is worth
more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons, need
I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not
to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights?
Shall I say also that in this kind of war, more than in any
other, operations should be directed upon the communications of
the enemy? And, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of
defense at the confluence of the great valleys, covered by
strategic reserves, combined with great mobility and frequent
offensive movements, will be the best means of defending the
country?
I cannot terminate this article without remarking that
mountainous countries are particularly favorable for defense when
the war is a national one, in which the whole people rise up to
defend their homes with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy
cause imparts: every advance is then dearly bought. But to be
successful it is always necessary that the people be sustained by
a disciplined force, more or less numerous: without this they
must finally yield, like the heroes of Stanz and of the
Tyrol.
The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a
double case: it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains
beyond which are extensive plains, or the whole theater may be
mountainous.
In the first case there is little more to be done than
this,—viz.: make demonstrations upon the whole line of the
frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defense, and
then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest
results. The problem in such a case is to break through a cordon
which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders
than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole
line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and [Pg 168]the
capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw
fourteen thousand men on Innspruck in the midst of thirty
thousand Austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled
them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry
and bold commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be
forced.
The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I.
turned the army which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the
steep mountains between Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is
an example of those insurmountable obstacles which can
always be surmounted. To oppose him it would have been necessary
to adopt a system of cordon; and we have already seen what is to
be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and Italians at Suza
was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it inclosed
them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral
issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops
into these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of
the army toward Turin or Carignano.
When we consider the tactical difficulties of this kind
of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may
be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force
to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash maneuver,
and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as
there are practicable passes. In my opinion, this is one of the
most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what I say it is
only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of Championnet
at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six roads on the
menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; but the
army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they
were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately.
Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He
formed the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on
each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to divide the attention
of the enemy and flank his march.
The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains
[Pg 169]is a much greater and more difficult task than
where a dénouement may be accomplished by a decisive
battle in the open country; for fields of battle for the
deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous region, and
the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it would be
imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and
thus the invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the
wings on two or three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be
too widely separated, the marches being so arranged that the
masses may debouch at the junction of the valleys at nearly the
same instant. The enemy should be driven from all the ridges
which separate these valleys.
Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of
Switzerland would be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were
united in spirit; and with their assistance a disciplined force
might hold its own against a triple number.
To give specific precepts for complications which vary
infinitely with localities, the resources and the condition of
the people and armies, would be absurd. History, well studied and
understood, is the best school for this kind of warfare. The
account of the campaign of 1799 by the Archduke Charles, that of
the campaigns which I have given in my History of the Wars of the
Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of the Grisons by
Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and
the passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good
guides in this study.
ARTICLE XXIX.
Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are
those which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of
intervention. The second are great continental invasions, through
extensive tracts of country, which may be either friendly,
neutral, doubtful, or hostile. The third are of the same nature,
but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous
fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the [Pg 170]seas, to found, defend, or attack distant
colonies. The fifth includes the great descents, where the
distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful
state is attacked.
As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army
on the Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States,
would certainly be stronger and more favorably situated than if
it had reached either of these points by passing over hostile or
even neutral territory; for its base, lines of operations, and
eventual points of support will be the same as those of its
allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense,
provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
arsenals;—while in the other case its resources would be
upon the Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another
example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions.
In spite of the important difference between a war in which a
state is merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken
for its own interest and with its own resources, there are,
nevertheless, dangers in the way of these auxiliary armies, and
perplexity for the commander of all the
armies,—particularly if he belong to the state which is not
a principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805.
General Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of
Bavaria with thirty thousand Russians, to effect a junction with
Mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with the
exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from Donauwerth
by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus found himself with fifty
thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity of Napoleon with
one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune,
he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of about
seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him.
The battle of Austerlitz—due to a fault of
Weyrother—endangered the Russian army anew, since it was so
far from its base. It almost became the victim of a distant
alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of
regaining its own country.
The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in
the expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at
[Pg 171]Bergen in Holland, are examples which should be
well studied by every commander under such circumstances. General
Benningsen's position in 1807 was less disadvantageous, because,
being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his communications with
his base were preserved and his operations were in no respect
dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of the
French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the
parties were allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter
relation the political ties are never woven so closely as to
remove all points of dissension which may compromise military
operations. Examples of this kind have been cited in Article XIX., on political objective
points.
History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant
invasions across extensive territories. When half of Europe was
covered with forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only
horses and iron were necessary to transplant whole nations from
one end of the continent to the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals,
Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran empires in succession. But
since the invention of powder and artillery and the organization
of formidable standing armies, and particularly since
civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally
sustaining each other, no such events have taken place.
Besides these migrations of nations, there were other
expeditions in the Middle Ages, which were of a more military
character, as those of Charlemagne and others. Since the
invention of powder there have been scarcely any, except the
advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of Charles XII. into the
Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the campaigns
of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in Germany were of
a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the Swedes were
only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, besides, the
forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no one
but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he
will be imitated.
[Pg 172]Apart from the modifications which result from
great distances, all invasions, after the armies arrive upon the
actual theater, present the same operations as all other wars. As
the chief difficulty arises from these great distances, we should
recall our maxims on deep lines of operations, strategic
reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and
here it is that their application is indispensable, although even
that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812, although so
ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His care
in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves
that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to
base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest
enterprises may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the
preparations for their success.
If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting
diplomatic precautions; in not uniting under one commander the
different bodies of troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining
ten days too long at Wilna; in giving the command of his right to
his brother, who was unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince
Schwarzenberg a duty which that general could not perform with
the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do not speak now of his error
in remaining in Moscow after the conflagration, since then there
was no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been
so great if the retreat had taken place immediately. He has also
been accused of having too much despised distances, difficulties,
and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin. Before passing
judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to know the
real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have
been possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk
without having previously defeated the Russian army.
It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the
resentment of Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too
surely upon a dénouement between Wilna and the
Dwina. [Pg 173]Although he fully appreciated the bravery of
the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of
the people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty
and sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories
would have given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal
power of Russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation
of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he
neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral
enthusiasm.
The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the
capital point for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to
be given, is "never to attempt them without having secured the
hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough
the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies
of every kind may be accumulated, and which may also in case of
reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the
offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these
operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on
the safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of
eventual bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the
danger; to these should be added a just appreciation of
distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,—in short,
accuracy in calculation and moderation in success, in order that
the enterprise may not be carried too far. We are far from
thinking that any purely military maxims can insure the success
of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five or six have
been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
ruined nations and armies.
Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea,
have been rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades
being the last in date of occurrence; and probably the cause is
that the control of the sea, after having been held in succession
by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of
England, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the
land-forces necessary for such expeditions.
It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of
things now is very different from that existing when Xerxes
marched to the conquest of Greece, followed by four [Pg 174]thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while
his fleet coasted the shore.
Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very
true that the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports
will always be of immense value to any army on shore when the two
can act in concert. Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain
resource, for their progress depends upon the winds,—which
may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is exposed to
great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence.
The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the
line of operations, and the great distance of the principal
objective point, are the only points which require any deviation
from the ordinary operations of war.
Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than
distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. A
French army attacking Cadiz might find a tomb on the
Guadalquivir, although well based upon the Pyrenees and
possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the Tagus.
Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without
going as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of
disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the
country, will all be elements in determining the extent of the
enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion them
well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is
a great talent in a general. Although diplomacy does not play so
important a part in these invasions as in those more distant, it
is still of importance; since, as stated in Article VI., there is no enemy, however
insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an
ally. The influence which the change of policy of the Duke of
Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that day, and the
effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and of
Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war,
when their co-operation cannot be obtained.
[Pg 175]
EPITOME OF STRATEGY
The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably
fulfilled by what has been stated in reference to the strategic
combinations which enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We
have seen, from the definition at the beginning of this chapter,
that, in the most important operations in war, strategy
fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon
tactics for their execution. Therefore, before treating of
these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the
combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the
maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental
principle of war may be made.
By this method these operations, half strategic and half
tactical, will be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the
first place, I will give a synopsis of the contents of the
preceding chapter.
From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude
that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all
possible theaters of operations is found in what
follows:—
1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which
the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may
afford, in accordance with Article
XVIII.
2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the
strategic field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be
done to the enemy with the least risk to one's self.
3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the
lines of operations; adopting for defense the concentric system
of the Archduke Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that
of Soult in 1814, for retreats parallel to the frontiers.
[Pg 176]On the offensive we should follow the system which
led to the success of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he
directed his line upon the extremity of the strategic front; or
we might adopt his plan which was successful in 1796, 1809, and
1814, of directing the line of operations upon the center of the
strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the
respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
presented in Article XXI.
4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by
giving them such directions as always to be able to act with the
greater mass of the forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy
from concentrating or from affording each other mutual
support.
5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all
strategic positions, and all large detachments made to cover the
most important strategic points of the theater of war.
6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility
and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points
where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear
upon fractions of the hostile army.
The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the
effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part
of that of the enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure
success; but its effect will be quintupled if the marches be
skillfully directed upon the decisive strategic points of the
zone of operations, where the severest blows to the enemy can be
given.
However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this
decisive course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be
content with attaining a part of the object of every enterprise,
by rapid and successive employment of his forces upon isolated
bodies of the enemy, thus insuring their defeat. A general who
moves his masses rapidly and continually, and gives them proper
directions, may be confident both of gaining victories and of
securing great results therefrom.
The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths
most satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in
[Pg 177]1793, already mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may
be found in Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the
Revolution. Forty battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk
to Menin, Maubeuge, and Landau, by reinforcing the armies already
at those points, gained four victories and saved France. The
whole science of marches would have been found in this wise
operation had it been directed upon the decisive strategic point.
The Austrian was then the principal army of the Coalition, and
its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon the Meuse
that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the most
severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the
most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at
Ratisbon. The whole of strategy is contained in these four
examples.
It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of
strategy is to be able to assure real advantages to the army by
preparing the theater of war most favorable for its operations,
if they take place in its own country, by the location of
fortified places, of intrenched camps, and of têtes de
ponts, and by the opening of communications in the great
decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting
part of the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize
these lines and these decisive points, whether permanent or
temporary. Napoleon has afforded instruction on this point by the
roads of the Simplon and Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has
profited by it in the roads from the Tyrol to Lombardy, the
Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by different fortified
places projected or completed.
[Pg 178]
CHAPTER IV.
GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about
great questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy
directs armies to the decisive points of a zone of operations,
and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics,
aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories.
Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations
preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The
guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of
strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a
part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of
which promises the most important results.
Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and
deciding features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as
armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the
occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable
affairs. It is also true that a complete and decided victory may
give rise to results of the same character when there may have
been no grand strategic combinations.
The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of
causes which are not always within the scope of the military art:
the nature of the order of battle adopted, the greater or less
wisdom displayed in the plan of the battle, as well as the manner
of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and
enlightened co-operation of the officers subordinate to the
commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the proportions and
quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry,
and the manner of handling these arms; but it is the
morale of armies, as well as of nations, more than any
thing else, which makes victories and their results decisive.
Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting that a battle not
characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot result
[Pg 179]in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama,
Hannibal, in a few brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of
glory and success vanish before his eyes, although Scipio never
had a thought of turning his position. At Rivoli the
turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver more
successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As is
evident from Article XXXII., I by no
means intend to discourage the use of that maneuver, being, on
the contrary, a constant advocate of it; but it is very important
to know how to use it skillfully and opportunely, and I am,
moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's design to make
himself master of his enemy's communications while at the same
time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
tactical combinations to accomplish it.
There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or
those fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await
the enemy's attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks
another in position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and
resulting from the collision of two armies meeting on the march.
We will examine in succession the different combinations they
present.
ARTICLE XXX.
Positions and Defensive Battles.
When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and
forms its line of battle. From the general definitions given at
the beginning of this work, it will appear that I make a
distinction between lines of battle and orders of
battle,—things which have been constantly confounded. I
will designate as a line of battle the position occupied
by battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an
army will take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground
where it will await attack, having no particular project in view
for the future: it is the right name to give to a body of troops
formed with proper tactical intervals and distances upon one or
more lines, as will be more fully explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will
designate as an order of [Pg
180]battle an
arrangement of troops indicating an intention to execute a
certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
oblique order, the perpendicular order.
This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up
a proper distinction between two things which should by no means
be confounded.[22] From the nature of the two
things, it is evident that the line of battle belongs
especially to defensive arrangements; because an army awaiting an
attack without knowing what or where it will be must necessarily
form a rather indefinite and objectless line of battle. Order
of battle, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that
the line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a
body of troops may in this formation very well proceed to the
attack of a position, while an army on the defensive may use the
oblique order or any other. I refer above only to ordinary
cases.
Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a
war of positions, an army may often find it proper to await the
enemy at a favorable point, strong by nature and selected
beforehand for the purpose of there fighting a defensive battle.
Such a position may be taken up when the object is to cover an
important objective point, such as a capital, large depots, or a
decisive strategic point which controls the surrounding country,
or, finally, to cover a siege.
There are two kinds of positions,—the strategic,
which has [Pg 181]been discussed in Article
XX., and the tactical. The latter, again, are
subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions
occupied to await the enemy under cover of works more or less
connected,—in a word, intrenched camps. Their relations to
strategic operations have been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense
are discussed in Article XXXV.
Secondly, we have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp
for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third and last are
open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the defensive. The
characteristics to be sought in these positions vary according to
the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance not to
be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very
steep and difficult of access,—quite suitable places,
probably, for temporary camps, but not always the best for
battle-grounds. A position of this kind, to be really strong,
must be not only steep and difficult of access, but should be
adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as
many advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the
principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles
presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the
enemy than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that
Massena, in taking the strong position of the Albis, would have
made a great error if his chief strength had been in cavalry and
artillery; whilst it was exactly what was wanted for his
excellent infantry. For the same reason, Wellington, whose whole
dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a good choice of
position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach were well
swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,
rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
battle-ground.
The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical
positions are the following:—
1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him
to approach the line of battle.
2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.
3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the
move[Pg 182]ments of troops between the wings, that they may
be massed upon any point deemed the proper one.
4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's
movements.
5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.
6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or
artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon
their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center,
or at least some point of the front.
This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army
rests on a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and
the smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the
result of the broken line being forced back upon the very
obstacles which seemed to afford perfect protection. This
danger—about which there can be no doubt—gives rise
to the thought that points admitting an easy defense are better
on a battle-field than insurmountable obstacles.[23]
7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is
remedied by throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous;
because a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the
enemy may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in
the angle of the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close
column behind the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to
fulfill the required condition than the crotchet; but the nature
of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two
methods. Full details on this point are given in the description
of the battle of Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years'
War.)
8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover
the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles
[Pg 183]on other points of the front, of such a character
as to compel an attack upon the center. Such a position will
always be one of the most advantageous for defense,—as was
shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo. Great obstacles are not
essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the
ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet
of Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington's center, instead of
the left as he had been ordered.
When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken
to hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
idle spectators of it.
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means
are but palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on
the defensive is to know how to take the offensive at a
proper time, and to take it. Among the conditions to be
satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of
enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an
examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a
good road behind the center and each wing, have its retreat
compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle?
My own opinion is that such a position would be more favorable
for a retreat than an entirely open field; for a beaten army
could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger.
Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a portion of the
artillery left in battery in front of the forest would, in all
probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a
plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat
than a forest,—this statement being made upon the
supposition that there are at least two good roads behind the
line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the
enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally,
that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before
the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case
at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, as at
Waterloo, the forest formed a con[Pg
184]cave line behind
the center; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to
receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession
on the main roads.
When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the
varying chances which the two systems, the defensive and
the offensive, give rise to; and it was seen that
especially in strategy the army taking the initiative has the
great advantage of bringing up its troops and striking a blow
where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon the
defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction,
is often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its
movements by those of the enemy. We have also seen that in
tactics these advantages are not so marked, because in this case
the operations occupy a smaller extent of ground, and the party
taking the initiative cannot conceal his movements from the
enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once counteract them by
the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party advancing upon the
enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising from
accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile
line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always
inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets,
hedges, farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be
taken possession of or be passed by. To these natural obstacles
may also be added the enemy's batteries to be carried, and the
disorder which always prevails to a greater or less extent in a
body of men exposed to a continued fire either of musketry or
artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all
must agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting
from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.
However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still
more manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events
of history. Every army which maintains a strictly defensive
attitude must, if attacked, be at last driven from its position;
whilst by profiting by all the advantages of the defensive
system, and holding itself ready to take the offensive when
occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest [Pg 185]success. A general who stands motionless to
receive his enemy, keeping strictly on the defensive, may fight
ever so bravely, but he must give way when properly attacked. It
is not so, however, with a general who indeed waits to receive
his enemy, but with the determination to fall upon him
offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and transfer
to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main
strength into the action at the most important point,—a
thing altogether impossible when keeping strictly on the
defensive. In fact, a general who occupies a well-chosen
position, where his movements are free, has the advantage of
observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously arranged
in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries placed
so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies;
and when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself
strongly assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in
his hands, the advantage will, in all probability, be his no
longer, for the moral effect of such a counter-attack upon the
part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to
stagger the boldest troops.
A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal
success either the offensive or defensive system; but it is
indispensable,—1st, that, so far from limiting himself to a
passive defense, he should know how to take the offensive at
favorable moments; 2d, that his coup-d'oeil be certain and
his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able to rely surely upon
his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he should by no
means neglect to apply the general principle which would have
regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning;
5th, that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths
are demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz,
as well as by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at
Waterloo.
FOOTNOTES:
[22]
It is from no desire to make innovations that I have modified
old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is
wrong for the same word to designate two very different things;
and, if we continue to apply the term order of battle to
the disposition of troops in line, it must be improper to
designate certain important maneuvers by the terms oblique
order of battle, concave order of battle, and it
becomes necessary to use instead the terms oblique system of
battle, &c.
I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The
order of battle on paper may take the name plan of
organization, and the ordinary formation of troops upon the
ground will then be called line of battle.
[23]
The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and the
rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the
Danube, in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps
be said that the courage of the defenders in the two cases was
not the same; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it
must be granted that the difficulties of a position, when
properly taken advantage of, need not be insurmountable in order
to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen the great height and
steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost ineffectual,
were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.
[Pg 186]
ARTICLE XXXI.
Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.
We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights
when assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the
strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an
attack, and an army receiving an attack may, during the progress
of the battle, take the offensive and obtain the advantages
incident to it. History furnishes numerous examples of battles of
each of these kinds. As defensive battles have been discussed in
the preceding article, and the advantages of the defensive been
pointed out, we will now proceed to the consideration of
offensive movements.
It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral
advantage over the assailed, and almost always acts more
understandingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a
state of uncertainty.
As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of
attack must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to
be called order of battle.
It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be
commenced without a detailed plan, because the position of the
enemy is not entirely known. In either case it should be well
understood that there is in every battle-field a decisive point,
the possession of which, more than of any other, helps to secure
the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application
of the principles of war: arrangements should therefore be made
for striking the decisive blow upon this point.
The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has
been already stated, by the character of the position, the
bearing of different localities upon the strategic object in
view, and, finally, by the arrangement of the contending forces.
For example, suppose an enemy's flank to rest upon high ground
from which his whole line might be attained, the occupation of
this height seems most important, tactically considered; but it
may happen that the height in question is very [Pg 187]difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to
be of the least importance, strategically considered. At the
battle of Bautzen the left of the allies rested upon the steep
mountains of Bohemia, which province was at that time rather
neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically considered, the
slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be held, when
it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line of
retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing
the right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of
retreat and throw the allies into the mountains, where they might
have lost all their matériel and a great part of
the personnel of their army. This course was also easier for them
on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led
to more important results, and would have diminished the
obstacles in the future.
The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has
been stated: 1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not
always the tactical key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field
is certainly that which combines strategic with topographical
advantages; 3. When the difficulties of the ground are not too
formidable upon the strategic point of the battle-field, this is
generally the most important point; 4. It is nevertheless true
that the determination of this point depends very much upon the
arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines of battle
too much extended and divided the center will always be the
proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the
center is the strongest point, since, independently of the
reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks:
the decisive point in this case is therefore one of the
extremities of the line. When the numerical superiority is
considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon both
extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or
inferior numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that
all the combinations of a battle consist in so employing the
force in hand as to obtain the most effective action upon that
one of the three points mentioned which offers the greatest
number of chances of success,—a point very easily
determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.
[Pg 188]The object of an offensive battle can only be to
dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by
strategic maneuvers to ruin his army completely. An enemy is
dislodged either by overthrowing him at some point of his line,
or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank and rear, or by
using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him in front
while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line
turned.
To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to
make choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method
to be used.
At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1.
The simple parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive
or offensive crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both
wings; 4. The order reinforced in the center; 5. The simple
oblique order, or the oblique reinforced on the attacking wing; 6
and 7. The perpendicular order on one or both wings; 8. The
concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The order by echelon on
one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the center; 12.
The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the center
and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)
Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has
been stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column
intended to turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper
appreciation of the merits of each, it becomes necessary to test
each by the application of the general principles which have been
laid down. For example, it is manifest that the parallel order
(Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it requires no
skill to fight one line against another, batta[Pg 189]lion against battalion, with equal chances of
success on either side: no tactical skill is needed in such a
battle.
There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable
order, which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in
great strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon
the enemy's communications and cutting off his line of retreat
while covering its own; when the battle takes place between them,
that army which has reached the rear of the other may use the
parallel order, for, having effected the decisive maneuver
previous to the battle, all its efforts should now be directed
toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to open a way
through for himself. Except for this single case, the parallel
order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle
cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the
other must gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the
advantage will then be upon his side who has the best troops, who
best knows when to engage them, who best manages his reserve and
is most favored by fortune.
Fig. 6.
The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most usually adopted in a defensive
position. It may be also the result of an offensive combination;
but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in the case of
defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very
remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is
exposed if properly attacked.
Fig. 7.
The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the center, (Fig.
8,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favorable than
the two preceding ones, and is also much more in accordance with
the [Pg 190]general principles which have been laid down;
although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of
the line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have
its own safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the
enemy.
Fig. 8.
Fig. 9.
The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best
for an inferior force attacking a superior; for, in addition to
the advantage of bringing the main strength of the forces against
a single point of the enemy's line, it has two others equally
important, since the weakened wing is not only kept back from the
attack of the enemy, but performs also the double duty of holding
in position the part of his line not attacked, and of being at
hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged
wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the
battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of
its use in modern times was given by Frederick the Great at the
battle of Leuthen. (See Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand
Operations.)
Fig. 10.
Fig. 11.
The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs.
10 and 11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the
direction along which the primary tactical move[Pg 191]ments might be made in a battle. Two armies will
never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions indicated
in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first
position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of
the army A, the latter would at once change the front of a
portion of its line; and even the army B, as soon as it extended
itself to or beyond the extremity of A, must of necessity turn
its columns either to the right or the left, in order to bring
them near the enemy's line, and so take him in reverse, as at C,
the result being two oblique lines, as shown in Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the
assailing army would take a position perpendicular to the enemy's
wing, whilst the remainder of the army would approach in front
for the purpose of annoying him; and this would always bring us
back to one of the oblique orders shown in Figures 9 and 16.
The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack
adopted, may be very advantageous, but it is only admissible when
the assailant is very decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the
fundamental principle is to bring the main strength of the forces
upon the decisive point, a weaker army would violate it in
directing a divided attack against a superior force. This truth
will be clearly demonstrated farther on.
Fig. 12.
The order concave in the center (Fig.
12) has found advocates since the day when Hannibal by its
use gained the battle of Cannæ. This order may indeed be
very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to
it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires
before him, and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings.
But, if this order is adopted before the battle begins, the
enemy, instead of falling on the center, has only to attack the
wings, which present their extremities and are in precisely the
same relative situation as if they had been assailed in flank.
This order would, therefore, be scarcely [Pg 192]ever used except against an enemy who had taken
the convex order to fight a battle, as will be seen farther
on.
Fig. 12 bis.
An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a
broken line with the center retired, (Fig. 12,
bis.) If several writers may be believed, such an
arrangement gave the victory to the English on the famous days of
Crécy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than a
semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to
attack, whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and
preserving all the advantages of concentration of fire. These
advantages vanish if the enemy, instead of foolishly throwing
himself upon the retired center, is content to watch it from a
distance and makes his greatest effort upon one wing. Essling, in
1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a concave line;
but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an error in
attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube behind
it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of
communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to
maneuver at pleasure.
Fig. 13.
The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an engagement immediately upon
the passage of a river when the wings must be retired and rested
on the river to cover the bridges; also when a defensive battle
is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be passed and
the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may become a
natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If
an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a
single wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole
army.[26]
[Pg 193]The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were
successful, because the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a
strong attack upon the center or upon a single extremity, divided
his attack upon five or six diverging lines, and particularly
upon both wings at once. Nearly the same convex order was adopted
at Essling, and during the second and third days of the famous
battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had just the result
that might have been expected.
Fig. 14.
The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig.
14 is of the same nature as the perpendicular order,
(Fig. 11,) being, however, better than
that, because, the echelons being nearest each other in the
direction where the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be
less able, both as regards room and time, to throw himself into
the interval of the center and make at that point a threatening
counter-attack.
Fig. 15.
The order by echelon on the center (Fig.
15) may be used with special success against an army
occupying a position too much cut up and too extended, because,
its center being then somewhat isolated from the wings and liable
to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be probably
destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental
principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain
of success against an army having a connected and closed line;
for the reserve being generally near the center, and the wings
being able to act either by concentrating their fire or by moving
against the foremost echelons, might readily repulse them.
[Pg 194]If this formation to some extent resembles the
famous triangular wedge or boar's head of the ancients,
and the column of Winkelried, it also differs from them
essentially; for, instead of forming one solid mass,—an
impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of
artillery,—it would have a large open space in the middle,
which would render movements more easy. This formation is
suitable, as has been said, for penetrating the center of a line
too much extended, and might be equally successful against a line
unavoidably immovable; but if the wings of the attacked line are
brought at a proper time against the flanks of the foremost
echelons, disagreeable consequences might result. A parallel
order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be a
much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line
in this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the
enemy as to the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from
taking the echelons of the center by the flank.
This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of
the intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand
Operations, chapter xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable;
for it is then certain that the defensive army being forced to
remain within its intrenchments, there is no danger of its
attacking the echelons in flank. But, this formation having the
inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point of his line
which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made upon
the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.
Fig. 16.
The order of attack in columns on the center and on one
extremity at the same time (Fig. 16) is
better than the preceding, especially in an attack upon an
enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may even be
called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The
attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy,
prevents the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking
him in flank, as [Pg 195]was done by Hannibal and Marshal
Saxe. The enemy's wing which is hemmed in between the attacks on
the center and at the extremity, having to contend with nearly
the entire opposing force, will be defeated and probably
destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his victories
of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at
Borodino,—where he obtained only a partial success, on
account of the heroic conduct of the Russian left and the
division of Paskevitch in the famous central redoubt, and on
account of the arrival of Baggavout's corps on the wing he hoped
to outflank. He used it also at Bautzen,—where an
unprecedented success would have been the result, but for an
accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing
intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
arrangement having been made with that view.
It should be observed that these different orders are not to
be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them.
A general who would expect to arrange his line of battle as
regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly
mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat. This is
particularly true as battles are now fought. In the time of Louis
XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to form lines of battle
almost as regular as the geometrical figures, because armies
camped under tents, almost always closely collected together, and
were in presence of each other several days, thus giving ample
time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns
to be at regular distances from each other. But in our
day,—when armies bivouac, when their division into several
corps gives greater mobility, when they take position near each
other in obedience to orders given them while out of reach of the
general's eye, and often when there has been no time for thorough
examination of the enemy's position,—finally, when the
different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of
battle,—under these circumstances, all orders of battle
which must be laid out with great accuracy of detail are
impracticable. These [Pg
196]figures have
never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
arrangements.
If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit
under the influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought,
the art of winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most
favorable order of battle, and a general could reckon with
certainty upon the success of maneuvers arranged beforehand. But
the facts are altogether different; for the great difficulty of
the tactics of battles will always be to render certain the
simultaneous entering into action of the numerous fractions whose
efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give good
ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty
is to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the
decisive maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of
the battle, is to result in victory.
Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they
will be understood and executed by the subordinates of the
general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in
others, a defective coup-d'oeil militaire,—every
thing of this kind may interfere with the simultaneous entering
into action of the different parts, without speaking of the
accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the arrival
of a corps at the appointed place.
Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a
decisive maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2.
Sudden maneuvers seasonably executed during an engagement are
more likely to succeed than those determined upon in advance,
unless the latter, relating to previous strategic movements, will
bring up the columns which are to decide the day upon those
points where their presence will secure the expected result.
Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the moment when
Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the
French, and they could then only fight to make the defeat less
complete. In like manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached
Klix, the retreat of the allies during the night of the 20th of
May could alone have saved them, for on the 21st it was too late;
and, if Ney had [Pg 197]executed better what he was advised
to do, the victory would have been a very great one.
As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations
upon the co-operation of columns proceeding from the general
front of the army, with the intention of effecting large detours
around an enemy's flank, it may be stated that their result is
always doubtful, since it depends upon such an accurate execution
of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely seen. This subject will
be considered in Art. XXXII.
Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application
of an order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that
battles begin without even the assailant having a well-defined
object, although the collision may have been expected. This
uncertainty results either from circumstances prior to the
battle, from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans, or from
the fact that a portion of the army may be still expected to
arrive on the field.
From these things many people have concluded that it is
impossible to reduce to different systems the formations of
orders of battle, or that the adoption of either of them can at
all influence the result of an engagement,—an erroneous
conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases cited above. Indeed,
in battles begun without any predetermined plan it is probable
that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some
point; the party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what
quarter the storm will burst upon him, will hold a large part of
his forces in reserve, to be used as occasion may require; the
assailant must make similar efforts to have his forces well in
hand; but as soon as the point of attack shall have been
determined, the mass of his troops will be directed against the
center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,—which
will, it is hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this
classification of the different systems or orders of battle is
neither fanciful nor useless.
[Pg 198]There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which
disproves my assertion, although they are less susceptible than
any others of being represented by lines accurately laid down. We
see him, however, at Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon,
concentrating his forces toward the center to be ready at the
favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. At the Pyramids he
formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At Leipsic,
Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like
Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether
like Fig. 16, bringing up two masses upon
the center and right, while keeping back the left wing; and this
he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the
Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost
entirely unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and
offensive movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left
almost perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was
endeavoring to break through the center; but these attacks were
not simultaneous, that on the center being repulsed at eleven
o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack vigorously upon the left
until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the two wings, for
the first time probably in his life, because his center was
covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in
addition, the attack of his left was combined with that of
Vandamme upon the enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may
credit Napoleon himself, the oblique order he assumed, resting
his right at Castel Ceriole, saved him from almost inevitable
defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by strategy before they
were fought, tactics having but little to do with them. At Ulm
there was not even a regular battle.
I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to
desire to mark out upon the ground orders of battle in such
regular lines as would be used in tracing them on a sketch, a
skillful general may nevertheless bear in mind the orders which
have been indicated above, and may so combine his troops on the
battle-field that the arrangement shall be similar to one of
them. He should endeavor in all his combinations, whether
deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to
form a sound conclusion as to the [Pg
199]important point
of the battle-field; and this he can only do by observing well
the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting
the direction in which strategy requires him to operate. He will
then give his attention and efforts to this point, using a third
of his force to keep the enemy in check or watch his movements,
while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point the possession
of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he will have
satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can
impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art
in the most perfect manner. The manner of determining the
decisive point of a battle-field has been described in the
preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)
Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has
occurred to me that this would be a proper place to reply to
several statements made in the Memoirs of Napoleon published by
General Montholon.
The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern
invention, a theorist's fancy,—an opinion I can by no means
share; for the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and
I have seen it used with my own eyes. This assertion of
Napoleon's seems the more remarkable because Napoleon himself
boasted of having used, at Marengo, the very order of which he
thus denies the existence.
If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in
the rigid and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the
Berlin school. Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an
absurdity; but I repeat that a line of battle never was a regular
geometrical figure, and when such figures are used in discussing
the combinations of tactics it can only be for the purpose of
giving definite expression to an idea by the use of a known
symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of battle which
is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must be
oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of
another army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing
troops upon it while the weakened wing is kept retired from
attack, the direction of the line [Pg
200]must of necessity
be a little oblique, since one end of it will be nearer the enemy
than the other. The oblique order is so far from being a mere
fancy that we see it used when the order is that by echelons on
one wing, (Fig. 14.)
As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be
denied that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the
Austrians was a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In
these orders parallel lines may be used as in the case of
straight lines, and they would be classified as belonging to the
parallel system when no part of the line was more strongly
occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than another.
Laying aside for the present further consideration of these
geometrical figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose
of fighting battles in a truly scientific manner, the following
points must be attended to:—
1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to
force the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.
2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to
overwhelm one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same
time. An enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking
and turning his position.
3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success
if concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the
assault.
4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time,
without having very superior forces, would be entirely in
opposition to the rules of the art, unless one of these attacks
can be made very strongly without weakening the line too much at
the other points.
5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at
least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon
one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of
danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single
oblique line.
6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.
[Pg 201]7. The object of the defense being to defeat the
plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive
order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of
approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve,
well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a
point where the enemy least expect to meet it.
8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best
method to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position.
An order of battle would be perfect which united the double
advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect
produced by an onset. A skillful mixture of deployed lines and
columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always
be a good combination. In the practical use of this system many
variations must arise from differences in the coup-d'oeil
of commanders, the morale of officers and soldiers, their
familiarity with maneuvers and firings of all sorts, from varying
localities, &c.
9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the
enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible,
the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material
force as can be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens,
however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful
utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank
and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat.
He may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly
and successfully if attacked by main force.
History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them
when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these
turning movements with attacks by main force.
10. The combination of these two methods—that is to say,
the attack in front by main force and the turning
maneuver—will render the victory more certain than the use
of either sepa[Pg 202]rately; but, in all cases, too
extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a
contemptible enemy.
11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main
force is the following:—Throw his troops into confusion by
a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, increase this
confusion by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the
advantages thus gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well
covered in front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.
But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon
the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after
that, the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the
attacking party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not
the moral effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion
the retreat of the second and cause the general in command to
lose his presence of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will
usually be somewhat disordered, even in victory, and it will
often be very difficult to replace them by those of the second
line, because they generally follow the first line at such a
distance as not to come within musket-range of the enemy; and it
is always embarrassing to substitute one division for another in
the heat of battle, at the moment when the enemy is putting forth
all his strength in repelling the attack.
These considerations lead to the belief that if the general
and the troops of the defensive army are equally active in the
performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind,
if their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the
advantage will usually be on their side at the second collision
of the battle; but to insure that result their second line and
the cavalry must be launched against the victorious battalions of
the adversary at the proper instant; for the loss of a few
minutes may be irreparable, and the second line may be drawn into
the confusion of the first.
12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following
truth: "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of
all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists
in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the
second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper
employment of masses of cavalry and of batteries, to [Pg 203]assist in striking the decisive blow at the second
line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all the
problems of the tactics of battles."
In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an
uncertain guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can
never compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a
sufficient substitute for that intuitive coup-d'oeil
imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery
and coolness.
The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of
all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the
critical moment of the battle, be the problem which every
skillful general will attempt to solve and to which he should
give his whole attention. This critical moment is usually when
the first line of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of
both contestants are put forth,—on the one side to complete
the victory, on the other to wrest it from the enemy. It is
scarcely necessary to say that, to make this decisive blow more
certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's
flank would be very advantageous.
13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is
to be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops
as skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses.
The object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion
the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and
musketry will be the natural defensive means of the first line,
and when the enemy presses too closely the columns of the second
line and part of the cavalry must be launched against him. There
will then be a strong probability of his repulse.
FOOTNOTES:
[24]
In every battle one party must be the assailant and the other
assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
defensive for the other.
[25]
The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve orders
indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of
battle ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed
in columns of attack, in squares, or checkerwise.
[26]
An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in some
cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a
rule, a false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack
against one extremity, would be the best method to use against
such a line.
[27]
The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when it is
necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons.
Moreau decided the battle of Engen with four companies of
infantry; and what Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo
is known to every reader of history.
[Pg 204]
ARTICLE XXXII.
Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.
We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers
undertaken to turn an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of
the advantages which may be expected from them. A few words
remain to be said as to the wide détours which these
maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many
plans seemingly well arranged.
It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is
dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an
opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder
of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very
much upon the rapid and certain coup-d'oeil of the
opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and
succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would
have been hazardous in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or
Wellington might have entire success against a general of limited
capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at
the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of
moving in this manner.
It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the
subject. The following directions are all that can be given. Keep
the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper
moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of
accumulating troops in too large bodies. A commander observing
these precautions will be always prepared for any thing that may
happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and seems
inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
more daring.
A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the
reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the
results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of
the generals and the armies concerned in them.
In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of
[Pg 205]Prague because the Austrians had left a
feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their
right and the remainder of their army,—the latter part
remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This
inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians
had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support
their right than Frederick had to attack it; for the right was in
the form of a crotchet, and Frederick was obliged to move on the
arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of
Torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too
extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of
turning the right of Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the
right by a concentric movement to the heights of Siptitz, where
he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed.
The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are
familiar with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of
staff Weyrother wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which
was concentrated on the plateau of Rivoli. Their center was
beaten,—while their left was piled up in the ravine of the
Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making a wide
détour to get upon the rear of the French army,
where he was speedily surrounded and captured.
No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived
the unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a
united army of sixty thousand men by three small divisions of
seven thousand or eight thousand men, separated by distances of
several leagues, whilst Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army,
(thirteen thousand men,) was to pass twelve miles beyond the
right flank and get in rear of this army of sixty thousand men,
which could not help being victorious over these divided
fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a
miracle.
We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother,
[Pg 206]who had desired to surround Napoleon at Rivoli,
attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe
lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of the allied
army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off from
Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular
movement of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a
half in their line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell
upon the center, and surrounded their left, which was completely
shut up between Lakes Tellnitz and Melnitz.
Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very
similar to Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his
retreat to Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his
line,—seeing which, the English general entirely defeated
his left wing, that had no support.
If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at
Austerlitz, he might have destroyed the French army, instead of
suffering in each case a total defeat; for the general who at
Stockach attacked a mass of sixty thousand men with four small
bodies of troops so much separated as to be unable to give mutual
aid would not have known how to take proper advantage of a wide
detour effected in his presence. In the same way, Marmont was
unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief merit
was a rapid and practiced tactical coup-d'oeil. With the
Duke of York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably
have been successful.
Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day,
Waterloo and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these
the first was almost altogether a strategic operation, and was
attended with a rare concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As
to Hohenlinden, we will search in vain in military history for
another example of a single brigade venturing into a forest in
the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such
astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in the defile of
Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all probability, to
lay down his arms.
At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly
to the successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack
upon the center under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Berna[Pg 207]dotte had not rendered opportune assistance, it is
by no means certain that a like success would have been the
result.
So many examples of conflicting results might induce the
conclusion that no rule on this subject can be given; but this
would be erroneous; for it seems, on the contrary, quite evident
that, by adopting as a rule an order of battle well closed and
well connected, a general will find himself prepared for any
emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially
important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's
character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in
numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be
imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same
capacity. A maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be
connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an
attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either
against the wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic
operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving
battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its
own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and
effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver
during the battle.
FOOTNOTES:
[28]
For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and XXV.
of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.
ARTICLE XXXIII.
Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the
march gives rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.
In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy
in a position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a
reconnoissance as close and accurate as possible. It often
happens, however,—especially as war is now carried
on,—that two armies approach each other, each intending to
make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision ensues
unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by
another which has prepared a surprise for it,—as happened
to the French at Rossbach.
[Pg 208]A great occasion of this kind calls into play all
the genius of a skillful general and of the warrior able to
control events. It is always possible to gain a battle with brave
troops, even where the commander may not have great capacity; but
victories like those of Lutzen, Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can
only be gained by a brilliant genius endowed with great coolness
and using the wisest combinations.
There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is
by no means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but
these are the very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly
before the mind the fundamental principles of the art and the
different methods of applying them, in order to a proper
arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided upon at the instant
and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.
Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their
camp-equipage, and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better
at first than cause their advanced guard to deploy to the right
or left of the roads they are traversing. In each army the forces
should at the same time be concentrated so that they may be
thrown in a proper direction considering the object of the march.
A grave error would be committed in deploying the whole army
behind the advanced guard; because, even if the deployment were
accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the
advanced guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be
the rout of the troops which were forming. (See the account of
the battle of Rossbach, Treatise on Grand Operations.)
In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved,
marching upon several roads, and divided into masses which may
act independently, these routs are not so much to be feared; but
the principles are unchanged. The advanced guard must always be
halted and formed, and then the mass of the troops concentrated
in that direction which is best suited for carrying out the
object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the enemy may then
attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.
[Pg 209]
ARTICLE XXXIV.
Of Surprises of Armies.
I shall not speak here of surprises of small
detachments,—the chief features in the wars of partisan or
light troops, for which the light Russian and Turkish cavalry are
so well adapted. I shall confine myself to an examination of the
surprise of whole armies.
Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily
effected than at present; for the reports of artillery and
musketry firing are heard to so great a distance that the
surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility, unless the
first duties of field-service are forgotten and the enemy is in
the midst of the army before his presence is known because there
are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War presents
a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that a
surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from
the combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of,
one extremity of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not
necessary to take it so entirely unawares that the troops will
not even have emerged from their tents, but it is sufficient to
attack it in force at the point intended, before preparations can
be made to meet the attack.
As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a
march, prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in
order to plan one it becomes necessary to have an accurate
knowledge of the enemy's camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at
Eylau there was something like a surprise; but this term should
only be applied to an entirely unexpected attack. The only great
surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in 1812, where
Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force;
but there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised
through his own negligence.
It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an
army is to fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the
[Pg 210]moment when nothing of the sort is expected.
Confusion in the camp will certainly take place; and, if the
assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can give
a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen
events occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in
war, although it is rare, and less brilliant than a great
strategic combination which renders the victory certain even
before the battle is fought.
For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all
opportunities for surprising an adversary, the necessary
precautions should be used to prevent such attacks. The
regulations for the government of any well-organized army should
point out the means for doing the last.
ARTICLE XXXV.
Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched
Camps or Lines.—Of Coups de Main in General.
There are many fortified places which, although not regular
fortresses, are regarded as secure against coups de main,
but may nevertheless be carried by escalade or assault, or
through breaches not altogether practicable, but so steep as to
require the use of ladders or some other means of getting to the
parapet.
The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same
combinations as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to
the class of coups de main.
This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with
the strength of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground
on which they are built; 3d, with the fact of their being
isolated or connected; 4th, with the morale of the respective
parties. History gives us examples of all of these varieties.
For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and
Warsaw, the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of
Feldkirch, Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several
cases, each with varying circumstances and results. At Kehl
(1796) the intrenchments were better connected and better
constructed than at Warsaw. There [Pg
211]was, in fact, a
tête de pont nearly equal to a permanent
fortification; for the archduke thought himself obliged to
besiege it in form, and it would have been extremely hazardous
for him to make an open attack upon it. At Warsaw the works were
isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had as a keep a
large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended by a
number of desperate men.
Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one
front of which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet
than such as was suited to a field-work. The camp proper was
protected by simple redoubts, at considerable distances apart,
very poorly built, the keep giving it its sole strength.[29]
At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of
circumvallation; but if in the first case they were strong, they
were certainly not so at Turin, where upon one of the important
points there was an insignificant parapet with a command of three
feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. In the latter case, also,
the lines were between two fires, as they were attacked in rear
by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene assailed
them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the
right flank.
The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works
are few in number. If it seems probable that a work may be
surprised if attacked a little before day, it is altogether
proper to make the attempt; but if this operation may be
recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by no means to be
expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp will
permit itself to be surprised,—especially as the
regulations of all services require armies to stand to their arms
at dawn. As an attack by main force seems likely to be the method
followed in this case, the following simple and reasonable
directions are laid down:—
1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful
artillery-fire,[Pg 212] which at the same time has the
effect of discouraging the defenders.
2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
mount the parapet.
3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
support.
4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get
cover for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as
possible.
5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to
their duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the
manner of attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the
bodies of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops
if the ground permits. When all these arrangements are made,
there is nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to
the attack as actively as possible, while a detachment makes an
attempt at the gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are
worse than the most daring rashness.
Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare
soldiers for escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers
may with great advantage give their attention to providing means
for facilitating the passage of the ditches of field-works and
climbing their parapets.
Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I
have read, none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw
and the intrenched camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description
of Laudon's dispositions for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz,
which, although not executed, is an excellent example for
instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited as one of the
finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to
be followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made
for attacking Dresden in 1813.
Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable
assaults or escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom
in 1747,—both preceded by sieges, but still brilliant
[Pg 213]coups de main, since in neither case was
the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.
Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily
carried, because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is
almost impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them
at some point. The capture of the lines of Mayence and
Wissembourg, which are described in the History of the Wars of
the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,) and that of the lines
of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent lessons for
study.
This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred
to, is so familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to
recall the details of it; but I cannot pass it by without
remarking how easily the victory was bought and how little it
should have been expected. The strategic plan was certainly
admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza to Asti
by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow.
When we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that
the victors owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom.
It required no great effort of genius upon the part of Prince
Eugene to prepare the order he issued to his army; and he must
have felt a profound contempt for his opponents to execute a
march with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten different
nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the one side and the
Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for forty-eight
hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever attempted.
The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to
write a better. Directing the formation of eight columns of
infantry by brigade in two lines, giving them orders to carry the
intrenchments and to make openings through them for the passage
of the cavalry into the camp, make up the sum total of all the
science exhibited by Eugene in order to carry out his rash
undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of [Pg 214]the
intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half
the bodies of its defenders.
But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the
explanation of the measures most suitable for adoption in an
attack on lines. If they have a sufficient relief to make it
difficult to carry them by assault, and if on the other hand they
may be outflanked or turned by strategic maneuvers, it is far
better to pursue the course last indicated than to attempt a
hazardous assault. If, however, there is any reason for
preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one of
the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by
the defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made
at that point, while the real attack took place at the center,
and succeeded simply because unexpected. In these operations the
locality and the character of the generals engaged must decide as
to the proper course to be pursued.
The attack may be executed in the manner described for
intrenched camps. It has sometimes happened, however, that these
lines have had the relief and proportions of permanent works; and
in this case escalade would be quite difficult, except of old
earthen works whose slopes were worn away from the lapse of time
and had become accessible for infantry of moderate activity. The
ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this character; so also was
the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so gloriously defended
against Ney, because he preferred making his stand at the ravines
in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with an
inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.
If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd
to think of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy
collecting his forces, the mass of which would be near the
center, might defeat the columns advancing between the center and
the river and completely destroy them. This absurdity, however,
has sometimes been successful; because the enemy driven behind
his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive return upon the
assailant, no matter how advan[Pg
215]tageous it might
seem. A general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are
already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does
not occur to them when their intrenchments are attacked.
Notwithstanding these facts, I cannot advise such a course; and
the general who would run such a risk and meet the fate of
Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of complaint.
Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched
camps and lines. The first is to be sure of having strong
reserves placed between the center and each wing, or, to speak
more accurately, on the right of the left wing and on the left of
the right wing. With this arrangement succor can be easily and
rapidly carried to a threatened point, which could not be done
were there but one central reserve. It has been suggested that
three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment is very
extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of
great importance,—that the troops be made to understand
they must by no means despair of finally defending a line which
may be forced at one point; because, if a good reserve is at
hand, it may take the offensive, attack the assailant, and
succeed in driving him out of the work he may have supposed in
his power.
COUPS DE MAIN.
These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an
army for the capture of posts of different strength or
importance.[30] They partake of the nature
both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these
methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
successful issue. Although coups de main seem to be
entirely tactical operations, their importance certainly depends
on the relations of the captured posts to the strategic
combinations in hand. It will become necessary, therefore, to say
a few words with reference to coups de main in Article XXXVI., when speaking of
de[Pg 216]tachments. However tiresome these repetitions may
seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing such
operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the
attack of intrenchments.
I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to
these operations; for their name, coups de main, implies
that ordinary rules are not applicable to them. I desire only to
call attention to them, and refer my readers to the different
works, either historical or didactic, where they are
mentioned.
I have previously stated that important results may often
follow from these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828,
the unsuccessful attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796,
the remarkable surprises of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in
1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814, as well as the escalades of
Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the different kinds of
coup de main. Some are effected by surprise, others by
open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the
things which have an influence upon the successful issue of
coups de main.
As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is
no longer of the same importance as formerly unless it has a
direct influence upon the results of a great strategic
operation.
The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by
intrenchments, that of a large convoy, of a small fort closing
important passes, like the two attacks which were made in 1799
upon the fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the capture of
Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, the capture of a
post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of provisions
and munitions much needed by the enemy;—such are the
enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment
engaging in them may be exposed.
Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes
with fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been
used for the same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and
should always be prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and
attached to the shoes of soldiers, to help [Pg 217]them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at
Cremona by Prince Eugene.
In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but
hints; for what has been done once may be done again.
FOOTNOTES:
[29]
The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August 25)
was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and
the third day, more than one hundred thousand.
[30]
The distinction between the importance and the strength of a
post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very
little importance, and vice aversá.
CHAPTER V.
OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY
STRATEGICAL AND PARTLY TACTICAL.
ARTICLE XXXVI.
Of Diversions and Great Detachments.
The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so
important a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty
of determining their strength and the proper occasions for them
is one of the greatest and most delicate responsibilities imposed
upon a commander. If nothing is more useful in war than a strong
detachment opportunely sent out and having a good ensemble
of operations with the main body, it is equally certain that no
expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately adopted.
Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential qualities
of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many
detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or
of attacking the main body during their absence.
The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes
been carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results,
that many persons now believe it better to have none of them. It
is undoubtedly much safer and more agreeable for an army to be
kept in a single mass; but it is a thing at times impossible or
incompatible with gaining a complete or even considerable
success. The essential point in this matter is to send out as few
detachments as possible.
There are several kinds of detachments.
[Pg 218]
1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the
zone of operations of the main army, in order to make diversions
of greater or less importance.
2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations
to cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to
guard a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if
threatened.
3. There are large detachments made upon the front of
operations, in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main
body in some combined operation.
4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the
effect of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have
an important bearing upon the general operations of the
campaign.
I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried
out at a distance from the principal zone of operations, at the
extremities of a theater of war, upon the success of which it is
sometimes foolishly supposed the whole campaign depends. Such
diversions are useful in but two cases, the first of which arises
when the troops thus employed cannot conveniently act elsewhere
on account of their distance from the real theater of operations,
and the second is that where such a detachment would receive
strong support from the population among which it was
sent,—the latter case belonging rather to political than
military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out
of place here.
The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the
Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke
Charles toward the end of the last century, (which have been
referred to in Article XIX.,) are well
known.
In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies
intended an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while
the combined forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive
him from Hanover, nearly sixty thousand men being designed for
these two widely-separated points. But, while their troops were
collecting at the two extremities of Europe, Napoleon ordered the
evacuation of Naples and Hanover, Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a
junction with Mas[Pg 219]sena in the Frioul, and Bernadotte,
leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of Ulm
and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had
no difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example
of the failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such
an operation would have been proper.
In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty
thousand men to La Vendée, they would have accomplished
much more than by increasing the numbers of those who were
fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the Rhine, and in Belgium.
Here is a case where a diversion would have been not only very
useful, but decisive.
It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a
distance and of small bodies, large corps are often detached in
the zone of operations of the main army.
If the employment of these large corps thus detached for
secondary objects is more dangerous than the diversions above
referred to, it is no less true that they are often highly proper
and, it may be, indispensable.
These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first
are permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a
direction opposite to the main line of operations, and are to
remain throughout a campaign. The second are corps temporarily
detached for the purpose of assisting in carrying out some
special enterprise.
Among the first should be especially enumerated those
fractions of an army that are detached either to form the
strategic reserve, of which mention has been made, or to cover
lines of operation and retreat when the configuration of the
theater of the war exposes them to attack. For example, a Russian
army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to leave a
portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the
valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its
line of operations. However successful it may be, a respectable
force must always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on
the right bank of the river toward Routchouk.
This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary
[Pg 220]to have a double strategic front, and then the
detachment of a considerable corps must be made to offer front to
a part of the enemy's army in rear of the main army. Other
localities and other circumstances might be mentioned where this
measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the
double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French
army passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct
its main column, a detachment must be left on the other front
sufficiently strong to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut
the line of communications. The third example is the frontier of
Spain, which enables the Spaniards to establish a double
front,—one covering the road to Madrid, the other having
Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To whichever side the invading
army turns, a detachment must be left on the other proportioned
in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction.
All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous
to enlarge as much as possible the field of operations of such
detachments, and to give them as much power of mobility as
possible, in order to enable them by opportune movements to
strike important blows. A most remarkable illustration of this
truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of 1797. Obliged as
he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the valley of
the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward the
Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the
risk of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave
the parts of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in
detail. Persuaded that he could be victorious with his army
united, he apprehended no particular danger from the presence of
a few hostile detachments upon his communications.
Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the
following reasons:—
1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of
operations, or else to cover your own.
2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main
body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
reinforcements.
[Pg 221]3. To observe and hold in position a large portion
of the opposing army, while a blow is struck at the
remainder.
4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or
munitions, on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege
or the success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the
march of a convoy of your own.
5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction
where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of
an enterprise in another direction.
6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places
for a certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the
garrison shut up within the ramparts.
7. To take possession of an important point upon the
communications of an enemy already retreating.
However great may be the temptation to undertake such
operations as those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in
mind that they are always secondary in importance, and that the
essential thing is to be successful at the decisive points. A
multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be avoided. Armies
have been destroyed for no other reason than that they were not
kept together.
We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show
that their success depends sometimes upon good fortune and
sometimes upon the skill of their designer, and that they often
fail from faulty execution.
Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of
Charles XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of
the famous convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely
defeated at Denain the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in
1709 under D'Albermale.
The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick
during the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate
Moravia. The fate of the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut
in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen in 1759, demonstrates how difficult
it is at times to avoid making detachments, and how dangerous
they may be. To come nearer our own times, the disaster of
Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching that a corps must
not be [Pg 222]thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the
fault was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not
supporting it properly, as might easily have been done. That of
Fink was destroyed at Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the
same reason.
Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the
army are decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of
engaging the enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass
of the forces is collected upon another point where the important
blow is to be struck. In such a case, care must be taken not only
to avoid engaging the corps making the demonstration, but to
recall it promptly toward the main body. We will mention two
examples as illustrations of these facts.
In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true
direction of his march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from
Kehl, whilst he was really filing off his army toward Stockach;
his left, having simply shown itself, returned toward the center
by Fribourg in Brisgau.
In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps
of Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the
Archduke Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory;
in another direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself
in Hungary; but he withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the
event which was to decide the issue of the campaign, and a great
and decisive victory was the result of his wise maneuvers.
Operations of this kind, so far from being in opposition to the
principles of the art of war, are necessary to facilitate their
application.
It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules
cannot be laid down for these operations, so varied in character,
the success of which depends on so many minute details. Generals
should run the risk of making detachments only after careful
consideration and observation of all the surrounding
circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the subject are
these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall thorn
immediately when their duty is per[Pg
223]formed. The
inconveniences necessarily attending them may be made as few as
practicable, by giving judicious and carefully-prepared
instructions to their commanders: herein lies the great talent of
a good chief of staff.
One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which
detachments sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions
prescribed by tactics for increasing the strength of any force by
posting it in good positions; but it is generally imprudent to
engage in a serious conflict with too large a body of troops. In
such cases ease and rapidity of motion will be most likely to
insure safety. It seldom happens that it is right for a
detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position it has
taken, whether voluntarily or by order.
It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics
and of field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well
as by the army itself.
Since we have included in the number of useful cases of
detachments those intended for coups de main, it is proper
to mention a few examples of this kind to enable the reader to
judge for himself. We may call to mind that one which was
executed by the Russians toward the end of 1828 with the view of
taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of Bourghas. The
capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians rapidly
strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential
point d'appui beyond the Balkan, where depots could be
established in advance for the army intending to cross those
mountains: in case of failure, no one was compromised,—not
even the small corps which had been debarked, since it had a safe
and certain retreat to the shipping.
In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the coup de
main attempted by the Austrians for the purpose of taking
possession of Kehl and destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was
returning from Bavaria, would have had very important
consequences if it had not failed.
In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great
deal; and, as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the
main army, they may be freely recommended.
Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the
[Pg 224]enemy's operations belong to the class of
detachments that are judicious. A few hundred horsemen thus
risked will be no great loss if captured; and they may be the
means of causing the enemy great injury. The small detachments
sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a great
hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his
plans to fail by intercepting his couriers.
For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold
and full of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all
the injury they can without compromising themselves. When an
opportunity of striking a telling blow presents itself, they
should not think for a moment of any dangers or difficulties in
their path. Generally, however, address and presence of mind,
which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are qualities more
necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. For
further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter
XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this work, on light
cavalry.
ARTICLE XXXVII.
Passage of Rivers and Other Streams.
The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already
in place or might be easily constructed, presents none of the
combinations belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the
passage of a large river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po,
the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is
an operation worthy the closest study.
The art of building military bridges is a special branch of
military science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It
is not from this point of view that I propose to consider the
passage of a stream, but as the attack of a military position and
as a maneuver.
The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the
determination of the point of passage may have an important
connection with all the operations taking place within the entire
theater of the war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in
1800 is an excellent illustration of the truth of this
[Pg 225]remark. Napoleon, a more skillful strategist than
Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to take
Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had
already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater
convenience to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his
extreme left. The tactical advantages seemed to his mind much
more sure than the strategical: he preferred the certainty of a
partial success to the risk attending a victory which would have
been a decisive one. In the same campaign Napoleon's passage of
the Po is another example of the high strategic importance of the
choice of the point of crossing. The army of the reserve, after
the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march by the left
bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino and
march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino,
enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching
with twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross
the Po at Piacenza, expecting to get before Mélas more
certainly in that direction than if he came down too soon upon
his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donauwerth and
Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar operation. The direction
chosen for the passage was the prime cause of the destruction of
Mack's army.
The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by
recollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX.; and it is here only necessary to
remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in every other
operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive points,
and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the
distribution of the hostile forces.
If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the
tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality
presents obstacles exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be
chosen, and in making the new selection care should be taken to
have the direction of the movement as nearly as possible
coincident with the true strategic direction. Independently of
the general combinations, which exercise a great influence in
fixing the point of passage, there is still another [Pg 226]consideration, connected with the locality itself.
The best position is that where the army after crossing can take
its front of operations and line of battle perpendicular to the
river, at least for the first marches, without being forced to
separate into several corps moving upon different lines. This
advantage will also save it the danger of fighting a battle with
a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.
Enough has been said with reference to the strategical
considerations influencing the selection of the point of crossing
a river. We will now proceed to speak of the passage itself.
History is the best school in which to study the measures likely
to insure the success of such operations. The ancients deemed the
passage of the Granicus—which is a small stream—a
wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned, the people
of modern days can cite much greater.
The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been
greatly lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time,
General Dedon has made famous the two passages of the Rhine at
Kehl and of the Danube at Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model
as far as concerns the details; and in these operations minute
attention to details is every thing. More recently, three other
passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous passage of the
Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind previously seen.
The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and at Wagram,
in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men
provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where
the bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting
account of them should be carefully read. The third was executed
by the Russian army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to
be compared with the two just mentioned, was very remarkable on
account of the great local difficulties and the vigorous
exertions made to surmount them. The passage of the Beresina was
truly wonderful. My object not being to give historical details
on this subject, I direct my readers to the special narratives of
these events. I will give several general rules to be
observed.
1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of
[Pg 227]passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing
force there. In addition to the strategic demonstrations, false
attacks must be made near the real one, to divide the attention
and means of the enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery
should be employed to make a great deal of noise at the points
where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect silence
should be preserved where the real attempt is to be made.
2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as
possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of
dislodging the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the
work; and these troops should take possession at once of any
villages, woods, or other obstacles in the vicinity.
3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of
heavy caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to
silence any artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the
bridge while building. For this purpose it is convenient to have
the bank from which the passage is made somewhat higher than the
other.
4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives
great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for
constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream
emptying into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable
place for collecting and concealing boats and materials for the
bridge.
5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a
re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can
cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to
land from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest,
thus taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to
oppose the passage.
6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both
banks, that the army may have good communications to the front
and rear on both banks of the river. For this reason, those
points where the banks are high and steep should be usually
avoided.
The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of
course from those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders
is to counteract the efforts of the assailants. The important
[Pg 228]thing is to have the course of the river watched
by bodies of light troops, without attempting to make a defense
at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the threatened point, in
order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of his army shall
have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendôme at Cassano, and
the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,—the last example
being particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was
not so decidedly successful as might have been expected.
In Article XXI. attention was
called to the influence that the passage of a river, in the
opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction to the lines
of operations. We will now see what connection it may have with
subsequent strategic movements.
One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a
passage is to cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to
destroy it, without interfering too much with the free movement
of the army. When the army is numerically very superior to the
enemy, or when the river is passed just after a great victory
gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling; but when the
campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are about
equal, the case is very different.
If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg
or at Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the
first thing to be done will be to drive the enemy in three
directions,—first, before them as far as the Black Forest,
secondly, by the right in order to cover the bridges on the Upper
Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to cover the bridges of Mayence
and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the cause of an
unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the
inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea
must be insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army
to be separated into three equal parts, nor need these
detachments remain absent longer than the few days required for
taking possession of the natural point of concentration of the
enemy's forces.
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed
is one in which the general finds his position a most trying one;
for if he divides his army to protect his bridges [Pg 229]he
may be obliged to contend with one of his subdivisions against
the whole of the enemy's force, and have it overwhelmed; and if
he moves his army upon a single line, the enemy may divide his
army and reassemble it at some unexpected point, the bridges may
be captured or destroyed, and the general may find himself
compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a
victory.
The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a
city which will afford a strong defensive point for their
protection, to infuse all possible vigor and activity into the
first operations after the passage, to fall upon the subdivisions
of the enemy's army in succession, and to beat them in such a way
that they will have no further desire of touching the bridges. In
some cases eccentric lines of operations may be used. If the
enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several
corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected
with one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center
of the line of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this
position may be overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men
each may then be formed, which, by taking diverging lines of
operations, can certainly drive off the successive portions of
the opposing army, prevent them from reuniting, and remove them
farther and farther from the bridges. But if, on the contrary,
the passage be effected at one extremity of the enemy's strategic
front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy may be beaten
throughout its whole extent,—in the same manner that
Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout
its length,—the bridges will be secure in rear of the army,
and remain protected during all the forward movements. It was in
this manner that Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf
in 1795, on the extreme right of the Austrians, could have
advanced in perfect safety toward the Main. He was driven away
because the French, having a double and exterior line of
operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men inactive
between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan upon
the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the
advantages gained by passing a river upon [Pg 230]one
extremity of the enemy's strategic front. A commander-in-chief
should either adopt this method, or that previously explained, of
a central mass at the moment of passage, and the use of eccentric
lines afterward, according to the circumstances of the case, the
situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as well as
the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations, of
which something has already been said in the article on lines of
operations, does not appear out of place here, since their
connection with the location of bridges has been the chief point
under discussion.
It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double
passage is attempted upon a single front of operations, as was
the case with Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is
gained of having in case of need a double line of retreat, there
is the inconvenience, in thus operating on the two extremities of
the enemy's front, of forcing him, in a measure, to concentrate
on his center, and he may be placed in a condition to overwhelm
separately the two armies which have crossed at different points.
Such an operation will always lead to disastrous results when the
opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to take
advantage of this violation of principles.
In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may
be diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of
the points, which then becomes the decisive one, and by
concentrating the two portions by interior lines as rapidly as
possible, to prevent the enemy from destroying them separately.
If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this rule, and made a junction
of their forces in the direction of Donauwerth, instead of moving
eccentrically, they would probably have achieved great successes
in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon the Rhine.
ARTICLE XXXVIII.
Retreats and Pursuits.
Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war.
This remark is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said,
in his usual piquant style, that he could not conceive
[Pg 231]how an army ever succeeded in retreating. When we
think of the physical and moral condition of an army in full
retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving
order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not
hard to understand why the most experienced generals have
hesitated to attempt such an operation.
What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight
be continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat
executed under cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait
for this last chance, but to abandon the field of battle while it
can be done and a strong opposition still made to the pursuing
army? Should a forced march be made in the night, in order to get
as much start of the enemy as possible? or is it better to halt
after a half-march and make a show of fighting again? Each of
these methods, although entirely proper in certain cases, might
in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the theory of war
leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is certainly
one of them.
If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may
expose yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives;
and if a forced retreat must begin when the shades of night are
shrouding every thing in darkness and obscurity, how can you
prevent the disintegration of your army, which does not know what
to do, and cannot see to do any thing properly? If, on the other
hand, the field of battle is abandoned in broad daylight and
before all possible efforts have been made to hold it, you may
give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is about to
do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
troops, you may lose their confidence,—as they are always
inclined to blame a prudent general who retreats before the
necessity for so doing may be evident to themselves. Moreover,
who can say that a retreat commenced in the daylight in presence
of an enterprising enemy may not become a rout?
When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to
decide whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the
start of the enemy as possible,—since this hurried movement
might sometimes cause the destruction of the army, [Pg 232]and
might, in other circumstances, be its salvation. All that can be
positively asserted on this subject is that, in general, with an
army of considerable magnitude, it is best to retreat slowly, by
short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of sufficient
strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check for
several hours.
Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from
which they result. A general may retire of his own accord before
fighting, in order to draw his adversary to a position which he
prefers to his present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver
than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from
Wischau toward Brunn to draw the allies to a point which suited
him as a battle-field. It was thus that Wellington retired from
Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed to do before the
attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was known. I
represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat
that I was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a
retrograde movement without fighting, which would have been the
means of avoiding the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26,
1813.)
A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a
point threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the
line of retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its
depots, in an exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in
order to get nearer its supplies. Finally, an army retires
involuntarily after a lost battle, or after an unsuccessful
enterprise.
These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats.
Their character will vary with that of the country, with the
distances to be passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted.
They are specially dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the
points at which the retreats begin are distant from the friendly
country and the base of operations, they become painful and
difficult.
From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so
justly celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which
[Pg 233]befell the French army in 1812, history does not
make mention of many remarkable retreats. That of Antony, driven
out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of the Emperor
Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In more
recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he
passed by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an
admirable one. The retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not
deserve the praises it has received. Those executed by the King
of Prussia after raising the siege of Olmutz and after the
surprise at Hochkirch were very well arranged; but they were for
short distances. That of Moreau in 1796, which was magnified in
importance by party spirit, was creditable, but not at all
extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to Altorf,
and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur,
were glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of
short duration. The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen
to Moscow—a space of two hundred and forty
leagues,—in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon and such
cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable
circumstances, but was highly deserving of praise, not only for
the talent displayed by the generals who directed its first
stages, but also for the admirable fortitude and soldierly
bearing of the troops who performed it. Although the retreat from
Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was also
glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
Beresina,—because the skeleton of the army was saved, when
not a single man should have returned. In this ever-memorable
event both parties covered themselves with glory.
The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country
to be traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be
encountered, the attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in
flank, superiority or inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the
troops, are circumstances which have a great effect in deciding
the fate of retreats, leaving out of consider[Pg 234]ation the skillful arrangements which the generals
may make for their execution.
A general falling back toward his native land along his line
of magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in
good order, and may effect a retreat with more safety than one
compelled to subsist his army in cantonments, finding it
necessary to occupy an extended position. It would be absurd to
pretend that a French army retiring from Moscow to the Niemen
without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry and draft
horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and with
the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an
immense number of light cavalry.
There are five methods of arranging a retreat:—
The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.
The second consists in dividing the army into two or three
corps, marching at the distance of a day's march from each other,
in order to avoid confusion, especially in the
matériel.
The third consists in marching upon a single front by several
roads nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.
The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging
roads.
The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
roads.
I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but
it is taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared
and well sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This
arrangement is common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing
to do with the strategic relations of these operations.
An army falling back in good order, with the intention of
fighting as soon as it shall have received expected
reinforcements or as soon as it shall have reached a certain
strategic position, should prefer the first method, as this
particularly insures the compactness of the army and enables it
to be in [Pg 235]readiness for battle almost at any moment,
since it is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and
form the remainder of the troops under their protection as they
successively arrive. An army employing this method must not,
however, confine itself to the single main road, if there are
side-roads sufficiently near to be occupied which may render its
movements more rapid and secure.
When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second
method, having the portions of his army separated by an entire
march. He made therein a great mistake, because the enemy was not
following upon his rear, but moving along a lateral road which
brought him in a nearly perpendicular direction into the midst of
the separated French corps. The three fatal days of Krasnoi were
the result. The employment of this method being chiefly to avoid
incumbering the road, the interval between the departure of the
several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery may
readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole
march, the army would be better divided into two masses and a
rear-guard, a half-march from each other. These masses, moving
off in succession with an interval of two hours between the
departure of their several army-corps, may file off without
incumbering the road, at least in ordinary countries. In crossing
the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other calculations would
doubtless be necessary.
I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty
thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, having a
rear-guard of twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men distant
about a half-march in rear. The army may be divided into two
masses of about sixty thousand men each, encamped at a distance
of three or four leagues from each other. Each of these masses
will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may either move
successively along the road or form in two lines across the road.
In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five
A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of
interference with each other, unless something unusual should
happen; for the second mass being at the same hours of the day
about four [Pg 236]leagues behind the first, they can
never be occupying the same part of the road at the same
time.
When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable
at least for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be
diminished. It is scarcely necessary to add that such an order of
march can only be used when provisions are plentiful; and the
third method is usually the best, because the army is then
marching in battle-order. In long days and in hot countries the
best times for marching are the night and the early part of the
day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics to
make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for
armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.
Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of
halts, and great disorder on the march is the consequence, as
each brigade or division takes the responsibility of halting
whenever the soldiers are a little tired and find it agreeable to
bivouac. The larger the army and the more compactly it marches,
the more important does it become to arrange well the hours of
departures and halts, especially if the army is to move at night.
An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as much mischief
as a rout.
If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in
order to relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass,
which will halt with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty
thousand men in battle-order will think it necessary to halt and
collect his columns; and then the retreat should recommence at
nightfall, to regain the space which has been lost.
The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads,
is excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other.
But, if they are quite distant, one wing separated from the
center and from the other wing may be compromised if the enemy
attacks it in force and compels it to stand on the defensive. The
Prussian army moving from Magdeburg toward the Oder, in 1806,
gives an example of this kind.
The fourth method, which consists in following concentric
roads, is undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from
[Pg 237]each other when the retreat is ordered. Nothing
can be better, in such a case, than to unite the forces; and the
concentric retreat is the only method of effecting this.
The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous
system of eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and
have opposed so warmly in the earlier editions of my works,
because I thought I could not be mistaken either as to the sense
of his remarks on the subject or as to the object of his system.
I gathered from his definition that he recommended to a
retreating army, moving from any given position, to separate into
parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object of
withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of
arresting his march by threatening his flanks and his line of
communications. I found great fault with the system, for the
simple reason that a beaten army is already weak enough, without
absurdly still further dividing its forces and strength in
presence of a victorious enemy.
Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his
meaning, and that by the term eccentric retreat he did not
understand a retreat made on several diverging roads, but one
which, instead of being directed toward the center of the base of
operations or the center of the country, should be eccentric to
that focus of operations, and along the line of the frontier of
the country.
I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his
language, and in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for
I have strongly recommended that kind of a retreat to which I
have given the name of the parallel retreat. It is my opinion
that an army, leaving the line which leads from the frontiers to
the center of the state, with a view of moving to the right or
the left, may very well pursue a course nearly parallel to the
line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and its
base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as
eccentric retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all
leading from the strategic front.
However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of
which was the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only
[Pg 238]with those retreats made along several diverging
roads, under pretense of covering a greater extent of frontier
and of threatening the enemy on both flanks.
By using these high-sounding words flanks, an air of
importance may be given to systems entirely at variance with the
principles of the art. An army in retreat is always in a bad
state, either physically or morally; because a retreat can only
be the result of reverses or of numerical inferiority. Shall such
an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I find no fault
with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the ease
of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am
speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations.
Suppose an army of forty thousand men retreating before another
of sixty thousand. If the first forms four isolated divisions of
about ten thousand men, the enemy may maneuver with two masses of
thirty thousand men each. Can he not turn his adversary,
surround, disperse, and ruin in succession all his divisions? How
can they escape such a fate? By concentration. This being
in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls of
itself.
I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When
the leading divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by
Wurmser, Bonaparte collected them all together at Roverbella;
and, although he had only forty thousand men, he fought and beat
sixty thousand, because he had only to contend against isolated
columns. If he had made a divergent retreat, what would have
become of his army and his victories? Wurmser, after his first
check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two wings toward
the extremities of the line of defense. What was the result? His
right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left,
and destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.
When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of
the French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an
eccentric movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his
concentric retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very
extended line of isolated divi[Pg
239]sions, perceived
that this was an excellent system for his own destruction, if he
stood his ground and fought or adopted the alternative of
retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all the
efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which
it was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line
of two hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further
discussion.[31]
There are two cases in which divergent retreats are
admissible, and then only as a last resource. First, when an army
has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and the
scattered fragments seek protection within the walls of fortified
places. Secondly, in a war where the sympathies of the whole
population are enlisted, each fraction of the army thus divided
may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province; but in a
purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on according
to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
absurd.
There is still another strategical consideration as to the
direction of a retreat,—to decide when it should be made
perpendicularly to the frontier and toward the interior of the
country, or when it should be parallel to the frontier. For
example, when Marshal Soult gave up the line of the Pyrenees in
1814, he had to choose one of two directions for his
retreat,—either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of
France, or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by
the Pyrenees. In the same way, when Frederick retired from
Moravia, he marched toward Bohemia instead of returning to
Silesia.
These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the
reason that they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital
of the state and the center of its power. The propriety of giving
such a direction to a retreat must be determined by the
configuration of the frontiers, the positions of the fortresses,
the greater or less space the army may [Pg
240]have for its
marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
communications with the central portions of the state.
Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a
French army penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base
themselves upon Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the
Asturias; and in either case the French cannot move directly to
Madrid, because their line of operations would be at the mercy of
their adversary.
The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the
same advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.
In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially
when the nation itself is not divided into two political parties
each of which is striving for the possession of the capital. If
the hostile army penetrates through the Alps, the French can act
on the Rhone and the Saône, passing around the frontier as
far as the Moselle on one side, or as far as Provence on the
other. If the enemy enters the country by way of Strasbourg,
Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least
very hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good
condition and based upon its circle of fortified towns. The same
is the case for all countries having double fronts of
operations.[32]
Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of
the directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river
Danube. Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two
bastions connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and
regards this frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel
movements. This assertion was not well sustained by the events of
the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel
method has not yet had a fair trial on that ground, the question
is still an open one.
[Pg 241]It seems to me that the propriety of applying the
parallel method depends mainly upon the existing and the
antecedent circumstances of each case. If a French army should
approach from the Rhine by way of Bavaria, and should find allies
in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it would be a very delicate
operation to throw the whole Austrian army into the Tyrol and
into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this way the
forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an
unfortunate division of force is the consequence; and if it is
decided to throw the whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way
to Vienna open, there would be great danger incurred if the enemy
is at all enterprising. In Italy, beyond the Mincio, the parallel
method would be of difficult application on the side of the
Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy approaching from
Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations would be
too contracted.
In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great
advantage against an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe
or the Oder, whilst its employment would be impossible against a
French army moving from the Rhine, or a Russian army from the
Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria were allies. This is a result
of the geographical configuration of the country, which allows
and even favors lateral movements: in the direction of its
greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a movement
would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.
When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the
operation, a pursuit always follows.
A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and
by an army in good condition, always gives an advantage to the
pursuing army; and this is particularly the case after a defeat
and when the source of supplies and reinforcements is at a great
distance; for a retreat then becomes more difficult than any
other operation in war, and its difficulties increase in
proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy in conducting the
pursuit.
[Pg 242]The boldness and activity of the pursuit will
depend, of course, upon the character of the commanders and upon
the physique and morale of the two armies. It is
difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases of pursuits, but
the following points must be recollected:—
1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank
of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's
own country and where no danger is incurred in moving
perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of
operations. Care must, however, be taken not to make too large a
circuit; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating
enemy entirely.
2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively
executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a
battle gained; because the demoralized army may be wholly
dispersed if vigorously followed up.
3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge
of gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may
say; for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to
leave a country, unless in the case when an unexpected success
shall have been gained over him by an army much inferior to his
in numbers.
Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been
said on the subject of retreats, as far as they are connected
with grand combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate
several tactical measures which may render them more easy of
execution.
One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy
may be resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the
front, and that the preservation of order is the only means of
saving a body of troops harassed by the enemy during a retrograde
movement. Rigid discipline is at all times the best preservative
of good order, but it is of special importance during a retreat.
To enforce discipline, subsistence must be furnished, that the
troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the purpose of
getting supplies by marauding.
It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to
[Pg 243]an officer of great coolness, and to attach to it
staff officers who may, in advance of its movements, examine and
select points suitable for occupation to hold the enemy
temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so rapidly on the main
body that it is evidently desirable to have considerable bodies
of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the execution of a
slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of thoroughly
examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to prevent
an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
retreating columns.
It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at
the distance of half a day's march from the main body. The
rear-guard would run great risk of being itself cut off, if
farther distant. When, however, there are defiles in its rear
which are held by friends, it may increase the sphere of its
operations and remain a full day's march to the rear; for a
defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same degree that
it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. If the
army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon
its strength, the nature of the country, and the character and
strength of the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely,
it is of importance not to permit him to do so with impunity,
especially if the retreat is made in good order. In such a case
it is a good plan to halt from time to time and fall unexpectedly
upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the Archduke Charles did in
1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and Kleber at Ukerath.
Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of the
surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body
of troops which is thinking of little else than collecting
trophies and spoils.
Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means
devoid of interest. If the stream is narrow and there are
permanent bridges over it, the operation is nothing more than the
passage of a defile; but when the river is wide and is to be
crossed upon a temporary military bridge, it is a [Pg 244]maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the
precautions to be taken, a very important one is to get the parks
well advanced, so that they may be out of the way of the army;
for this purpose it is well for the army to halt a half-day's
march from the river. The rear-guard should also keep at more
than the usual distance from the main body,—as far, in
fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being
too much hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so
arranged that it shall have reached a position in front of the
bridge just as the last of the main body has passed. This will be
a suitable moment for relieving the rear-guard by fresh troops
strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass through the intervals
of the fresh troops in position and will cross the river; the
enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give him
battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then
cross the river, breaking the bridges after it.
It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass
they form on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to
protect the corps left to hold the enemy in check.
The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of
the precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures
should always be taken to throw up intrenchments at the point
where the bridge is to be constructed and the passage made. Where
time is not allowed for the construction of a regular
tête de pont, a few well-armed redoubts will be
found of great value in covering the retreat of the last
troops.
If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy
is only pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so
when the army is threatened both in front and rear and the river
is guarded by the enemy in force.
The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of
the most remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an
army in a more desperate condition, and never was one extricated
more gloriously and skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with
cold, distant twelve hundred miles [Pg
245]from its base of
operations, assailed by the enemy in front and in rear, having a
river with marshy banks in front, surrounded by vast forests, how
could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the honor it gained.
The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped its escape;
but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise should
be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
operations which brought up the Russian armies from the
extremities of Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the
Beresina as to a rendezvous arranged in peace,—a plan which
came near effecting the capture of their formidable
adversary,—or the wonderful firmness of the lion thus
pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.
The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to
be closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of
passage, and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way
before the one which is following the rear of your column can
come up. Never place yourself in a position to be exposed to such
danger; for escape in such a case is rare.
If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges
either by regular têtes de font, or at least by
lines of redoubts to cover the rear-guard, it is natural, also,
that the enemy pursuing should use every effort to destroy the
bridges. When the retreat is made down the bank of a river,
wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also fire-ships and
mills,—a means the Austrians used in 1796 against Jourdan's
army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did
the same thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the
Danube, and brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.
It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this
character unless there is time for placing a stockade above it.
Boats may be anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to
catch floating bodies and with means for extinguishing
fire-boats.
FOOTNOTES:
[31]
Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian
army. Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it
was, in the end, the cause of his ruin.
[32]
In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the
defensive, it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which
may move directly upon the capital, while the other may follow
the army retiring along the frontier. If the armies are equal,
this is impossible.
[Pg 246]
ARTICLE XXXIX.
Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established
in Winter Quarters.
So much has been written on this point, and its connection
with my subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very
briefly.
To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried
on, is generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may
be, and there is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's
attacks. A country where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony,
the Netherlands, Swabia, or old Prussia, presents more facilities
for the establishment of quarters than one where towns are few;
for in the former case the troops have not only convenient
supplies of food, but shelters which permit the divisions of the
army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia, portions of
Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is more
difficult to put an army into winter quarters.
Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter
quarters at the end of October, and all the fighting after that
time was of a partisan character and carried on by the advanced
troops forming the outposts.
The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace
in 1674, by Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned
the best method of conducting such an enterprise, and the
precautions to be taken on the other side to prevent its
success.
The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to
be the following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and
connectedly and occupying a space as broad as long, in order to
avoid having a too extended line of troops, which is always
easily broken through and cannot be concentrated in time; cover
them by a river, or by an outer line of troops in huts and with
their position strengthened by field-works; fix upon points of
assembly which may be reached by all the troops before the enemy
can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by which an enemy may
approach constantly [Pg 247]patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made
at any point.
In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in
cantonments behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the
advanced guard alone being hutted near the cities of Gutstadt,
Osterode, &c. The army numbered more than one hundred and
twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite in feeding it
and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position until June.
The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
expected to be the case everywhere.
An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very
difficult to have a compact and well-connected system of winter
quarters in countries where large towns are numerous. The
difficulty increases with the size of the army. It must be
observed, however, that if the extent of country occupied
increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means of
opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same
proportion. The important point is to be able to assemble fifty
thousand or sixty thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an
army in hand, and with the certainty of having it rapidly
increased, the enemy may be held in check, no matter how strong
he may be, until the whole army is assembled.
It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk
in going into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a
body and seems inclined to make offensive movements; and the
conclusion to be drawn from this fact is, that the only method of
giving secure repose to an army in winter or in the midst of a
campaign is to establish it in quarters protected by a river, or
to arrange an armistice.
In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course
of a campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of
observation, or waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the
offensive, it will probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The
selection of such positions requires great experience upon the
part of a general, in order that he may form correct conclusions
as to what he may expect the enemy to do. An army should occupy
space enough to [Pg 248]enable it to subsist readily, and it
should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be ready
for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions
are by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement
than to place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a
square, so that in case of need the whole may be assembled at any
point where the enemy may present himself. Nine divisions placed
in this way, a half-day's march from each other, may in twelve
hours assemble on the center. The same rules are to be observed
in these cases as were laid down for winter quarters.
ARTICLE XL.
Descents.
These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as
among the most difficult in war when effected in presence of a
well-prepared enemy.
Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by
it in navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the
monstrous three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are
with a hundred cannon, that an army can make a descent only with
the assistance of a numerous fleet of ships of war which can
command the sea, at least until the debarkation of the army takes
place.
Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also
the ships of war; they were moved along at pleasure by using
oars, were light, and could skirt along the coasts; their number
was in proportion to the number of troops to be embarked; and,
aside from the danger of tempests, the operations of a fleet
could be arranged with almost as much certainty as those of an
army on land. Ancient history, for these reasons, gives us
examples of more extensive debarkations than modern times.
Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by
the Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the
Archipelago,—the innumerable hosts landed in Greece by
Xerxes and Darius,—the great expeditions of the
Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of Alexander
into Asia [Pg 249]Minor, those of Cæsar to England and
Africa, that of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,—the
Crusades,—the expeditions of the Northmen to England, to
France, and even to Italy?
Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of
Philip II. was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude
until that set on foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All
other marine expeditions were of no great extent: as, for
example, those of Charles V. and of Sebastian of Portugal to the
coast of Africa; also the several descents of the French into the
United States of America, into Egypt and St. Domingo, of the
English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, Philadelphia. I
say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for that was
a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.
The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states
of the world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men,
except against second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult
to find transportation for one hundred or one hundred and fifty
thousand men with their immense trains of artillery, munitions,
cavalry, &c.
We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the
vast problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if
it is true that Napoleon seriously contemplated the
transportation of one hundred and sixty thousand veterans from
Boulogne to the British Isles: unfortunately, his failure to
execute this gigantic undertaking has left us entirely in the
dark as to this grave question.
It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line
in the Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon
the point of being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a
favorable wind, to pass over the flotilla in two days and effect
a landing. But what would become of the army if a storm should
disperse the fleet of ships of war and the English should return
in force to the Channel and defeat the fleet or oblige it to
regain its ports?
Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
[Pg 250]generations, that this immense undertaking was not
carried through, or at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men
would have met their deaths; but were not those men mowed down
more uselessly on the plains of Swabia, of Moravia, and of
Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and the forests of
Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring to a
conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in
the preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable
lessons the present century has furnished for the study of
soldiers and of statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on
the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most
remarkable monuments of the activity, foresight, and skill of
Napoleon. It is recommended to the careful attention of young
officers. But, while admitting the possibility of success for a
great descent upon a coast so near as the English to Boulogne,
what results should be expected if this armada had had a long
sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin
would not so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open
seas! Moreover, the artillery, munitions of war, equipments,
provisions, and fresh water that must be carried with this
multitude of men require immense labor in preparation and vast
means of transportation.
Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such
an expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it
is evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in
four cases:—1st, against colonies or isolated possessions;
2d, against second-rate powers which cannot be immediately
supported from abroad; 3d, for the purpose of effecting a
temporary diversion, or to capture a position which it is
important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a diversion, at once
political and military, against a state already engaged in a
great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the point
of the descent.
It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this
character. About the only recommendations I can make are the
[Pg 251]following. Deceive the enemy as to the point of
landing; choose a spot where the vessels may anchor in safety and
the troops be landed together; infuse as much activity as
possible into the operation, and take possession of some strong
point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and
protection to the troops that have landed.
A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact
that the transports can never get near the beach, and the troops
must be landed in boats and rafts,—which takes time and
gives the enemy great advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to
be landed are exposed to great risks; for what can a body of
infantry do, crowded in boats, tossed about by the waves, and
ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness for the proper use of
their arms?
I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his
forces too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an
impossibility to line the entire coast with batteries and
battalions for its defense; but the approaches to those places
where large establishments are to be protected must be closed.
Signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the point
where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force should
be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a firm
foothold.
The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon
descents and their prosecution. There are countries where the
coasts are steep and present few points of easy access for the
ships and the troops to be landed: these few places may be more
readily watched, and the descent becomes more difficult.
Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with
descents which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle
which forbids a continental army from interposing the mass of its
forces between the enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary,
that an army landing upon a coast should always keep its
principal mass in communication with the shore, which is at once
its line of retreat and its base of supplies. For the same
reason, its first care should be to make [Pg 252]sure of the possession of one fortified harbor/ or
at least of a tongue of land which is convenient to a good
anchorage and may be easily strengthened by fortifications, in
order that in case of reverse the troops may be re-embarked
without hurry and loss.
CHAPTER VI.
LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
ARTICLE XLI.
A few Remarks on Logistics in General.
Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary,
is it a general science, forming one of the most essential parts
of the art of war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use,
intended to designate collectively the different branches of
staff duty,—that is to say, the different means of carrying
out in practice the theoretical combinations of the art?
These questions will seem singular to those persons who are
firmly convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the
art of war, and believe it wrong to search out new definitions
where every thing seems already accurately classified. For my own
part, I am persuaded that good definitions lead to clear ideas;
and I acknowledge some embarrassment in answering these questions
which seem so simple.
In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of
other military writers, and called by the name of
logistics the details of staff duties, which are the
subject of regulations for field-service and of special
instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This was
the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word
logistics is derived, as we know, from the title of the
major général des logìs, (translated
in German by Quartiermeister,) an officer whose duty it
formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to
the [Pg 253]marches of columns, and to locate them upon the
ground. Logistics was then quite limited. But when war began to
be waged without camps, movements became more complicated, and
the staff officers had more extended functions. The chief of
staff began to perform the duty of transmitting the conceptions
of the general to the most distant points of the theater of war,
and of procuring for him the necessary documents for arranging
plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give
information of them to subordinates in orders and instructions,
to explain them and to supervise their execution both in their
ensemble and in their minute details: his duties were,
therefore, evidently connected with all the operations of a
campaign.
To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary
that a man should be acquainted with all the various branches of
the art of war. If the term logistics includes all this,
the two works of the Archduke Charles, the voluminous treatises
of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard, and Ternay, all taken
together, would hardly give even an incomplete sketch of what
logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than the
science of applying all possible military knowledge.
It appears from what has been said that the old term
logistics is insufficient to designate the duties of staff
officers, and that the real duties of a corps of such officers,
if an attempt be made to instruct them in a proper manner for
their performance, should be accurately prescribed by special
regulations in accordance with the general principles of the art.
Governments should take the precaution to publish well-considered
regulations, which should define all the duties of staff officers
and should give clear and accurate instructions as to the best
methods of performing these duties.
The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for
their government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was
better adapted to the old methods of carrying on war than the
present. This is the only work of the kind I have seen. There
are, no doubt, others, both public and secret; but I have no
knowledge of their existence. Several gene[Pg 254]rals—as, for instance, Grimoard and
Thiebaut—have prepared manuals for staff officers, and the
new royal corps of France has issued several partial sets of
instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a complete manual
on the subject.
If it is agreed that the old logistics had reference
only to details of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the
functions of staff officers at the present day are intimately
connected with the most important strategical combinations, it
must be admitted that logistics includes but a small part of the
duties of staff officers; and if we retain the term we must
understand it to be greatly extended and developed in
signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of ordinary
staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.
To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the
principal points that must be included if we wish to embrace in
one view every duty and detail relating to the movements of
armies and the undertakings resulting from such
movements:—
1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting
the army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the
assemblage of the army and its subsequent launching upon its
theater of operations.
2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the
general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans of
attack in expected battles.
3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to
be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
facilitate the operations of the army.
4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information
as possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.
5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of
movements ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the
different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and
connected manner. Ascertaining certainly that the means
[Pg 255]requisite for the ease and safety of marches are
prepared. Regulating the manner and time of halts.
6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good
instructions for their guidance. Providing all the means
necessary for the performance of their duties.
7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate
commanders or their staff officers, relative to the different
methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at
hand, as well as their formation in the most appropriate manner
when the army is to engage in battle, according to the nature of
the ground and the character of the enemy.[33]
8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments
well-chosen points of assembly in case of their attack by
superior numbers, and informing them what support they may hope
to receive in case of need.
9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of
baggage, munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the
columns and in their rear, in such manner that they will not
interfere with the movements of the troops and will still be near
at hand. Taking precautions for order and security, both on the
march and when trains are halted and parked.
10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of
supplies. Collecting all the means of transportation of the
country and of the army, and regulating their use.
11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting
regulations for their safety, good order, and police.
12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and
supplies, as well as lines of communications with these lines for
detached bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and
commanding in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of
detachments and convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and
looking out also for preserving suitable means of communication
of the army with its base.
[Pg 256]
13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly
men, movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for
their safety.
14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and
looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their
service on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when
required, some center of action, and forming strategic
reserves.
15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
between the army and its base of operations.
16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment
of the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the
chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labors to be
performed by those troops and as to their management in sorties
and assaults.
17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the
rear-guard; causing intelligent officers to examine and select
positions where the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage
the enemy, check his pursuit, and thus gain time; making
provision in advance for the movement of trains, that nothing
shall be left behind, and that they shall proceed in the most
perfect order, taking all proper precautions to insure
safety.
18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different
corps; indicating to each principal division of the army a place
of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all
orders, instructions, and regulations are implicitly
observed.
An examination of this long list—which might easily be
made much longer by entering into greater detail—will lead
every reader to remark that these are the duties rather of the
general-in-chief than of staff officers. This truth I announced
some time ago; and it is for the very purpose of permitting the
general-in-chief to give his whole attention to the supreme
direction of the operations that he ought to be pro[Pg 257]vided with staff officers competent to relieve him
of details of execution. Their functions are therefore
necessarily very intimately connected; and woe to an army where
these authorities cease to act in concert! This want of harmony
is often seen,—first, because generals are men and have
faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found
individual interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the
chiefs of staff and hindering them in performing their
duties.[34]
It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain
rules for the guidance of staff officers in all the details of
their multifarious duties; for, in the first place, every
different nation has staff officers with different names and
rounds of duties,—so that I should be obliged to write new
rules for each army; in the second place, these details are fully
entered into in special books pertaining to these subjects.
I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon
some of the first articles enumerated above:—
1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for
preparing the army to enter upon active operations in the field
include all those which are likely to facilitate the success of
the first plan of operations. They should, as a matter of course,
make sure, by frequent inspections, that the
matériel of all the arms of the service is in good
order: horses, carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes,
&c. should be carefully examined and any deficiencies
supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool trains,
matériel of artillery, siege-trains if they are to
move, ambulances,—in a word, every thing which conies under
the head of matériel,—should be carefully
examined and placed in good order.
If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great
rivers, gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all
the small craft should be collected at the points and
[Pg 258]at the bank where they will probably be used.
Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable points
both for embarkations and for landings,—preferring those
localities which present the greatest chances of success for a
primary establishment on the opposite bank.
The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will
be necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to
the proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such
direction to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn
from them any thing relative to the projected enterprise.
If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with
the chief engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected
near the base of operations, when têtes de ponts or
intrenched camps are to be constructed there. If the war is
defensive, these works will be built between the first line of
defense and the second base.
2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which
relates to making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are
fixed by the general and notice of them given to the proper
persons by the chiefs of staff. The next most important
qualification of a general, after that of knowing how to form
good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating the
execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may
be the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if
the general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as
far as he can, having a proper understanding with the responsible
chief.
I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch
of the service. The first, which may be styled the old school,
consists in issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of
the army, general instructions filled with minute and somewhat
pedantic details, so much the more out of place as they are
usually addressed to chiefs of corps, who are supposed to be of
sufficient experience not to require the same sort of instruction
as would be given to junior subalterns just out of school.
[Pg 259]The other method is that of the detached orders
given by Napoleon to his marshals, prescribing for each one
simply what concerned himself, and only informing him what corps
were to operate with him, either on the right or the left, but
never pointing out the connection of the operations of the whole
army.[35] I have good reasons for
knowing that he did this designedly, either to surround his
operations with an air of mystery, or for fear that more specific
orders might fall into the hands of the enemy and assist him in
thwarting his plans.
It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his
plans secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that
if his night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into
the fire. That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's
time, when his whole army was kept closely about him; but when
maneuvers of the vastness of Napoleon's are executed, and war is
waged as in our day, what concert of action can be expected from
generals who are utterly ignorant of what is going on around
them?
Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A
judicious mean may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness
of Napoleon and the minute verbosity which laid down for
experienced generals like Barclay, Kleist, and Wittgenstein
precise directions for breaking into companies and reforming
again in line of battle,—a piece of nonsense all the more
ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of
the enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in
such cases, to give the generals special orders relative to their
own corps, and to add a few lines in cipher informing them
briefly as to the whole plan of the operations and the part they
are to take individually in executing it. When a proper cipher is
wanting, the order may be transmitted verbally by an officer
capable of understanding it and repeating it accurately.
Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and concert
of action would be secured.
3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to
[Pg 260]undertake some enterprise, the important thing
will be to secure as much concert and precision of action as
possible, whilst taking all the usual precaution's to gain
accurate information of the route it is to pursue and to cover
its movements thoroughly.
There are two kinds of marches,—those which are made out
of sight of the enemy, and those which are made in his presence,
either advancing or retiring. These marches particularly have
undergone great changes in late years. Formerly, armies seldom
came in collision until they had been several days in presence of
each other, and the attacking party had roads opened by pioneers
for the columns to move up parallel to each other. At present,
the attack is made more promptly, and the existing roads usually
answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when an army
is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if
necessary, and secure the means of easy communication between the
different corps of the army.
In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times
and distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a
different distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their
departure and giving them instructions the following particulars
must be considered:—1, the distances to be passed over; 2,
the amount of matériel in each train; 3, the nature
of the country; 4, the obstacles placed in the way by the enemy;
5, the fact whether or not it is important for the march to be
concealed or open.
Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of
arranging the movements of the great corps forming the wings of
an army, or of all those corps not marching with the column
attached to the general head-quarters, will be to trust the
details to the experience of the generals commanding those
corps,—being careful, however, to let them understand that
the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will then be
enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the object
to be attained, the route to be pursued [Pg
261]and the hour at
which they will be expected to be in position. They should be
informed what corps are marching either on the same roads with
them or on side-roads to the right or left in order that they may
govern themselves accordingly; they should receive whatever news
there may be of the enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated
to them.[36]
All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for
the chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and
placing them in position are mere pedantry,—more hurtful
than useful. To see that they march habitually according to
regulation or custom is necessary; but they should be free to
arrange their movements so as to arrive at the appointed place
and time, at the risk of being removed from their command if they
fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats, however,
which are made along a single road by an army separated into
divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully
regulated.
Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers,
that its march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is
convenient also, even when they form part of a second line, for
the head of each column to be preceded by a few pioneers and
sappers, provided with tools for removing obstacles or making
repairs in case of accidents; a few of these workmen should also
accompany each train: in like manner, a light trestle-bridge
train will be found very useful.
4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general
advanced guard, or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the
center and each wing may have its special advanced guard. It is
customary for the reserves and the center to accompany the
head-quarters; and the general advanced guard, when there is one,
will usually follow the same road: so that half the army is thus
assembled on the central route. Under these circumstances, the
greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the road. It
happens sometimes, however, when [Pg
262]the important
stroke is to be made in the direction of one of the wings, that
the reserves, the general head-quarters, and even the general
advanced guard, may be moved in that direction: in this case, all
the rules usually regulating the march of the center must be
applied to that wing.
Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers,
capable of forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and
of giving an accurate account of them to the general, thus
enabling him to make his plans understandingly. The commander of
the advanced guard should assist the general in the same way. A
general advanced guard should be composed of light troops of all
arms, containing some of the élite troops of the
army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot,
some horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light
trestles and pontoons for passing small streams. A few good
marksmen will not be out of place. A topographical officer should
accompany it, to make a sketch of the country a mile or two on
each side of the road. A body of irregular cavalry should always
be attached, to spare the regular cavalry and to serve as scouts,
because they are best suited to such service.
5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it
becomes the more necessary to have a good line of operations and
of depots which may keep up the connection of the army with its
base. The staff officers will divide the depots into departments,
the principal depot being established in the town which can lodge
and supply the greatest number of men: if there is a fortress
suitably situated, it should be selected as the site of the
principal depot.
The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from
fifteen to thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The
mean distance apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles.
This will give fifteen depots upon a line of three hundred miles,
which should be divided into three or four brigades of depots.
Each of these will have a commander and a detachment of troops or
of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the arrangements for
accommodating troops and give protection to the authorities of
the country, (if they [Pg
263]remain;) they
furnish facilities for transmitting the mails and the necessary
escorts; the commander sees that the roads and bridges are kept
in good order. If possible, there should be a park of several
carriages at each depot, certainly at the principal one in each
brigade. The command of all the depots embraced within certain
geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and able
general officers; for the security of the communications of the
army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may
sometimes become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good battalions, with the
assistance of movable detachments passing continually between the
army and the base, will generally be able to keep open the
communications.
6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly
tactical, to be taken by the staff officers in bringing the
troops from the order of march to the different orders of battle,
is very important, but requires going into such minute detail
that I must pass it over nearly in silence, contenting myself
with referring my readers to the numerous works specially devoted
to this branch of the art of war.
Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few
examples should be given as illustrations of the great importance
of a good system of logistics. One of these examples is the
wonderful concentration of the French army in the plains of Gera
in 1806; another is the entrance of the army upon the campaign of
1815.
In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make
such arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely
separated, were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the
decisive point of the zone of operations; and in this way he
insured the successful issue of the cam[Pg
264]paign. The choice
of the decisive point was the result of a skillful application of
the principles of strategy; and the arrangements for moving the
troops give us an example of logistics which originated in his
own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
instructions which were conceived with so much precision and
usually transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had
frequent opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth.
The emperor was his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair
of dividers opened to a distance by the scale of from seventeen
to twenty miles in a straight line, (which made from twenty-two
to twenty-five miles, taking into account the windings of the
roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched at full length upon
his map, where the positions of his corps and the supposed
positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a
certainty and precision which were astonishing. Turning his
dividers about from point to point on the map, he decided in a
moment the number of marches necessary for each of his columns to
arrive at the desired point by a certain day; then, placing pins
in the new positions, and bearing in mind the rate of marching
that he must assign to each column, and the hour of its setting
out, he dictated those instructions which are alone enough to
make any man famous.
Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from
Upper Swabia, Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate,
Bernadotte and Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard
from Paris, were all thus arranged in line on three parallel
roads, to debouch simultaneously between Saalfeld, Gera, and
Plauen, few persons in the army or in Germany having any
conception of the object of these movements which seemed so very
complicated.
In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army
quietly in cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and
Wellington was attending fêtes in Brussels, both
waiting a signal for the invasion of France, Napoleon, who was
supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed with diplomatic
[Pg 265]ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had
been but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a
thunderbolt upon Charleroi and Blücher's quarters, his
columns arriving from all points of the compass, with rare
punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the plains of Beaumont and
upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not leave Paris until
the 12th.)
The combinations described above were the results of wise
strategic calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a
masterpiece of logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the
merit of these measures, I will mention, by way of contrast, two
cases where faults in logistics came very near leading to fatal
consequences. Napoleon having been recalled from Spain in 1809 by
the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and being certain that this
power intended war, he sent Berthier into Bavaria upon the
delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was extended from
Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was returning
from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the
Strasbourg route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were
moving from their respective countries. The corps were thus
separated by great distances, and the Austrians, who had been
long concentrated, might easily break through this spider's web
or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly uneasy, and
ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war had
not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate
it in a more retired position toward Ulm.
The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war
had begun, Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a
point of assembly, as the corps might thus be thrown separately
into the midst of two hundred thousand enemies; but by fixing
upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the army would be
concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have five
or six marches more to make before reaching-it,—which was a
highly-important consideration as the parties were then
situated.
No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities
having commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's
ar[Pg 266]rival at Munich, this too celebrated chief of
staff was so foolish as to adhere to a literal obedience of the
order he had received, without conceiving its obvious intention:
he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon, but even
obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal had
had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward
Ingolstadt.
Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph
of the passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence,
came with the speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust
was on the point of being surrounded and his army cut in two or
scattered by a mass of one hundred and eighty thousand enemies.
We know how wonderfully Napoleon succeeded in rallying his army,
and what victories he gained on the glorious days of Abensberg,
Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon, that repaired the
faults committed by his chief of staff with his contemptible
logistics.
We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the
events which preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of
the Danube before the battle of Wagram. The measures taken to
bring to a specified point of the island of Lobau the corps of
the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that of Marmont from Styria,
that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful than the famous
imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the
details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the
plains of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty
thousand Austrians and five hundred cannon, as if the operation
had been a military fête. These masses were all
assembled upon the island on the evening of the 4th of July;
three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the Danube
one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst
torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over
the bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up
before mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the
bridges which they covered by a change of front; the whole being
accomplished in less time than might have been supposed necessary
had it been a simple maneuver for instruction and after being
several times repeated. The enemy had, it is [Pg 267]true, determined to offer no serious opposition to
the passage; but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit
of his dispositions is not at all diminished by it.
Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he
made ten copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by
mistake the bridge of the center had been assigned to Davoust,
who had the right wing, whilst the bridge on the right was
assigned to Oudinot, who was in the center. These two corps
passed each other in the night, and, had it not been for the good
sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene of
confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of
the enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising
from a few detachments following corps to which they did not
belong. The most remarkable feature of the whole transaction is
found in the fact that after such a blunder Berthier should have
received the title of Prince of Wagram.
The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating
his decree; but should it not have been detected by a chief of
staff who made ten copies of the order and whose duty it was to
supervise the formation of the troops?
Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of
good logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting
this battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and
in the midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams
and gardens, it was highly important to have a number of small
bridges, to prepare the banks for approaching them with ease, and
to stake out the roads. These precautions would not have
prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but they would have
saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well as the
guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing
up of the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable
carelessness upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed
existed only in name, owing to the manner of Berthier's
management of it. We must also agree that Napoleon, who was
perfectly conversant with the logistical measures of an offensive
[Pg 268]campaign, had then never seriously thought what
would be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the
emperor was present himself no one thought of making any
arrangement for the future unless by his direction.
To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it
becomes necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to
reconnoissances. They are of two kinds: the first are entirely
topographical and statistical, and their object is to gain a
knowledge of a country, its accidents of ground, its roads,
defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its resources and means
of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences of
geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced
state, these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly;
but they are still very useful, and it is not probable that the
statistics of any country will ever be so accurate that they may
be entirely dispensed with. There are many excellent books of
instruction as to the art of making these reconnoissances, and I
must direct the attention of my readers to them.
Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is
necessary to gain information of the movements of the enemy. They
are made by detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy
is drawn up in battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs
of staff make the reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole
divisions of cavalry may be thrown out to break through his
screen of posts.
FOOTNOTES:
[33]
I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are not
to be repeated every day: such repetition would be
impracticable.
[34]
The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the
administrative departments all claim to have direct connection
with the general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There
should, of course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse
between these high officers and the commander; but he should work
with them in presence of the chief of staff, and send him all
their correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable.
[35]
I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and
at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated
from his usual custom by issuing a general order.
[36]
Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no general
should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten.
In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is
often indispensable.
[37]
It may be objected that in some wars, as where the population
is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to
organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be
exposed to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they
are most necessary and should be most numerous. The line from
Bayonne to Madrid was such a line, which resisted for four years
the attacks of the guerrillas,—although convoys were
sometimes seized. At one time the line extended as far as
Cadiz.
ARTICLE XLII.
Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct
Information of the Movements of the Enemy.
One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war
would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect
information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man
say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant what his
adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest
importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is
[Pg 269]one of the chief causes of the great difference
between the theory and the practice of war.
From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are
simply learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have
not acquired that practical coup-d'oeil which is imparted
by long experience in the direction of military operations. It is
a very easy matter for a school-man to make a plan for
outflanking a wing or threatening a line of communications upon a
map, where he can regulate the positions of both parties to suit
himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful, active, and
enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect riddle,
then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the
incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of
genius.
I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life,
that, if I had to put a general to the test, I should have a much
higher regard for the man who could form sound conclusions as to
the movements of the enemy than for him who could make a grand
display of theories,—things so difficult to put in
practice, but so easily understood when once exemplified.
There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's
operations. The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the
second consists in reconnoissances made by skillful officers and
light troops; the third, in questioning prisoners of war; the
fourth, in forming hypotheses of probabilities. This last idea I
will enlarge upon farther on. There is also a fifth
method,—that of signals. Although this is used rather for
indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions
as to his designs, it may be classed with the others.
Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any
other agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps;
for reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information
of any thing beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean
to say that they should not be resorted to, for we must use every
means of gaining information; but I do say that their results are
small and not to be depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often
useful, but it is gene[Pg
270]rally dangerous
to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will always be able to
select intelligent officers who can so frame their questions as
to elicit important information from prisoners and deserters.
The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of
operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it
is almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the
information they possess. An extensive system of espionage will
generally be successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to
penetrate to the general's closet and learn the secret plans he
may form: it is best for him, therefore, to limit himself to
information of what he sees with his own eyes or hears from
reliable persons. Even when the general receives from his spies
information of movements, he still knows nothing of those which
may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going
finally to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a
corps has passed through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has
passed through Gera toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself
the questions, Where are they going, and what enterprise are they
engaged in? These things the most skillful spy cannot learn.
When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information
of the enemy's operations was certain, because
reconnoitering-parties could be thrown forward in sight of the
camps, and the spies could report accurately their movements; but
with the existing organization into corps d'armée which
either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to learn any thing
about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the hostile
army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who
always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves.
Such, for example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If
it was known when they moved and what route they followed, it was
not difficult to conclude what project was in view, and the
details of the movements of smaller bodies needed not to be
attended to particularly.
A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods
by making reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with
great satisfaction say that this means hardly ever [Pg 271]failed me. Though fortune never placed me at the
head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a hundred
thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils
of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under
consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined
armies of Europe; and I was never more than two or three times
mistaken in my hypotheses and in my manner of solving the
difficulties they offered. As I have said before, I have
constantly noticed that, as an army can operate only upon the
center or one extremity of its front of operations, there are
seldom more than three or four suppositions that can possibly be
made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and conversant with
the principles of war will always be able to form a plan which
will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the
future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own
observation.
In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the
war with Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the
war and the operations which would take place.
I made the three following hypotheses:—1st. The
Prussians will await Napoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will
fight on the defensive as far as the Oder, in expectation of aid
from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or they will advance upon the Saale,
resting their left upon the frontier of Bohemia and defending the
passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d. Or else, expecting the
French by the great Mayence road, they will advance imprudently
to Erfurt.
I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless
the Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their
forces, already inferior to the French, upon the two directions
of Wesel and Mayence,—a useless mistake, since there had
not been a French soldier on the first of these roads since the
Seven Years' War.
These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one
should ask what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to
reply "that the mass of the French army being already assembled
in Bavaria, it should be thrown upon the left of the Prussians by
way of Grera and Hof, for the gordian knot [Pg 272]of
the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan they
should adopt."
If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their
line of retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the
North Sea. If they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their
left by way of Hof and Gera, defeat them partially, and reach
Berlin before them by way of Leipsic. If they stood fast behind
the Elbe, he must still attack them by way of Gera and Hof.
Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed,
what mattered it to him to know the details of their movements?
Being certain of the correctness of these principles, I did not
hesitate to announce, a month before the war, that
Napoleon would attempt just what he did, and that if the
Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at Jena and
Naumburg!
I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for
if that were my motive I might mention many more of a similar
character. I have only been anxious to show that in war a plan of
operations may be often arranged, simply based upon the general
principles of the art, without much attention being of necessity
given to the details of the enemy's movements.
Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies
has been neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies.
In 1813 the staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou
for expenditure for such services, and the Emperor Alexander was
obliged to furnish the staff officers with funds from his own
private purse to enable them to send agents into Lusatia for the
purpose of finding out Napoleon's whereabouts. General Mack at
Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806, were no better informed;
and the French generals in Spain often suffered severely, because
it was impossible to obtain spies and to get information as to
what was going on around them.
The Russian army is better provided than any other for
gathering information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks;
and history confirms my assertion.
[Pg 273]The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent
after the battle of Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who
crossed the Elbe by swimming and marched in the midst of the
French columns as far, nearly, as Wittenberg, is a remarkable
instance of this class. The information furnished by the partisan
troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf, Davidoff, and
Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
intercepted near Châlons by the Cossacks, that the allies
were informed of the plan he had formed of falling upon their
communications with his whole disposable force, basing his
operations upon the fortified towns of Lorraine and Alsace. This
highly-important piece of information decided Blücher and
Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies, which the
plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought to
act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.
We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General
Doctoroff saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon,
who had just left Moscow in retreat with his whole army.
Doctoroff did not at first credit this news,—which so
irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of a French
officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This
warning, which decided the march of Koutousoff to
Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon from taking the way by
Kalouga, where he would have found greater facilities for
refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous days of
Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.
Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of
what good partisan troops can accomplish when led by good
officers.
I will conclude this article with the following
summary:—
1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of
the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by
capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and
prisoners.
[Pg 274]2. By multiplying the means of obtaining
information; for, no matter how imperfect and contradictory they
may be, the truth may often be sifted from them.
3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these
means.
4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the
methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging
several courses of action for himself, based upon probable
hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him
to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art.
I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing
very unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,—as has
so often happened to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to
command an army, he should at least be able to form reasonable
suppositions as to what the enemy is going to do, and fix for
himself a certain line of conduct to suit each of these
hypotheses.[38] It cannot be too much
insisted upon that the real secret of military genius consists in
the ability to make these reasonable suppositions in any case;
and, although their number is always small, it is wonderful how
much this highly-useful means of regulating one's conduct is
neglected.
In order to make this article complete, I must state what is
to be gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are
several kinds. Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most
important of all. Napoleon owes his astonishing success at
Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact of his having established a
telegraphic communication between the head-quarters of the army
and France. He was still at Paris when the Austrian army crossed
the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading Bavaria and
breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in
twenty-four hours, of what was passing [Pg
275]at a distance of
seven hundred miles, he threw himself into his
traveling-carriage, and a week later he had gained two victories
under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the telegraph, the campaign
would have been lost. This single fact is sufficient to impress
us with an idea of its value.
It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a
telegraphic arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on
high ground, could communicate the orders of the center to the
extremities of a line of battle, as well as the reports of the
wings to the head-quarters. Repeated trials of it were made in
Russia; but the project was given up,—for what reason,
however, I have not been able to learn. These communications
could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method could
not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be
reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented
by signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it
should be necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers
capable of transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly
be a gain of rapidity.[39] attempt of another kind was
made in 1794, at the battle of Fleurus, where General Jourdan
made use of the services of a balloonist to observe and give
notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not aware that he
found the method a very useful one, as it was not again used; but
it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the
victory: of this, however, I have great doubts.
It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in
readiness to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his
making careful observations upon what is going on below, whilst
floating at the mercy of the winds above, has led to the
abandonment of this method of gaining information. By giving the
balloon no great elevation, sending up with it an officer capable
of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's movements, and
perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection with the
balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its use.
Sometimes the smoke of the battle, [Pg
276]and the
difficulty of distinguishing the columns, that look like
liliputians, so as to know to which party they belong, will make
the reports of the balloonists very unreliable. For example, a
balloonist would have been greatly embarrassed in deciding, at
the battle of Waterloo, whether it was Grouchy or Blücher
who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but this
uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much
mixed. I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from
such observations when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch,
at the battle of Leipsic; and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp,
whom I had conducted to the same point, could not deny that it
was at my solicitation the prince was prevailed upon to emerge
from the marsh between the Pleisse and the Elster. An observer is
doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than in a frail
basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at hand
in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported
at pleasure.
There is still another method of signaling, by the use of
large fires kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before
the invention of the telegraph, they afforded the means of
transmitting the news of an invasion from one end of the country
to the other. The Swiss have made use of them to call the militia
to arms. They have been also used to give the alarm to winter
quarters and to assemble the troops more rapidly. The
signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so as to
indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's
threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate
to meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give
notice of descents.
Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an
action, by means of military instruments. This method of signals
has been brought to greater perfection in the Russian army than
in any other I know of. While I am aware of the great importance
of discovering a sure method of setting in motion simultaneously
a large mass of troops at the will of the commander, I am
convinced that it must be a long time before the problem is
solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for
skirmishers. A move[Pg 277]ment of a long line of troops may be
made nearly simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point
and passed rapidly from man to man; but these shouts seem
generally to be a sort of inspiration, and are seldom the result
of an order. I have seen but two cases of it in thirteen
campaigns.
FOOTNOTES:
[38]
I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in war
can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To
prove the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to
cite the surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am
still of the opinion, however, that such events even as these
might always have been anticipated, entirely or in part, as at
least within the limits of probability or possibility.
[39]
When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not
known.—Translators.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR
COMBINED USE OF THE THREE ARMS.
ARTICLE XLIII.
Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
Having explained in Article XXX.
what is to be understood by the term line of battle, it is
proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, and how the
different troops are to be distributed in it.
Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in
regiments and brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps,
drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left wing.
The cavalry was usually placed upon the wings, and the
artillery—which at this period was very unwieldy—was
distributed along the front of each line. The army camped
together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two
cavalry wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings
four columns were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which
was specially applicable to flank movements,) two columns were
formed, unless, on account of local circumstances, the cavalry or
a part of the infantry had camped in a third line,—which
was rare.
This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only
necessary to give such orders as the following:—"The army
will move in such direction, by lines or by wings, by the right
or by the left." This monotonous but simple forma[Pg 278]tion was seldom deviated from; and no better could
have been devised as war was carried on in those days.
The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as
many columns as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the
front in line,—a simple impossibility.
If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method
of camping and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such
a system were applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one
hundred and fifty thousand men, there would be no end to the
columns, and the result would be the frequent occurrence of routs
like that of Rossbach.
The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions,
which broke up the excessive compactness of the old formation,
and brought upon the field fractions capable of independent
movement on any kind of ground. This change was a real
improvement,—although they went from one extreme to the
other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the
Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery,
and cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very
much extended, either to enable them to subsist without the use
of depots, or with an absurd expectation of prolonging the line
in order to outflank that of the enemy. The seven or eight
divisions of an army were sometimes seen marching on the same
number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from each other; the
head-quarters was at the center, with no other support than five
or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four
hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of
his forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line
was pierced, and the general-in-chief, having no disposable
infantry reserve, could do nothing but order a retreat to rally
his scattered columns.
Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this
difficulty, partly by the mobility of his army and the rapidity
of his maneuvers, and partly by concentrating the mass of his
divisions upon the point where the decisive blow was to fall.
When he became the head of the government, and saw the sphere of
his means and his plans constantly increas[Pg 279]ing
in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger organization
was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system and the
new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional
system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps
of two or three divisions, which he placed under the command of
lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center,
and the reserve of his army.[40]
This system was finally developed fully at the camp of
Boulogne, where he organized permanent army corps under the
command of marshals, who had under their orders three divisions
of infantry, one of light cavalry, from thirty-six to forty
pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each corps was thus a
small army, able at need to act independently as an army. The
heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, composed
of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of
light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable
infantry reserve. At a later period—1812—the cavalry
was also organized into corps of three divisions, to give greater
unity of action to the constantly-increasing masses of this arm.
This organization was as near perfection as possible; and the
grand army, that brought about such great results, was the model
which all the armies of Europe soon imitated.
Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have
recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to
act independently, should contain three instead of two brigades,
because this number will allow one for the center and each wing.
This would certainly be an improvement; for if the division
contains but two brigades there is an open space left in the
center between the brigades on the wings: these brigades, having
no common central support, cannot with safety act independently
of each other. Besides this, with three brigades in a division,
two may be engaged while the third is held in reserve,—a
manifest advantage. But, [Pg
280]if thirty
brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades are better
than when formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades, it becomes
necessary, in order to obtain this perfect divisional
organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry by
one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from
three to two,—which last would be a serious disadvantage,
because the army-corps is much more frequently called upon to act
independently than a division, and the subdivision into three
parts is specially best for that[41].
What is the best organization to be given an army just setting
out upon a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in
logistics; because it is extremely difficult to maintain the
original organization in the midst of the operations of war, and
detachments must be sent out continually.
The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization
seemed to leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the
assertion just made. The center under Soult, the right under
Davoust, the left under Ney, and the reserve under Lannes, formed
together a regular and formidable battle-corps of thirteen
divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and
the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte and
Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left,
were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the
Danube at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first
reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the
battle-corps was divided partly to the right and partly to the
left, so that this fine arrangement was destroyed.
It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization.
Events are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and
Moreau's campaign of 1800 proves that the original
organ[Pg 281]ization may sometimes be maintained, at least for
the mass of the army. With this view, it would seem prudent to
organize an army in four parts,—two wings, a center, and a
reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the
strength of the army; but in order to retain this organization it
becomes necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of
the general line in order to furnish the necessary detachments.
While these divisions are with the army, they may be attached to
that part which is to receive or give the heaviest blows; or they
may be employed on the flanks of the main body, or to increase
the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four great parts of the
army may be a single corps of three or four divisions, or two
corps of two divisions each. In this last case there would be
seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps
should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing
and to the center.
With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the
general line in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that
the extreme corps may be detached, so that each wing might
contain but two divisions, and from these a brigade might be
occasionally detached to flank the march of the army, leaving but
three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak order of
battle.
These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the
line of battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and
one of light cavalry, with three or four divisions for
detachments, would be more stable than one of seven corps, each
of two divisions.
But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and
of the units of which it is composed, as well as upon the
character of the operations in which it may be engaged, the
arrangement may be greatly varied. I cannot go into these
details, and shall simply exhibit the principal combinations that
may result from forming the divisions in two or three brigades
and the corps in two or three divisions. I have indicated the
formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one behind
the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28
inclusive.)
[Pg 282]
Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of
Infantry.
Fig. 17.
|
Fig. 18.
|
Fig. 19.
|
|
|
|
Fig. 20.
|
Fig. 21.
|
Fig. 22.
|
|
|
|
[Pg 283]
Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades
each.
Fig. 23.
|
Fig. 24.
|
Fig. 25.
|
|
|
|
Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades
each.
Fig. 26.
|
Fig. 27.
|
|
|
[Pg 284]
Fig. 28.
Note.—In all these formations the unit is the brigade in
line; but these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of
battalions in columns of attack by divisions of two companies.
The cavalry attached to the corps will be placed on the flanks.
The brigades might be so drawn up as to have one regiment in the
first line and one in the second.
[Pg 285]The question here presents itself, whether it is
ever proper to place two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon
often did, particularly at Wagram. I think that, except for the
reserves, this arrangement may be used only in a position of
expectation, and never as an order of battle; for it is much
better for each corps to have its own second line and its reserve
than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under
different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to
support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his
troops for that purpose; and when in the general of the first
line he sees not a colleague, but a hated rival, as too
frequently happens, it is probable he will be very slow in
furnishing the assistance which may be greatly needed. Moreover,
a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line cannot
execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front
was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his
own troops drawn up in rear.
The table below[42] will show that the number
of men in an army will have great influence in determining the
best formation for it, and that the subject is a complicated
one.
[Pg 286]In making our calculations, it is scarcely
necessary to provide for the case of such immense masses being in
the field as were seen from 1812 to 1815, when a single army
contained fourteen corps varying in strength from two to five
divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can be proposed
than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of these
corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six
for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line
that might require support. If this system be applied to an army
of one hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly
practicable to employ divisions of two brigades each where
Napoleon and the allies used corps.
If nine divisions form the main body,—that is, the wings
and the center,—and six others form the reserve and
detachments, fifteen divisions would be required, or thirty
brigades,—which would make one hundred and eighty
battalions, if each regiment contains three battalions. This
supposition brings our army up to one hundred and forty-five
thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With
regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred
and twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if
each regiment contains but two battalions, each battalion should
be one thousand men strong, and this would increase the infantry
to one hundred and twenty thousand men and the entire army to one
hundred and sixty thousand men. These calculations show that the
strength of the minor subdivisions must be carefully considered
in arranging into corps and divisions. If an army does not
contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation by
divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was
Napoleon's army of 1800.
Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a
somewhat permanent organization to the main body of an army, it
will not be out of place for me to inquire whether this
permanency is desirable, and if it is not advantageous to deceive
the enemy by frequently changing the composition of corps and
their positions.
I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it
[Pg 287]may be gained while still retaining a quite
constant organization of the main body. If the divisions intended
for detachments are joined to the wings and the
center,—that is, if those parts contain each four divisions
instead of three,—and if one or two divisions be
occasionally added to the wing which is likely to bear the brunt
of an engagement, each wing will be a corps properly of four
divisions; but detachments will generally reduce it to three, and
sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by a portion
of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy would
thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of
the line.
But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable
that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of
an army, the organization into corps will long be retained by all
the great powers of Europe, and calculations for the arrangement
of the line of battle must be made upon that basis.
The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has
changed in recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the
line. Formerly it was usually composed of two lines, but now of
two lines and one or more reserves. In recent[43] conflicts in Europe, when
the masses brought into collision were very large, the corps were
not only formed in two lines, but one corps was placed behind
another, thus making four lines; and, the reserve being drawn up
in the same manner, six lines of infantry were often the result,
and several of cavalry. Such a formation may answer well enough
as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best for battle, as
it is entirely too deep.
The classical formation—if I may employ that
term—is still two lines for the infantry. The greater or
less extent of the battle-field and the strength of an army may
necessarily produce greater depth at times; but these cases are
the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and the
reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number
of men to be simultaneously engaged.
When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either
formed in front of the line of battle or be carried to
[Pg 288]the rear to strengthen the reserve;[44] but, as has been previously
stated, this will not often happen with the present method of
forming and moving armies. Each wing has usually its own advanced
guard, and the advanced guard of the main or central portion of
the army is naturally furnished by the leading corps: upon coming
into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return to their
proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve is
almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not
prevent its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the
line of battle by the character of the position or by the wishes
of the commanding general.
From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that
very great changes of army organization took place from the time
of the revival of the art of war and the invention of gunpowder
to the French Revolution, and that to have a proper appreciation
of the wars of Louis XIV., of Peter the Great, and of Frederick
II., they should consider them from the stand-point of those
days.
One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if,
by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule
to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good
arrangement for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men,
especially when the ground in the center is not so suitable for
the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. It is
usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each
infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference to
the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks.
If the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit
the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as
reserve to the center and one to each wing, the arrangement is
certainly a good one. If that is impossible, this reserve may be
formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing and the
other on the left of the right [Pg
289]wing. These
columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may
be threatened.[45]
The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and
may, as formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each
division remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that,
the organization of the artillery having been greatly improved,
an advantageous distribution of it may be more readily made; but
it is a great mistake to scatter it too much. Few precise rules
can be laid down for the proper distribution of artillery. Who,
for example, would dare to advise as a rule the filling up of a
large gap in a line of battle with one hundred pieces of cannon
in a single battery without adequate support, as Napoleon did
successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into much
detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the
following rules:—
1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it
can move freely in every direction.
2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of
heavy caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or
hedges from sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for
me to add—what every young officer should know
already—that too elevated positions are not those to give
artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping ground is
better.
3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but
it is well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery,
to be readily thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover,
proper to have horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried
as rapidly as possible to any threatened point. General
Benningsen had great cause for self-congratulation at Eylau
because he had fifty light guns in reserve; for they had a
powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself when his
line had been broken through between the center and the left.
4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy
[Pg 290]batteries in front, instead of holding them in
reserve, since it is desirable to attack the enemy at the
greatest possible distance, with a view of checking his forward
movement and causing disorder in his columns.
5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the
artillery not in reserve distributed at equal intervals in
batteries along the whole line, since it is important to repel
the enemy at all points. This must not, however, be regarded as
an invariable rule; for the character of the position and the
designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the artillery to move
to a wing or to the center.
6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate
a very powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is
desired to make a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the
enemy's line to such a degree that he will be unable to withstand
an attack upon which the fate of the battle is to turn. I shall
at another place have more to say as to the employment of
artillery in battles.
FOOTNOTES:
[40]
Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing of
three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions
under Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under
Saint-Suzanne, the general-in-chief having three divisions more
as a reserve under his own immediate orders.
[41]
Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades
each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while the
same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades
each may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the
second. But it then becomes necessary to diminish the number of
divisions and to have but two in a corps,—which would be a
faulty arrangement, because the corps is much more likely to be
called upon for independent action than the division.
[42]
Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,—in
all, four principal subdivisions,—besides accidental
detachments.
Below are some of the different formations that may be given
to infantry.
1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men
each:—
Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two
divisions each, and three divisions for detachments |
11 = 22 = 88 = 72,000 |
Four corps of three divisions each, and three
divisions for detachments |
15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000 |
Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps
for detachments |
16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000 |
2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six
battalions:—
Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two
divisions each, besides detachments |
11 = 22 = 132 = 105,000 |
Four corps of three divisions each, besides
detachments |
15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000 |
Eight corps of two divisions each |
16 = 32 = 192 = 154,000 |
If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery,
and engineers, the total force for the above formations may be
known.
It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight
hundred men each would become very weak at the end of two or
three months' campaigning. If they do not consist of three
battalions, then each battalion should contain one thousand
men.
[43]
The term recent here refers to the later wars of
Napoleon I.—Translators.
[44]
As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every day,
and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the
hour of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in
front of the line of battle.
[45]
This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon the
supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This is
the essential condition of every well-arranged line of
battle.
ARTICLE XLIV.
Formation and Employment of Infantry.
Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service,
since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the
attack and defense of positions. If we must admit that, next to
the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable
instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most
important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that
without their assistance the infantry might at times be very
seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial
success.
We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the
shallow and the deep formations, although the question, which was
supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. The war
in Spain and the battle of Waterloo have again given rise to
disputes as to the relative advantages of fire and the shallow
order, and of columns of attack and the deep order. I will give
my own opinion farther on.
[Pg 291]There must, however, be no misconception on this
subject. The question now is not whether Lloyd was right in
wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry
formation, with the expectation of producing more effect by the
shock when attacking, or opposing a greater resistance when
attacked. Every officer of experience knows the difficulty of
moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in three
ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the
disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that
Lloyd, who had seen service, should have insisted so much upon
the material advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass
of a battalion; for it very rarely happens that such a collision
between opposing troops takes place that mere weight decides the
contest. If three ranks turn their backs to the enemy, the fourth
will not check them. This increase in the number of ranks
diminishes the front and the number of men firing upon the
defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much
mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more
difficult to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four
ranks than in three: although in the former case the extent of
front is less, the ranks cannot be kept properly closed.
Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so
absurd that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have
imagined it. He wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave
between them one hundred and fifty yards, or an interval equal to
their front. We may well ask what would befall those battalions
thus separated. The cavalry may penetrate the intervals and
scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.
But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist
of deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of
columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on the
central division and depending on its force and impetuosity?
I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a
decision of the question in hand.
There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to
[Pg 292]attack an enemy:—l, as skirmishers; 2, in
deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; 3, in lines of
battalions formed in column on the central divisions; 4, in deep
masses; 5, in small squares.
The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of
skirmishers are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it
by taking advantage of the ground, to protect the movements of
columns, to fill up intervals, and to defend the skirts of a
position.
These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible
to four: the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three
ranks; the half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in
columns doubled on the center or in battalion squares; the mixed
order, where regiments are partly in line and partly in column;
finally, the deep order, composed of heavy columns of battalions
deployed one behind the other.
FIG. 29. [46]
Deployed in order of two lines.
The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was
formerly used to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on
the defensive. These deployed lines may either be continuous,
(Fig. 29,) or checkerwise, or in
echelons.
Fig. 30.
Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with
skirmishers in the intervals.
A more compact order is shown in Fig.
30, where each battalion is formed into a column of attack,
being by divisions upon the central division. It is really a line
of small columns
[Pg 293]In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four
divisions[47]
will have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are
in this way too many non-combatants, and the column presents too
good a mark for the artillery. To remedy in part these
inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is
employed in columns of attack, to form it in two ranks, to place
only three divisions of a battalion one behind the other, and to
spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of the
battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these
skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.) Each battalion would thus have two
hundred more men to fire, besides those thrown into the two front
ranks from the third. There would be, also, an increase of the
whole front. By this arrangement, while having really a depth of
but six men, there would be a front of one hundred men, and four
hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each
battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[48] A battalion of eight
hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four
divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the
first alone—and only two ranks of that—discharge
their pieces. Bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one
hundred and twenty shots at a volley, whilst formed in the manner
shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver four
hundred.
Fig. 31.
[Pg 294]While searching after methods of obtaining more
fire when necessary, we must not forget that a column of attack
is not intended to fire, and that its fire should be reserved
until the last; for if it begins to fire while marching, the
whole impulsive effect of its forward movement is lost. Moreover,
this shallower order would only be advantageous against infantry,
as the column of four divisions in three ranks—forming a
kind of solid square—would be better against cavalry. The
Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and
particularly at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was
proposed by myself in my chapter on the General Principles of
War, published in 1807. The brave cavalry of Bessières
could make no impression upon these small masses.
To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers
might, it is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed;
but this would be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less
resistance to a charge than the three-rank
formation,—particularly on the flanks. If to remedy this
inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military men
believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well
as columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only
in two ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the
French cavalry, only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in
conclusion, that, if the two-rank formation be used for the
columns of attack, it will be difficult to preserve that in three
ranks for deployed lines, as it is scarcely possible to have two
methods of formation, or, at any rate, to employ them alternately
in the same engagement. It is not probable that any European
army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed lines in
two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns
of attack.
I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and
Prussians, of forming columns of four divisions in three ranks,
of which one may be employed as skirmishers when necessary, is
more generally applicable than any other; whilst the other, of
which mention has been made, would be suitable only in certain
cases and would require a double formation.
[Pg 295]
Fig. 32.
There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the
Tagliamento and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of
three battalions, one was deployed to form the first line, and
two others to the rear in columns. (See Fig.
32.) This arrangement—which belongs also to the
half-deep order—is suitable for the offensive-defensive,
because the first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy,
which must throw him into more or less confusion, and the troops
formed in columns may debouch through the intervals and fall with
advantage upon him while in disorder. This arrangement would
probably be improved by placing the leading divisions of the two
battalions of the wings upon the same line with the central
deployed battalion. There would thus be a half-battalion more to
each regiment in the first line,—a by no means unimportant
thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear that,
these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched
against the enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose.
The order may be useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated
it.
Fig. 33.
Fig. 34.
The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is
certainly the most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon,
twelve battalions were sometimes deployed and closed one upon the
other, forming thirty-six ranks closely packed together. Such
masses are greatly exposed to the destructive effects of
artillery, their mobility and impulsion are diminished, while
their strength is not increased. The use of such masses at
Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated. Macdonald's
column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great sacrifice of
life; and it is not probable that this column would have been
vic[Pg 296]torious had it not been for the successes of
Davoust and Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line.
When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should
certainly be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching
in file, so that if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it
need not be arrested in its progress. (See Fig.
33.) Under the protection of these battalions, which may face
toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to the point
it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed to a
powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will
be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken
as was the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.
Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a
superiority in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square
is best for the defensive, and the battalion square for the
offensive. (See Figs. 35, 36, 37.)
Fig. 35.
Division in battalion squares.
Fig. 36.
The same division in long battalion squares.
Fig. 37.
Squared of regiments of three battalions.
The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a
large front and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of
the enemy. A regiment of three battalions will thus form a long
square, by wheeling the center battalion half to the right and
half to the left.
In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used,
because hostilities were carried on in [Pg
297]the vast plains
of Bessarabia, Moldavia, or Wallachia, and the Turks had an
immense force of cavalry. But if the seat of war be the Balkan
Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular cavalry be replaced
by an army organized according to the proportions usual in
Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the
Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia.
However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or
battalions seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the
assailant has not the superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on
level ground advantageous for the enemy's charges. The elongated
square, especially when applied to a battalion of eight
companies, three of which would march in front and one on each
side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed
battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above;
but there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if
the battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the
advantage, also, of being prepared to resist cavalry.
Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to
unmask each other. All the orders of battle may be formed of
squares as well as with deployed lines.
It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations
described is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to
the correctness of which every one will assent,—that a
formation suitable for the offensive must possess the
characteristics of solidity, mobility, and
momentum, whilst for the defensive solidity is
requisite, and also the power of delivering as much fire as
possible.
This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided
whether the bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire,
can stand long in presence of a deployed line firing twenty
thousand musket-balls in one round, and able to fire two hundred
thousand or three hundred thousand in five minutes. In the later
wars in Europe, positions have often been carried by Russian,
French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a shoulder and
without firing a shot. This was a triumph of momentum and
the moral effect it produces; but [Pg
298]under the cool
and deadly fire of the English infantry the French columns did
not succeed so well at Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore,
Albuera, and Waterloo.
We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts
that the advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation
and firing; for when the French formed their infantry in those
dense masses, it is not at all wonderful that the deployed and
marching battalions of which they were composed, assailed on all
sides by a deadly fire, should have been repulsed. Would the same
result have been witnessed if they had used columns of attack
formed each of a single battalion doubled on the center? I think
not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of the shallow
order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep order and
its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a
deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like
Fig. 31, (page
293.) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I
have seen them tried.
Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when
marching to attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be
moved up into action while firing? I think no one will answer
affirmatively. Suppose the attempt made to bring up twenty or
thirty battalions in line, while firing either by file or by
company, to the assault of a well-defended position: it is not
very probable they would ever reach the desired point, or, if
they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of
sheep.
What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said?
1. If the deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for
the offensive. 2. The column of attack of single battalions is
the best formation for carrying a position by assault; but its
depth should be diminished as much as possible, that it may when
necessary be able to deliver as heavy a column of fire as
possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's fire: it
ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by
cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the
second in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either
of them may be successful [Pg
299]in the hands of a
general of talent, who knows how to use his troops properly in
the manner indicated in Articles XVI.
and XXX.
Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements
have been made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making
them much more destructive. The effect of this is to incline men
to prefer the shallower formations, even in the attack. We
cannot, however, forget the lessons of experience; and,
notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, shrapnel-shot, and
the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method of forming
infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some
persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and
breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the
attack in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to
the deployed system, some better arrangement must be devised for
marching to the attack than long, continuous lines, and either
columns must be used with proper distances for deployment upon
arriving near the enemy's position, or lines drawn up
checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of
companies,—all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence
of an enemy who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his
side. A skillful commander will use either, or a combination of
all, of these arrangements, according to circumstances.
Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult
tactical problems is that of determining the best formation of
troops for battle; but I have also learned that to solve this
problem by the use of a single method is an impossibility.
In the first place, the topography of different countries is
very various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men
might be maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy,
Switzerland, the valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is
barely possible to deploy a division of ten battalions. The
degree of instruction of the troops, and their national
characteristics, may also have an influence upon the system of
formation.
Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its
instruction in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain
[Pg 300]in movements in long lines so much order and
steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which would be
entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies of
the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that
nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men
who think that there can be but one type and one system for all
armies and all countries.
To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the
problem, it seems to me, we ought to find out:—1. The best
method of moving when in sight of the enemy, but beyond his
reach; 2. The best method of coming to close quarters with him;
3. The best defensive order.
In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems
desirable in all cases to exercise the troops—1. In
marching in columns of battalions doubled on the center, with a
view to deployment, if necessary, when coming into musket-range,
or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in continuous
deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in
deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,—as these broken
lines are more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving
to the front by the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the
front in small squares, either in line or checkerwise; 6. In
changing front while using these different methods of marching;
7. In changes of front executed by columns of companies at full
distance, without deployment,—a more expeditious method
than the others of changing front, and the one best suited to all
kinds of ground.
Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks
of companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous.
In a plain it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very
convenient. It breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the
officers and privates to it, and by keeping the guides and
color-bearers well aligned, all confusion can be avoided. The
only objection to it is the danger to which the separated
companies are exposed of being ridden down by cavalry. This
danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and not
using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over
the first part of [Pg 301]the large interval separating the
two armies. At the least sign of the enemy's proximity the line
could be reformed instantly, since the companies can come into
line at a run. Whatever precautions may be taken, this maneuver
should only be practiced with well-disciplined troops, never with
militia or raw troops. I have never seen it tried in presence of
an enemy,—but frequently at drills, where it has been found
to succeed well, especially in changing front.
I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in
checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the
same battalions in continuous lines did not. The French,
particularly, have never been able to march steadily in deployed
lines. This checkered order would be dangerous in case of an
unexpected charge of cavalry. It may be employed in the first
stages of the movement forward, to make it more easy, and the
rear battalions would then come into line with the leading ones
before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form line at
the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only
between the leading and following battalions; for we must not
forget that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a
single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder
observed in the marches of continuous lines.
It is very difficult to determine positively the best
formation for making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of
all the methods I have seen tried, the following seemed to
succeed best. Form twenty-four battalions in two lines of
battalions in columns doubled on the center ready for deployment:
the first line will advance at charging-pace toward the enemy's
line to within twice musket-range, and will then deploy at a run;
the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread out in
skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and
pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns
follows the first, and the battalions composing it pass at
charging-step through the intervals of the first line. This
maneuver was executed when no enemy was present; but it seems to
me an irresistible combination of the advantages of firing and of
the column.
[Pg 302]Besides these lines of columns, there are three
other methods of attacking in the half-deep order.
The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions
with others in column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32,) page 295. The
deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column
would open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then
be made. The second is that of advancing a deployed line and
firing until reaching half musket-range, then throwing forward
the columns of the second line through the intervals of the
first. The third is the order in echelons, mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig.
15 on that page.
Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in
deployed lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until
one or the other party takes to its heels,—a case not
likely to happen.
I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best;
for I have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real
combats of infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions
deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or
else columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either
retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an
actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the
advance. I have seen mêlées of infantry in
defiles and in villages, where the heads of columns came in
actual bodily collision and thrust each other with the bayonet;
but I never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle.
In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are
useful, and should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as
useless the fire of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely
the half-deep formation; and an army is ruined if forced to
adhere to precisely the same style of tactical maneuvers in every
country it may enter and against every different nation. It is
not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of
the different arms which will insure victory. I must, however,
except very deep masses, as they should be entirely
abandoned.
[Pg 303]I will conclude this subject by stating that a
most vital point to be attended to in leading infantry to the
combat is to protect the troops as much as possible from the fire
of the enemy's artillery, not by withdrawing them at inopportune
moments, but by taking advantage of all inequalities and
accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of the enemy.
When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it
is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault
is then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for
skirmishers and troops on the defensive.
It is generally quite important to defend villages on the
front of a position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an
enemy who is assailed; but their importance should not be
overestimated; for we must never forget the noted battle of
Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene, seeing the mass of the
French infantry shut up in the villages, broke through the center
and captured twenty-four battalions which were sacrificed in
defending these posts.
For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or
brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. They
shelter the troops, conceal their movements, cover those of
cavalry, and prevent the enemy from maneuvering in their
neighborhood. The case of the park of Hougoumont at the battle of
Waterloo is a fine example of the influence the possession of
such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in
deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the
possession of the woods was very important.
FOOTNOTES:
[46]
In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of twelve
battalions.
[47]
The word division being used to designate four or five
regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is
danger of confusion in its use.
[48]
In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from the third
rank of each division,—which makes the column eight men in
depth, instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate
rallying the skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps,
better to take the whole fourth division for that purpose, thus
giving nine ranks, or three divisions of three ranks, against
infantry, while against cavalry there would be twelve ranks.
ARTICLE XLV.
Cavalry.
The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of
course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with
that of the whole army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an
inferior character may be so handled as to produce very great
results, if set in action at proper moments.
The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has
varied greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of [Pg 304]nations making their people more or less fit for
good troopers. The number and quality of horses, also, have
something to do with it. In the wars of the Revolution, the
French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly inferior to
the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was pompously
called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,—a weak
brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw
the same reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty
thousand horses,—so much had ideas and means changed.
As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open
country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its
whole strength; in mountainous countries one-tenth will
suffice.
The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity
and ease of motion. To these characteristics may be added its
impetuosity; but we must be careful lest a false application be
made of this last.
Whatever may be its importance in the ensemble of the
operations of war, cavalry can never defend a position without
the support of infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for
gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off
prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succoring a
threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering
retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient in cavalry
rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely
difficult.
The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action
depend upon the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the
battle, the enemy's movements, and a thousand other circumstances
which cannot be mentioned here. I can only touch upon the
principal things to be considered in its use.
All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line
in good order cannot be attempted with much hope of success,
unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the
French paid dearly for having violated this rule; and the cavalry
of Frederick the Great fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A
commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward
alone, but generally the best time [Pg
305]for charging a
line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing
infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several
others prove this.
There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided
superiority over infantry,—when rain or snow dampens the
arms of the latter and they cannot fire. Augereau's corps found
this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, and so did the Austrian left
at Dresden.
Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any
other way may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge
of this kind was made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg
in 1745. A charge against squares of good infantry in good order
cannot succeed.
A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of
artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more
easily; but the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the
cavalry, for a charge of this character has only a momentary
effect, which must be taken advantage of before the enemy can
return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The beautiful charge
of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, October 16, is
a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo with the
same object in view were admirable, but failed because
unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince
Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done
under such circumstances.
General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to
drive it from the field of battle and return more free to act
against his infantry.
Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear
of an enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front
by the infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a
gallop, and, if successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's
army. This operation is rarely attempted, but I see no reason why
it should not be very good; for a body of cavalry well handled
cannot be cut off even if it gets in rear of the enemy. This is a
duty for which light cavalry is particularly fitted.
[Pg 306]In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very
valuable results by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which
has engaged the opposing line and either broken it through or
been on the point of doing so. It may regain the advantages lost,
change the face of affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy
flushed and disordered by his own success. This was proved at
Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at Waterloo by
the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps
d'armée may charge at opportune moments, either to
co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a false
movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by pressing him
while in retreat.
It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of
attacking, as it depends upon the object in view and other
circumstances. There are but four methods of charging,—in
columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a gallop, and in open
order,—all of which may be successfully used. In charges in
line, the lance is very useful; in mêlées,
the saber is much better: hence comes the idea of giving the
lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the
saber to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in
individual combats. Pistol-firing is of very little use except
for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or when light cavalry
desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous to a charge.
I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of
cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any
accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the
enemy to attack. There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy
fire a musket while on horseback and in rapid motion.
I have just said that all the methods of charging may be
equally good. It must not be understood, however, that
impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry
against cavalry: the fast trot, on the contrary, seems to me the
best gait for charges in line, because every thing depends, in
such a case, upon the ensemble and good order of the
movement,—things which cannot be obtained in charges at a
fast gallop. Galloping is proper against artillery when it is
important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. In
[Pg 307]like manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers,
it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy's line
if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the cavalry is
armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the
advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of
good order: in a mêlée the lance is almost
useless.
If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent
to gallop to meet him; for the galloping party will be much
disordered, while the trotting party will not. The only advantage
of the gallop is its apparent boldness and the moral effect it
produces; but, if this is estimated at its true value by the
enemy, it is reasonable to expect his firm and compact mass to be
victorious over a body of horsemen galloping in confusion.
In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes
showed the small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will
penetrate where lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is
only when infantry is much disordered, or their fire poorly
maintained, that there is any advantage in the impetuous gallop
over the steady trot. To break good squares, cannon and lancers
are required, or, better still, cuirassiers armed with lances.
For charges in open order there are no better models for
imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.
Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways
of using cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon
the flanks of an enemy's line which is also attacked in front.
That this maneuver may be completely successful, especially in
charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the
very moment when the lines come in collision; for a minute too
soon or too late its effect may be lost. It is highly important,
therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a quick eye,
sound judgment, and a cool head.
Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of
arming and organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for
offensive purposes when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it
enables them to strike an enemy who cannot reach [Pg 308]them; but it is a very good plan to have a second
rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily
handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks
become broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a
charge of lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up
the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the
victory.
The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the
cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament
for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy
cavalry. Some military men of experience are inclined even to arm
the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry,
resembling very much the men-at-arms of former days, would bear
down every thing before them. A lance would certainly suit them
better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they should not
have lances like those of the light cavalry.
Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals
called dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several
battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a
defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood; but to make
cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on
horse or on foot, is very difficult. This might have been
supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when fighting
on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought
quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the
greatest inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons
consists in the fact of being obliged at one moment to make them
believe infantry squares cannot resist their charges, and the
next moment that a foot-soldier armed with his musket is superior
to any horseman in the world. This argument has more plausibility
than real force; for, instead of attempting to make men believe
such contradictory statements, it would be much more reasonable
to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave
foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not
always depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a
thousand other things; that the courage of the troops, the
presence of mind [Pg 309]of the commanders, the opportuneness
of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and musketry fire,
rain,—mud, even,—have been the causes of repulses or
of victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or
mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. By
impressing these truths upon dragoons, they will believe
themselves superior to their adversaries whether they fight on
foot or on horseback. This is the case with the Turks and the
Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to fight on foot in a
wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like foot-soldiers.
It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to
bring soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their
duties.
The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on
foot or mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to
collect the large number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons
in a single corps, while he did not consider Napoleon's
unfortunate experiment with French dragoons, and was not
restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment of these
troops at some particular point. It is probable that this
concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to
the instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted
soldiers, and that in war they were to be distributed to the
different grand divisions of the army. It cannot be denied,
however, that great advantages might result to the general who
could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback to a decisive
point and bring them into action as infantry. It thus appears
that the methods of concentration and of distribution have their
respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between
the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of
the army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a
retreat,) and then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in
divisions or corps.
Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of
infantry is applicable to cavalry, with the following
modifications:—
1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better
for cavalry than full lines; whilst for infantry lines
[Pg 310]drawn up checkerwise are too much disconnected,
and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed in
penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise
formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory
movements before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns
which can defend themselves in every direction against cavalry.
Whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between
them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into
confusion the others may not share it. It is well to observe that
in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full
lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It
should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there
should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may
be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the
passage through of the troops which have been brought up.
2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center
is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only
in battalions. The regiments should contain six squadrons, in
order that, by doubling on the center into divisions, three may
be formed. If there are only four squadrons, there can be but two
lines.
3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed en
masse like that of infantry; but there should always be full
or half squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage
itself and charge separately. This distance will be so great only
for those troops engaged. When they are at rest behind the line
of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground
and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into
action. The masses should, of course, be kept beyond
cannon-range.
4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry
than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons
should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line
of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy
coming in that direction.
5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several
squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is
at[Pg 311]tacked in front. Irregular cavalry is quite as
good as the regular for this purpose, and it may be better.
6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the
commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of
the formation. For example, in a deployed division of two
brigades it would not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a
single line behind the other, but each brigade should have one
regiment in the first line and one in the second. Each unit of
the line will thus have its own proper reserve behind
it,—an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in a
charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible
for a general to control the deployed regiments.
By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be
able to dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also,
to have a general reserve for the whole division. This
consideration leads me to think that five regiments would make a
good division. The charge may then be made in line by brigades of
two regiments, the fifth serving as a general reserve behind the
center. Or three regiments may form the line, and two may be in
column, one behind each wing. Or it may be preferable to use a
mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the others in
column. This is a good arrangement, because the three regiments,
formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks of
the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it
is beaten back. (See Fig. 38.)
Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.
Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
lines.
7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for
all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first
line must sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the
supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is
always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the
contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally
behind the second. The other point is that, with troops and
commanders on both sides equally good, [Pg
312]the victory will
remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in
readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while
his front is also engaged.
Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion
as to the proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for
battle.
Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid
deploying large cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus
drawn up is very unmanageable, and if the first line is checked
suddenly in its career the second is also, and that without
having an opportunity to strike a blow. This has been
demonstrated many times. Take as an example the attack made by
Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian cavalry
deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.
In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I
never intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or
in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to
say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in
lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into
confusion as soon as the first line breaks and turns.[49]
With cavalry still more than with infantry the morale
is very important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the
commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier,
whether in the mêlée or in the rally, will
oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the adoption of
this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is
adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the
[Pg 313]victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse
the use of a vicious formation.
The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the
old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in
the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid
all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the
Parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity,
wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing.
Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several exploits of the
Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry seem to
confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry, I
refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it
does not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in
horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals.) We must
by no means conclude it possible for a body of light cavalry
deployed as skirmishers to accomplish as much as the Cossacks or
other irregular cavalry. They acquire a habit of moving in an
apparently disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time
directing their individual efforts toward a common object. The
most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.
Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the
defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also
demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular
battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. Such charges are
valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can
lead to no decisive results.
From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to
give cavalry a regular organization, and furnish them long
weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing,
&c., an irregular cavalry armed with pistols, lances, and
sabers.
Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that
a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a
great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may
excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's
country, it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle
[Pg 314]his army, make his communications very perilous,
and destroy the ensemble of his operations. In a word, it
produces nearly the same results as a rising en masse of a
population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an
army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in
his calculations.
Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one
which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of
war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid
of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan
soldiers. These militia would certainly not possess all the
qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on horseback
and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure
supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better
off than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and
quality of her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the
irregular militia she can bring into the field at very short
notice.
Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter
XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing
on this subject:—
"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army
are not to be estimated. These light troops, which are
insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling
upon the flanks,) are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts.
They are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a
general's designs,—because he can never be sure of the
arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in
danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a
few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real
value has not been known; but when their number increases to
fifteen thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully
recognized,—especially in a country where the population is
not hostile to them.
"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided
with a strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be
undisturbed. Much unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the
part of the opponent's regular cavalry, which is soon broken down
by the unaccustomed fatigue.
"[Pg 315]Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time
of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks,
if they are well officered and move freely about from point to
point."
In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has
resources possessed by few other states. The services rendered by
mounted militia have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry
may be very useful, if for no other purpose than relieving the
regular cavalry of those occasional and extra duties to be
performed in all armies, such as forming escorts, acting as
orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on outposts, &c. Mixed
corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be more really
useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the
line,—because the fear of compromising a body of these last
often restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring
operations where he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars,
and he may thus lose excellent opportunities of accomplishing
great results.
FOOTNOTES:
[49]
To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the
battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of
cavalry in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up
checkerwise. Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was
at first formed checkered in two lines; but the real cause of
Marlborough's success was his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed
half his army behind Anderkirch and Gette, and his having the
good sense to withdraw thirty-eight squadrons from this wing to
reinforce his left, which in this way had twice as many cavalry
as the French, and outflanked them. But I cheerfully admit that
there may be many exceptions to a rule which I have not laid down
more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry
tactics,—a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm
itself.
ARTICLE XLVI.
Employment of Artillery.
Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive
and defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well
managed may break an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and
prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. As a
defensive means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only
on account of the material injury it inflicts upon the enemy
while at a distance, and the consequent moral effect upon his
troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching
near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less
important in the attack and defense of fortified places or
intrenched camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern
systems of fortification.
I have already in a former portion of this book given some
directions as to the distribution of artillery in a line of
battle; but it is difficult to explain definitely the proper
method of using it in the battle itself. It will not be right to
say that [Pg 316]artillery can act independently of the other
arms, for it is rather an accessory. At Wagram, however, Napoleon
threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the gap left by the
withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check the
Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to
advance. This was a special case, and should not be often
imitated.
I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental
rules, observing that they refer to the present state of
artillery service, (1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being
fully tested, I shall say little with reference to them.
1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should
concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to
be struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then
it assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and
cavalry.
2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the
offensive movements of the columns of attack, besides the
foot-batteries intended for the same purpose. Too much
foot-artillery should not move with an offensive column. It may
be posted so as to co-operate with the column without
accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may
have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.
3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery
should be held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any
required point.[50] For this purpose it should
be placed upon the most open ground, whence it can move readily
in every direction. I have already indicated the best positions
for the heavy calibers.
4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution
along the defensive line, should give their attention
particularly to those points where the enemy would be most likely
to approach, either on account of the facility or the advantage
of so doing. The general of artillery should therefore know the
decisive strategic and tactical points of [Pg 317]the
battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space
occupied. The distribution of the reserves of artillery will be
regulated by these.
5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently
to the front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or
ricochet firing: a converging fire is the best.
6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all
artillery in battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not
to reply to their batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to
fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. A third of
the disposable artillery may be assigned this duty, but
two-thirds at least should be directed against the infantry and
cavalry of the enemy.
7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries
should endeavor to cross their fire in order to strike the lines
obliquely. If guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of
troops, a most powerful effect is produced.
8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in
front. It is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and
especially in flank and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse
fire upon a body of troops is inconceivable; and the best
soldiers are generally put to flight by it. The fine movement of
Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few pieces of
Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked
them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent
direction he was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery,
thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most
important results, far overbalancing the risks run.
9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or
cavalry, and especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where
the rule may be deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable
example of this.
10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by
cavalry, preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid
shot, next shells, and then grape, as long as possible. The
infantry supports should, in such a case, form squares in the
vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, when necessary, the
[Pg 318]cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind
the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever
they should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the
flanks, smaller squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be
very efficient in frightening the horses.
11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should
continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to
commence firing too soon. The cannoneers can always be sheltered
from an infantry attack if the battery is properly supported.
This is a case for the co-operation of the three arms; for, if
the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by the artillery, a
combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will cause its
destruction.
12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different
wars. Napoleon conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty
pieces,—whilst in 1812 he invaded Russia with one thousand
pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. These facts show that any
fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. Usually three pieces
to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this allowance will
depend on circumstances.
The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary
also between wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much
heavy artillery, whose mobility must be much less than that of
the lighter calibers. A remarkable proof of the great importance
of having a strong artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after
the battle of Eylau. The great havoc occasioned among his troops
by the numerous guns of the Russians opened his eyes to the
necessity of increasing his own. With wonderful vigor, he set all
the Prussian arsenals to work, those along the Rhine, and even at
Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and to cast new ones
in order to enable him to use the munitions previously captured.
In three months he doubled the matériel and
personnel of his artillery, at a distance of one thousand
miles from his own frontiers,—a feat without a parallel in
the annals of war.
13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best
advantage is to place in command of it a general who is at once a
good strategist and tactician. This chief should be [Pg 319]authorized to dispose not only of the reserve
artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the different
corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with the
commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of
the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a
successful issue of the day, and he should never take the
responsibility of thus massing his artillery without previous
orders from the commanding general.
FOOTNOTES:
[50]
Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by mounting
the men on the boxes.
ARTICLE XLVII.
Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.
To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat
of the combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from
so doing by considering the great variety of points necessary to
be touched upon if I should attempt to go into an examination of
all the detailed operations that would arise in the application
of the general rules laid down for each of the arms.
Several authors—chiefly German—have treated this
subject very extensively, and their labors are valuable
principally because they consist mainly of citations of numerous
examples taken from the actual minor engagements of the later
wars. These examples must indeed take the place of rules, since
experience has shown that fixed rules on the subject cannot be
laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the commander
of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ them
so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after
all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established,
for the attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special
course of conduct in every case that may arise, when these cases
may be infinitely varied, would involve him in an inextricable
labyrinth of instructions. As the object and limits of this
Summary do not allow me to enter upon the consideration of such
details, I can only refer my readers to the best works which do
treat of them.
I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the
different arms be posted in conformity with the character of
[Pg 320]the ground, according to the object in view and
the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they be used
simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being
taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of
the events of previous wars, and especially experience in the
operations of war, will give an officer correct ideas on these
points, and the ability to use, at the right time and place, his
knowledge of the properties of the three arms, either single or
combined.
[Pg 321]
CONCLUSION.
I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may
be regarded as fundamental in war. War in its ensemble is
not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be
regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive
sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. Among
other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite
independent of scientific combinations, and they may become
essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a
thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements.
The passions which agitate the masses that are brought into
collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and
talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of
nations and epochs,[51]—in a word, every
thing that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of
war,—will have a permanent influence on its results.
Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things
as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful?
What military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an
absurdity? Are we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough
triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and
discipline of their battalions? Or do we find in the events of
Turin, Blenheim, and Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at
Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, or Austerlitz, which were the causes of
the victory in each case? When the application of a rule and the
consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for
skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great
probability of leading to [Pg
322]success, shall
their occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely
denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study
of the art? Shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has
only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in
its favor?
The morale of an army and its chief officers has an
influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a
certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. For example,
the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave
men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will
produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty
thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.
Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of
bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the
important point of the theater of war or of the zone of
operations.
Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to
which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches;
that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive moment
and at the decisive point of the field of battle. When troops are
thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be
termed active masses in the sense in which I use the term.
A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not
possessed of military coup-d'oeil, coolness, and skill,
may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to
apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects
will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be
probable. If he be a man of character, he will be able to
diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits
he will lose his army.
The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good
tactician and strategist, and have made all the arrangements for
gaining a victory that his means will permit: in this case, if he
be only moderately seconded by his troops and subordinate
officers, he will probably gain a decided victory. If, however,
his troops have neither discipline nor courage, [Pg 323]and
his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will undoubtedly see his
fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations can only
have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
unavoidable defeat.
No system of tactics can lead to victory when the
morale of an army is bad; and even when it may be
excellent the victory may depend upon some occurrence like the
rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling. Neither will
victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence to or
rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for
battle.
These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be
no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being
equal, will lead to success. It is true that theories cannot
teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in
every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always
point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a
highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in
the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of
almost certain success.
The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it
only remains to be able to discriminate between good rules and
bad. In this ability consists the whole of a man's genius for
war. There are, however, leading principles which assist in
obtaining this ability. Every maxim relating to war will be good
if it indicates the employment of the greatest portion of the
means of action at the decisive moment and place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the
strategic combinations which lead to such a result. As regards
tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of
the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. When we
come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to
be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery
put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of
infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
[Pg 324]coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire,
or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten
the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to
diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things
may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define the
cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible.
If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great
drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of
operations, that he may see clearly the relative advantages and
disadvantages it presents for himself and his enemies. This being
done, he can understandingly proceed to prepare his base of
operations, then to choose the most suitable zone of operations
for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep constantly before
his mind the principles of the art of war relative to lines and
fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly
endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting
objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects
of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or
less importance, depending upon its first successes.
The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all
means, to neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary,
protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising
the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the
time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by
labors, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded
provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting
the line of operations, depots, &c.
Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of
operations; but no plan can provide with certainty for that which
is uncertain always,—the character and the issue of the
first conflict. If your lines of operations have been skillfully
chosen and your movements well concealed, and if on the other
hand your enemy makes false movements which permit you to fall on
fractions of his army, you maybe successful in your campaign,
without fighting general battles, by the simple use of your
strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem [Pg 325]about equally matched at the time of conflict,
there will result one of those stupendous tragedies like
Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, where the
precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the chapter on that
subject, must have a powerful influence.
If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and
carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the
campaigns of the great masters of the art of war, still contend
that it has neither principles nor rules, I can only pity them,
and reply, in the famous words of Frederick, that "a mule which
had made twenty campaigns under Prince Eugene would not be a
better tactician than at the beginning."
Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by
actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history,
will form a true school of instruction for generals. If these
means do not produce great men, they will at least produce
generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural
masters of the art of war.
FOOTNOTES:
[51]
The well-known Spanish proverb, He was brave on such a
day, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French
at Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the
Prussians at Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.
[52]
The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable of
understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and
who will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the
same result of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent
commander.
[Pg 326]
[Pg 327]
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in
the military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia,
contained a concluding article that was never printed. I deem it
expedient to give it now in the form of a supplement, and add a
special article upon the means of acquiring a certain and ready
strategic coup-d'oeil.
It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand
clearly that in the military science, as in every other, the
study of details is easy for the man who has learned how to seize
the fundamental features to which all others are secondary. I am
about to attempt a development of these elements of the art; and
my readers should endeavor to apprehend them clearly and to apply
them properly.
I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great
combinations of war is in itself very simple, and requires
nothing more than ordinary intelligence and careful
consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity, many learned
military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. Their
minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing
themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of
what is just within their reach if they only would think so.
Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a
general: he must know how to arrange a good plan of
operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination.
The first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also
be acquired and developed by study. The second depends more
[Pg 328]on individual character, is rather a personal
attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be
improved.
It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a
government to possess the first of these talents, because in such
case, although he may not have the ability to execute, he can
arrange plans of operations and decide correctly as to the
excellence or defects of those submitted to him by others. He is
thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity of his generals,
and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and having
firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the
command of an army.
If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of
executive ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging
wise military combinations, he will be likely to commit all the
faults that have characterized the campaigns of many celebrated
warriors who were only brave soldiers without being at all
improved by study.
From the principles which I have laid down, and their
application to several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive
that the theory of the great combinations of war may be summed up
in the following truths.
The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in
knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate
correctly that of the enemy. To do this, a general must accustom
himself to decide as to the importance of decisive
points,—which is not a difficult matter when he is aided by
the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in Articles
from XVIII. to XXII.
The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops
upon the theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive.
(See Article XVII.) This employment
of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles:
the first being, to obtain by free and rapid movements the
advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of
the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive
direction,—that is to say, in that direction where the
consequences of his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy,
while at the same time his success would yield him no great
advantages.
[Pg 329]The whole science of great military combination is
comprised in these two fundamental truths. Therefore, all
movements that are disconnected or more extended than those of
the enemy would be grave faults; so also would the occupation of
a position that was too much cut up, or sending out a large
detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every well-connected,
compact system of operations would be wise; so also with central
strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than
the enemy's.
The application of these fundamental principles is also very
simple. If you have one hundred battalions against an equal
number of the enemy's, you may, by their mobility and by taking
the initiative, bring eighty of them to the decisive point while
employing the remaining twenty to observe and deceive half of the
opposing army. You will thus have eighty battalions against fifty
at the point where the important contest is to take place. You
will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior lines, or by
a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile line. I
have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these means
is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and
following.)
In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember
"that a strategic theater, as well as every position occupied
by an army, has a center and two extremities." A theater has
usually three zones,—a right, a left, and a central.
In choosing a zone of operations, select one,—1, that
will furnish a safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least
risk will be run by yourself, while the enemy will be most
exposed to injury; 3, bearing in mind the antecedent situations
of the two parties, and, 4, the dispositions and inclinations of
the powers whose territories are near the theater of war.
One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous,
while the other two will be more or less suitable according to
circumstances.
The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first
attempts must be selected. This is choosing an objective of
operations. There are two very different kinds: some, that are
[Pg 330]called territorial or geographical
objectives, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense which
it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched
camp to be captured; the others, on the contrary, consist
entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's
forces, without giving attention to geographical points of any
kind. This was the favorite objective of Napoleon.[53]
I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on
this point, (page 86;) and, as the
choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in a
plan of operations, I recommend the whole of Article XIX., (pages 84 and
following.)
The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward
it by one or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform
to the fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double
lines, unless the character of the theater of war makes it
necessary to use them, or the enemy is very inferior either in
the number or the quality of his troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two
geographical lines are used, it is essential to move the great
mass of the forces along the most important of them, and to
occupy the secondary line by detachments having a concentric
direction, if possible, with the main body.
The army, being on its way toward the objective, before
arriving in presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies
daily or temporary strategic positions: the front it embraces, or
that upon which the enemy may attack, is its front of operations.
There is an important consideration with reference to the
direction of the front of operations and to changes it may
receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article
XX., (page 93.)
The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are
equal, that the front be less extensive than the
enemy's,—especially if the front remains unchanged for some
time. If your strategic positions are more closely connected than
the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and more easily
[Pg 331]than he can, and in this way the fundamental
principle will be applied. If your positions are interior and
central, the enemy cannot concentrate except by passing by the
mass of your divisions or by moving in a circle around them: he
is then exactly in a condition not to be able to apply the
fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious measure.
But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central
position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior
at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very
far separated from each other, as was the case with the allied
armies in the Seven Years' War; or unless the central zone has a
natural barrier on one or two of its sides, like the Rhine, the
Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the enemy from using his
forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical inferiority it
is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the extremities
than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his
masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.
It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the
decisive points of a theater of war, requires two
things:—1st, that the principal mass of the force be moved
against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession;
2d, that the best direction of movement be adopted,—that is
to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already
known, and afterward upon secondary points.
To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will
give a sketch of the operations of the French at the close of
1793. (See Plate III.)
It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps
on the frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.
The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)
Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at
Menin. (No. 3.)
The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking
Maubeuge, and was guarding the space between that place and the
Scheldt by strong detachments. (No. 4.)
Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)
[Pg 332]Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse,
toward Thuin and Charleroi, the fortifications of which were
being rebuilt. (No. 6.)
Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No.
7.)
The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)
The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges.
(No. 9.)
General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the
Rhine. (No. 10.)
The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the
hostile corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille,
Douai, Guise, Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A
strong reserve, (g,) composed of the best troops drawn from the
camps of the northern frontier, was intended to be thrown upon
all the points of the enemy's line in succession, assisted by the
troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m.)
This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel
near Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2,
under the Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at
Menin; next that of Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally,
joining the army of the Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the
Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, and, with the assistance of the
army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser from the lines of
Wissembourg.
The general principle was certainly well applied, and every
similar operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians
composed half the allied forces, and they had their lines of
retreat from the points 4, 5, and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident
that if the French had collected three of their large corps in
order to move them against Benjouski at Thuin, (No. 6,) and then
fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the Charleroi road,
they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North Sea, and
would have obtained immense results.
The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great
importance that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the
hands of the English. Besides this, York's corps, [Pg 333]encamped on the downs, might be cut off and thrown
upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for this object
were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good reasons
for commencing operations by attacking the English. The principal
undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the
line of retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined,
by way of punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to
cut off the English as he might have done.
It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve
along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of
which had decisive results, because the attacks were made in
front, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied
armies not being cut through, and the French reserve moving on to
the different points in succession, none of the victories was
pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the French had based
themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse, had
collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed
Benjouski, assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him,
and pursued him vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and
as he wished to do at Ligny in 1815, the result would have been
very different.
I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the
two important points to be attended to in the strategic
management of masses of troops; that is, their employment at
different points in succession and at decisive points.[54]
Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths
educed, and will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers
will depend upon their conforming to the principle already
insisted upon; that is to say, the great [Pg 334]part of the force must be moved against one wing
or the center, according to the position of the enemy's masses.
It is of importance in battles to calculate distances with still
greater accuracy; for the results of movements on the
battle-field following them more rapidly than in the case of
strategic maneuvers, every precaution must be taken to avoid
exposing any part of the line to a dangerous attack from the
enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. Add to these
things calmness during the action; the ability to choose
positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive
with offensive returns, (Art.
XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the forces in striking
the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to
204;) the faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them
forward at opportune moments; and we have mentioned every thing
which can assist, as far as the general is concerned, in assuring
victories, and every thing which will constitute him a skillful
tactician.
It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a
field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is
precisely here that genius and experience are every thing, and
mere theory of little value.
It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which explains how a general
may make a small number of suppositions as to what the enemy may
or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall himself
pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be
prepared for any eventuality.
I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments.
These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care,
may prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this
point are, to make as few detachments as possible, to have
them readily movable, to draw them back to the main body as
soon as practicable, and to give them good instructions for
avoiding disasters.
I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on
military policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a
brief summary of this part of the art of war, which chiefly
concerns statesmen, but should be thoroughly understood by
[Pg 335]military men. I will, however, invite special
attention to Article XIV., relating to
the command of armies or to the choice of
generals-in-chief,—a subject worthy the most anxious care
upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often depends the
safety of the nation.
We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good
chief of staff for an army; but for the command in chief is
required a man of tried qualities, of high character and known
energy. The united action of two such men as commander-in-chief
and chief of staff, when a great captain of the first order
cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant results.
[Pg 336]
FOOTNOTES:
[53]
The objective may be in some degree
political,—especially in cases of wars of
intervention in the affairs of another country; but it then
really becomes geographical.
[54]
The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing
masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793,
but because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's
place, he would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi,
whence be would have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg
and cut his line of retreat. Let any one compare the results of
Carnot's half-skillful operations with the wise maneuvers of
Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be convinced.
[Pg
337]
NOTE
UPON
THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.
The study of the principles of strategy can produce no
valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them
in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to
hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great
captains. By such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain
strategic coup-d'oeil,—the most valuable
characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put
in practice the finest theories in the world.
When a military man who is a student of his art has become
fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong
mass against successive fractions of the enemy's force, and
particularly when he recognizes the importance of constantly
directing the main efforts upon decisive points of the theater of
operations, he will naturally desire to be able to perceive at a
glance what are these decisive points. I have already, in
Chapter III., page
70, of the preceding Summary, indicated the simple means by
which this knowledge may be obtained. There is, in fact, one
truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in all the
combinations of a methodical war. It is this:—in every
position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to
operate by the right, by the left, or by the front.
[Pg 338]To be convinced of the correctness of this
assertion, let us first take this general in his private office
at the opening of the war. His first care will be to choose that
zone of operations which will give him the greatest number of
chances of success and be the least dangerous for him in case of
reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three
zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the
left,) and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII.
pointed out the manner of perceiving the advantages and dangers
of these zones, the choice of a zone of operations will be a
matter of no difficulty.
When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to
operate with the principal portion of his forces, and when these
forces shall be established in that zone, the army will have a
front of operations toward the hostile army, which will also have
one. Now, these fronts of operations will each have its right,
left, and center. It only remains, then, for the general to
decide upon which of these directions he can injure the enemy
most,—for this will always be the best, especially if he
can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I
have dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.
Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other
upon the field of battle where the decisive collision is to
ensue, and are upon the point of coming to blows, they will each
have a right, left, and center; and it remains for the general to
decide still between these three directions of striking.
Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have
mentioned, the theater of operations, already referred to,
between the Rhine and the North Sea. (See Fig.
39.)
Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four
geographical sections,—viz.: the space between the Rhine
and the Moselle, that between the Moselle and the Meuse, that
between the Meuse and the Scheldt, and that between the last
river and the sea,—it is nevertheless true that an army of
which A A is the base and B B the front of operations will have
only three general directions to choose from; for the two spaces
in the center will form a single central zone, as [Pg 339]it
will always have one on the right and another on the left.
Fig. 39.
The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army
CC, whose base was the Rhine, would have three directions in
which to operate. If it maneuvered by the extreme right,
descending the Moselle, (toward D,) it would evidently threaten
the enemy's line of retreat toward the Rhine; but he,
concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg, might
fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front
and fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its
ruin if seriously defeated.
[Pg 340]If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its
greatest effort upon the left, (toward E,) in order to take
advantage of the finely-fortified towns of Lille and
Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences still more
serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking
this wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable
country toward Antwerp between the Scheldt and the
sea,—where there would remain but two things for it to do:
either to surrender at discretion, or cut its way through the
enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.
It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the
most disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be
inconvenient, although somewhat favorable in a certain point of
view. The central zone remains to be examined. This is found to
possess all desirable advantages, because the army B might move
the mass of its force toward Charleroi with a view of cutting
through the immense front of operations of the enemy, might
overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon Antwerp and
the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
communications.
When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most
favorable zone, they should, of course, have that direction of
movement toward the enemy's front of operations which is in
harmony with the chief object in view. For example, if you shall
have operated by your right against the enemy's left, with the
intention of cutting off the greater portion of his army from its
base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to operate in
the same direction; for if you should make your greatest effort
against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result
as you anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed.
If, on the contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with
the intention of crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought
constantly to maneuver by your right in order to accomplish your
object; for if you maneuvered by the left, yourself and not the
enemy would be the party thrown back upon the sea in case of a
reverse.
[Pg 341]Applying these ideas to the theaters of the
campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, we find the same three
zones, with this difference, that in those campaigns the central
direction was not the best. In 1800, the direction of the left
led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the line of retreat
of Mélas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led by
the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of
retreat of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the
Prussian line of retreat by the right zone, filing off from
Bamberg toward Gera.
In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations
on the right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona,
that of the center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that
of the left, leading to the line of communications of
Mélas, by way of Saint-Bernard or the Simplon. The first
two directions had nothing in their favor, and the right might
have been very dangerous,—as, in fact, it proved to
Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The
decisive direction was evidently that by the left.
I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.
The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in
the arrangements for these there are both strategical and
tactical considerations to be taken into account and harmonized.
A position for battle, being necessarily connected with the line
of retreat and the base of operations, must have a well-defined
strategic direction; but this direction must also depend somewhat
upon the character of the ground and the stations of the troops
of both parties to the engagement: these are tactical
considerations. Although an army usually takes such a position
for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it,
sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this
line. In such a case it is evident that if you fall with
overwhelming force upon the wing nearest the line of retreat, the
enemy may be cut off or destroyed, or, at least, have no other
chance of escape than in forcing his way through your line.
I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of
[Pg 342]Leuthen in 1757, of which I have given an account
in the history of Frederick's wars, and the famous days of
Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in 1812.
Fig. 40.
The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi.
The line A A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the
position B B to cover his line. It is evident that the principal
mass of Koutousoff's army D D should have moved to E E in order
to fall on the right of the French, whose army would have been
certainly destroyed if it had been anticipated at C; for
everybody knows in what a state it was while thus fifteen hundred
miles from its true base.
There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez,
by outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their
right, would have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.
At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian
left, which was in the direction of their line of retreat; and
for this reason the right wing was obliged to take refuge in
Breslau, where it capitulated a few days later.
In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive
point is that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of
retreat, and this line you must seize while protecting your
own.
When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to
and behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to
attack the center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground
shall be the least favorable for the defense; for in such a case
the first consideration is to gain the battle, without having in
view the total destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the
relative numerical strength, the morale of [Pg 343]the
two armies, and other circumstances, with reference to which no
fixed rules can be laid down.
Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing
the enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon
did at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such
case been secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only
remains to prevent the enemy from forcing his way through your
line. You can do nothing better than fight a parallel battle, as
there is no reason for maneuvering against one wing more than the
other. But for the enemy who is thus cut off the case is very
different. He should certainly strike most heavily in the
direction of that wing where he can hope most speedily to regain
his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass of his
forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort
shall be toward the right or the left.
It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great
river in the presence of a hostile army is sometimes an
exceptional case to which the general rules will not apply. In
these operations, which are of an exceedingly delicate character,
the essential thing is to keep the bridges safe. If, after
effecting the passage, a general should throw the mass of his
forces toward the right or the left with a view of taking
possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back
upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces
in another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might
be in a very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling
it. The battle of Wagram is an excellent example in
point,—as good, indeed, as could be desired. I have treated
this subject in Article XXXVII.,
(pages 224 and following.)
A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the
truths that have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid
and accurate coup-d'oeil. It will be admitted, moreover,
that a general who estimates them at their true value, and
accustoms himself to their use, either in reading military
history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, will seldom be in
[Pg 344]doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and
even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he
will always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting
them, by constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental
principles which should regulate all the operations of war.
Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of
the sublime art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I
appreciate thoroughly the difference between the directing
principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet,
and that special talent which is indispensable to the individual
who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a
hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one
single object. I know well what should be the character and
talents of the general who has to make such masses move as one
man, to engage them at the proper point simultaneously and at the
proper moment, to keep them supplied with arms, provisions,
clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special talent, to
which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted that
the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best
strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime
characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under
the command of leaders who were also brave and possessed
executive ability, have lost not only battles, but even empires,
because they were moved imprudently in one direction when they
should have gone in the other! Numerous examples might be
mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny, Waterloo, Bautzen,
Dennewitz, Leuthen.
I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already
been said. To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will
be ascribed to me for attaching too much importance to the
application of the few maxims laid down in my writings, I will
repeat what I was the first to announce:—"that war is
not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the
moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and
ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the
impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great
influence [Pg 345]upon it." I may be permitted also, after having
written the detailed history of thirty campaigns and assisted in
person in twelve of the most celebrated of them, to declare that
I have not found a single case where these principles, correctly
applied, did not lead to success.
As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced
penetrating mind which distinguish the practical man from the one
who knows only what others teach him, I confess that no book can
introduce those things into a head where the germ does not
previously exist by nature. I have seen many
generals—marshals, even—attain a certain degree of
reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived
incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen
these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make
the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient
in good judgment and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My
works are not intended for such misguided persons as these, but
my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of war for
careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles.
Taking this view, I claim credit for having rendered valuable
service to those officers who are really desirous of gaining
distinction in the profession of arms.
Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last
truth:—
"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a
leader is, that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated
by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers,
he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure
deserved laurels."
[Pg 346]
[Pg 347]
SECOND APPENDIX
TO THE
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a
distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to
whether recent improvements in fire-arms would cause any great
modifications in the manner of making war.
I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the
details of tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and
the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever,
result from the application of the principles which had led to
the success of great generals in all ages,—of Alexander and
Cæsar as well as of Frederick and Napoleon. My illustrious
interlocutor seemed to be completely of my opinion.
The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol
have not produced the slightest change in my opinion. This
gigantic contest between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by
entire armies and mounting two thousand guns of the largest
caliber, is an event without precedent, which will have no equal
in the future; for the circumstances which produced it cannot
occur again.
Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no
resemblance to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a
continent, cannot influence in any respect the great combinations
of war, nor even the tactics of battles.
The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving
evidence of the murderous effect of the new fire-arms,
natu[Pg 348]rally led me to investigate the changes which it
might be necessary to make on this account in the tactics for
infantry.
I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order
to complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in
the Summary of the Art of War.
The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in
battles is not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the
Great, and particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he
gained (it was said) because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of
cylindrical rammers in loading their muskets, were able to fire
three shots per minute more than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose
at this epoch between the partisans of the shallow and deep
orders of formation for troops is known to all military
students.
The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for
the infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order
of battle, was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in
reserve.
The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the
deployed as the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use
of battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial
combats,—such as an attack upon an isolated post, a
village, a forest, or small intrenchments.[56]
The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the
Republic forced the generals, who were poor tacticians,
[Pg 349]to employ in battle the system of columns
supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the nature of
the countries which formed the theaters of operations—the
Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La
Vendée—rendered this the only appropriate system.
How would it have been possible to attack the camps of Saorgio,
Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed regiments?
In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of
columns, as they were nearly always the assailants.
In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet
with the title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art
of War," in which I proposed to admit for the attack the system
of lines formed of columns of battalions by divisions of two
companies; in other words, to march to the attack in lines of
battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, preceded by
numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by
intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment
of a battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.
What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz,
Jena, and Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the
impossibility, of marching an army in deployed lines in either
two or three ranks, to attack an enemy in position. It was this
conviction which led me to publish the pamphlet above referred
to. This work attracted some attention, not only on account of
the treatise on strategy, but also on account of what was said on
tactics.
The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo
with troops deployed in lines of two ranks were generally
attributed to the murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and
created doubt in some minds as to the propriety of the use of
small columns; but it was not till after 1815 that the
controversies on the best formation for battle wore renewed by
the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.
In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the
clearest minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms,
and to cast in the same mold all the tactical combinations a
general may arrange, without taking into considera[Pg 350]tion localities, moral circumstances, national
characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had
proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack:
I never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for
the defense.
I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation
was approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first
was at the Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the
Archduke Charles observed "that he was under great obligations
for the summary I had published in 1807, which General Walmoden
had brought to him in 1808 from Silesia." At the beginning of the
war of 1809, the prince had not thought it possible to apply the
formation which I had proposed; but at the battle of Essling the
contracted space of the field induced him to form a part of his
army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr particularly,) and
they resisted admirably the furious charges of the cuirassiers of
General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they
could not have done if they had been deployed.
At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line
was formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of
terrible fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not
because his army was badly beaten, but because his left was
outflanked and thrown back so as to endanger his line of retreat
on Hungary. The prince was satisfied that the firm bearing of his
troops was in part due to this mixture of small columns with
deployed battalions.
The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is,
apparently, not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at
the Congress of Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on
the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation
for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had
been attributed) had given rise. He remarked that he was
convinced the manner of the attack of the French upon him, in
columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid,
well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well
supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that
these deep columns were very different from [Pg 351]the
small columns which I proposed,—a formation which insures
in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses
afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and
are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery.
I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not
formed the Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns
by battalions. He answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon
them so well as upon the English." I replied that this admission
proved that he thought a line formed of columns by battalions was
more firm than long deployed lines. He replied, "They are
certainly good, also; but their use always depends upon the
localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act in
the same manner under all circumstances."
To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon
himself, in the campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the
formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two
companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,—which was
identically what I had proposed in 1807.
The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns
at Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not
small columns of battalions, but enormous masses, much more
unwieldy and much deeper.
If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the
battle, it would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in
but four columns, at least in their march to the attack of La
Haye Sainte and the line extending from this farm to the
Papelotte. I was not present; but several officers have assured
me that at one time the troops were formed in columns by
divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being deployed
behind each other at six paces' interval.
This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the
military terms of the French. We give the same name of
division to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a
battalion of two companies each,—which is absurd. Let us
suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on the 18th of
June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
divi[Pg 352]sions and by battalions, intending that the
regulation of 1813 should be followed. His lieutenants might
naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to
their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the
following formations:—
1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been
formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve
battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is
indicated in this figure for eight battalions.[57]
2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve
columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies,
according to the system I have proposed, as in this figure,
viz.:—
I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of
words led to the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done
so; and it is important that in every language there should be
two different terms to express two such different things as a
division of twelve battalions and a division of a
quarter of a battalion.
Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my
Summary already referred to, which was too concise, and in my
revision of it I devoted a chapter to the discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different formations for
battle. I also added some considerations relative to a mixed
system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which consisted in
forming a regiment of three battalions by de[Pg 353]ploying the central one, the other two being in
column on the wings.
After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:—
1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the
defensive.
2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to
circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive,
since it was successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the
Tagliamento.
3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great
difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two
or three ranks over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred
yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position
with any chance of success, the front all the while being played
upon by artillery and musketry.
I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I
regard it as impossible, and am convinced that such a line could
not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the
force necessary for success.
Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
terms:—"Take your troops up in good order, and make a
vigorous assault upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of
carrying up to the assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed
battalions as a whole in good order? They will reach the enemy in
detachments disconnected from each other, and the commander
cannot exercise any control over the mass as a whole.
I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau,
Bautzen, Dresden, Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at
Austerlitz, Friedland, Katzbach, or Dennewitz.
I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever
marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position.
He generally awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he
gained the victory by maneuvers against the flanks; and at
Toulouse Soult's right wing was beaten while [Pg 354]descending the heights to attack. Even at
Waterloo, what fate would have befallen the English army if,
leaving the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in
deployed order to attack Napoleon in position on the heights of
La Belle Alliance?
I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to
be necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since
my Summary of the Art of War was written.
Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived
in 1813 from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored
to add to its value by dividing up the columns and increasing
their number, so as to make them more shallow and to facilitate
their deployment. With this view, they propose, instead of
forming four divisions or companies one behind the other, to
place them beside each other, not deployed, but in small columns.
That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of two
hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into
four sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be
dispersed as skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will
form a small column; so that the battalion, instead of forming
one column, will form four, and the regiment of three battalions
will form twelve small columns instead of three—
It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line
against the enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns
of sixty skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks
would never present the same order and solidity as a single
column of a battalion. Still as the system has some advantages,
it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced
in Prussia and Austria.
The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or
eight companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed
by companies, but by divisions of two
companies,—[Pg 355]that is, in three or four columns,
according to the number of companies.
Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of
these formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small
subdivisions would be in great danger; and even in attacking the
enemy's line, if driven back and pursued, disorder would be more
likely to occur than in the columns of battalions. Still, either
of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities,
and the morale of the troops. Experience alone can assign
to each its proper value. I am not aware whether the Austrians
applied these columns of companies at Custozza and Novara, or
whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their camps
of instruction.
Be that as it may, there is another not less important
question to be considered:—
"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls
bring about any important changes in the formation for battle and
the now recognized principles of tactics?"
If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it
was because the Russians were not provided with them; and it must
not be forgotten that in a year or two all armies will alike be
furnished with them, so that in future the advantage will not be
confined to one side.
What change will it make in tactics?
Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not
still be necessary to preserve either the formation of lines
deployed in two or three ranks, or lines of battalions in
columns?
Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the
parties will fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one
or the other shall retreat or be destroyed?
What military man will reply in the affirmative?
It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are
necessary, and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers
most skillfully; and he cannot maneuver except with deployed
lines or lines of columns of battalions, either whole or
subdivided into columns of one or two companies. To attempt
[Pg 356]to prescribe by regulation under what
circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be
absurd.
If a general and an army can be found such that he can march
upon the enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions,
then let the shallow order be adopted, and the formation in
columns be confined to the attack of isolated posts; but I freely
confess that I would never accept the command of an army under
this condition. The only point for a regulation for the formation
for battle is to forbid the use of very deep columns, because
they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep in order.
Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their
destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not
increase in any respect their chances of success.
If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt
for infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental
organization according with the formation for battle. I would
then make each regiment of infantry to consist of three
battalions and a depot. Each battalion should consist of six
companies, so that when in column by division the depth would be
three divisions or six ranks.
This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to
form the battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the
center of each battalion, or on any other division.
The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks,
would not be so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would
still have the mobility necessary to take the troops up in good
order and launch them upon the enemy with great force. The
deployment of these small columns could be executed with great
ease and promptitude; and for the forming of a square a column of
three divisions in depth would be preferable in several respects
to one of four or six divisions.
In the Russian service each battalion consists of four
companies of two hundred and fifty men each; each company being
as strong as a division in the French organization. The maneuver
of double column on the center is not practicable, since the
center is here merely an interval separating the second and third
companies. Hence the column must be [Pg
357]simple, not on
the center, but on one of the four companies. Something analogous
to the double column on the center would be attained by forming
the first and fourth companies behind the second and third
respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather
than in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the
organization of the battalion in six companies or three
divisions.
By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons,
making eight in all, the formation of double column on the
center might be made on the fourth and fifth platoons as the
leading division; but then each division would be composed of two
platoons belonging to different companies, so that each captain
would have half of the men of his company under the command of
another officer, and half of his own division would be made up of
another company.
Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient;
for, as the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of
the men of his own company, he can always obtain more from them
in the way of duty than any stranger. In addition, if the double
column should meet with a decided repulse, and it should be
necessary to reform it in line, it would be difficult to prevent
disorder, the platoons being obliged to run from one side to the
other to find their companies. In the French system, where each
battalion consists of eight companies, forming as many platoons
at drill, this objection does not exist, since each company is
conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be two
captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather
an advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and
emulation between the two captains and their men, which will lead
to greater display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior
captain is there, to command the division as a whole.
It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the
important question at issue.
Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it
is proper to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true
value in the light of historical events.
In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under
[Pg 358]his command a mass of troops of the country, in
which he placed but little confidence in regular formation in a
pitched battle, on account of their want of instruction and
discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred of the
French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the
enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and
impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena
and Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this
impetuosity and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose
positions difficult to approach, and covered all their avenues by
swarms of Spanish and Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in
taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground; he placed a
part of his artillery on the tactical crest of his position, and
a part more to the rear, and riddled the advancing columns with a
murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent
English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were posted a hundred
paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of these
columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out
of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a
general discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately
charged by the infantry with the bayonet.
This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly
applicable to Spain and Portugal, since he had there great
numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of
rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen, needed
some modifications to make it applicable to Belgium. At Waterloo
the duke took his position on a plateau with a gentle slope like
a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field of fire,
and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this
plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the
plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the French
army, while his own were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system
would not have prevented his losing the battle if a number of
other circumstances had not come to his aid.
Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this
terrible battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described.
[Pg 359]I demonstrated that its result was due neither to
the musketry-fire nor to the use of deployed lines by the
English, but to the following accidental causes, viz.:—
1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in
the attack painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be
less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by
the artillery.
2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part
of the French, principally on the right wing.
3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms:
the infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating
with each other, but they were in no case simultaneous.
4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole
Prussian army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not
the rear, of the French.
Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of
the mud and the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of
the French infantry had been thrown on the English in columns of
battalions immediately after the great charge of cavalry, the
combined army would have been broken and forced back on Antwerp.
Independently of this, if the Prussians had not arrived, the
English would have been compelled to retreat; and I maintain that
this battle cannot justly be cited as proof of the superiority of
musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in columns.
From all these discussions we may draw the following
conclusions, viz.:—
1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any
important change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but
that it would be useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry
the formation of columns by companies, and to have a numerous
body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and to exercise the troops
considerably in firing. Those armies which have whole regiments
of light infantry may distribute them through the different
brigades; but it would be preferable to detail sharp-shooters
alternately in each company as they are needed, which would be
practicable when [Pg 360]the troops are accustomed to firing:
by this plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in
the line with the others; and should the number of sharp-shooters
taken from the companies be at any time insufficient, they could
be reinforced by a battalion of light infantry to each
division.
2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and
musketry-fire be excellent for the defense, it would be difficult
ever to employ it in an attack upon an enemy in position.
3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies
in a battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a
distance: it will always be necessary for one of them to advance
to the attack of the other.
4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as
formerly, upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the
principles of grand tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in
knowing how to direct the great mass of the troops at the proper
moment upon the decisive point of the battle-field, and in
employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three
arms.
5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been
said on this subject in Chapters IV.
and V.; and that it would be
unreasonable to define by regulation an absolute system of
formation for battle.
6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the
party taking the offensive when the general in command possesses
the talent of taking his troops into action in good order and of
boldly attacking the enemy, adopting the system of formation best
adapted to the ground, to the spirit and quality of his troops,
and to his own character.
Finally, I will terminate this article with the following
remark: That war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible
and impassioned drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four
general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a
number of moral and physical complications.
FOOTNOTES:
[55]
It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron, instead
of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops used
wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is
attributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to
Prince Leopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt
the iron ramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741)
it had not been introduced into the Austrian service.
Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777,
thirty-six years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of
the cylindrical ramrod consisted in this,—that the soldier
in loading saved the time necessary to turn the ramrod; but
obviously this small economy of time could never have enabled him
to load three times while the enemy loaded once,—all other
things being equal.—Translators.
[56]
Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be
intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them
closed, in order to facilitate their deployment.
[57]
We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if
there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would
then consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six
ranks, while in the next figure there would be twelve battalions
on the line instead of eight, the depth not being increased.
[Pg 361]
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
I have thought it proper to give here an account of the
principal maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with
maxims on descents.
The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the
earliest mentioned in history, and of them the account is
confused. The Persians conquered these nations, as well as Asia
Minor, and became the most formidable power on both land and
sea.
About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the
coast of Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz,
passed the straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the
Balearic Isles and Sardinia, and finally made a descent on
Sicily.
The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that
could not have been expected,—although no country was ever
more favorably situated for a naval power than Greece, with her
fifty islands and her great extent of coast.
The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and
gave her the naval power to which Greece was indebted for her
independence. Her fleets, united with those of the islands, were,
under Themistocles, the terror of the Persians and the rulers of
the East. They never made grand descents, because their
land-forces were not in proportion to their naval strength. Had
Greece been a united government instead of a confederation of
republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse, Corinth, and
Sparta been combined instead of [Pg
362]fighting among
each other, it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered
the world before the Romans.
If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek
historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four
thousand vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we
read the account of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to
believe that at the same time, and by a concerted movement, five
thousand other vessels landed three hundred thousand
Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally defeated by
Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet of
Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal,
Imilcon, and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to
one hundred and fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were
taken, Lilybæum was founded, and Syracuse besieged twice.
The third time Androcles, with fifteen thousand men, landed in
Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This contest lasted one year
and a half.
Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty
thousand men: his naval force was only one hundred and sixty
sail, while the Persians had four hundred; and to save his fleet
Alexander sent it back to Greece.
After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the
division of the empire, made no important naval expedition.
Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by
their fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry,
three thousand horses, and the first elephants which had been
seen in Italy. This was two hundred and eighty years before the
Christian era.
Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is
difficult to understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the
solicitation of the Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians.
Recalled, after some success, by the Tarentines, he recrossed the
straits, harassed by the Carthaginian fleet: then, reinforced by
the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too late, concluded to
march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on Beneventum,
when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was all
that remained of his force.
[Pg 363]Carthage, which had been prospering for a long
time, profited by the ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire.
The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the
preponderating power in Italy, were the most celebrated in the
maritime annals of antiquity. The Romans were particularly
remarkable for the rapidity with which they improved and
increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or
vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years
after found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and
forty large vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one
hundred and twenty combatants, making in all one hundred and
forty thousand men. The Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger
by twelve to fifteen thousand men and fifty vessels.
The victory of Ecnomos—perhaps more extraordinary than
that of Actium—was the first important step of the Romans
toward universal empire. The subsequent descent in Africa
consisted of forty thousand men; but the greater part of this
force being recalled to Sicily, the remainder was overthrown, and
Regulus, being made prisoner, became as celebrated by his death
as by his famous victory.
The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at
Clypea, but was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its
successor met the same fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249
B.C. the Romans were defeated at Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight
thousand men and more than one hundred vessels. Another fleet, on
its way to besiege Lilybæum, in the same year, was lost off
Cape Pactyrus.
Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at
first resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power
of Sicily and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it
concluded to arm its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius
Catullus set out with three hundred galleys and seven hundred
transports for Drepanum, and gained the battle in the
Ægates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost one hundred
and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the first
Punic war.
The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy,
[Pg 364]was less maritime in its character. Scipio,
however, bore the Roman eagles to Cartagena, and by its capture
destroyed forever the empire of the Carthaginians in Spain.
Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a force inferior to
that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the battle of
Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five
hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the
Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained
the celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the
Romans the kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was
aided by a victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined
fleets of Rome and Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.
From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to
her power by using every means to insure to her the empire of the
sea. Paulus Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at
the head of twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and
brought Macedonia to submission.
Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of
Carthage. The important port of Utica having been given up to the
Romans, an immense fleet was employed in transporting to this
point eighty thousand foot-soldiers and four thousand horses;
Carthage was besieged, and the son of Paulus Emilius and adopted
son of the great Scipio had the glory of completing the victory
which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by destroying the bitter
rival of his country.
After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in
Europe, was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment
shaken by Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in
succession the small adjacent states, was in command of not less
than two hundred and fifty thousand men, and of a fleet of four
hundred vessels, of which three hundred were decked. He defeated
the three Roman generals who commanded in Cappadocia, invaded
Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty thousand Roman
subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece.
Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five
thousand Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent
[Pg 365]in succession two large armies by the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred thousand strong, was
destroyed at Chæronea, and the second, of eighty thousand
men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time,
Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the
cities of Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes,
was prepared to transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and
Mithridates, from fear, made peace.
In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena
and Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates,
driven step by step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the
sea, conceived the project of turning the Black Sea by the
Caucasus, in order to pass through Thrace to assume the
offensive,—a policy which it is difficult to understand, in
view of the fact that he was unable to defend his kingdom against
fifty thousand Romans.
Cæsar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred
vessels, transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars
he transported thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came
from Brundusium to join him with twenty thousand men, and passed
through the fleet of Pompey,—in which act he was as much
favored by the lucky star of Cæsar as by the arrangements
of his lieutenants.
Afterward Cæsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to
Africa; they did not, however, go in a body, but in successive
detachments.
The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic
was that of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and
twelve thousand horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides
the numerous transports required for such an army, there were two
hundred and sixty vessels of war to protect them. Antony was
superior in force on land, but trusted the empire of the world to
a naval battle: he had one hundred and seventy war-vessels, in
addition to sixty of Cleopatra's galleys, the whole manned by
twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides the necessary
rowers.
Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand
vessels, carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the
[Pg 366]Rhine to the mouths of the Ems. Half of this fleet
was destroyed on its return by a storm; and it is difficult to
understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks of the Rhine,
should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, when he
could have reached the same point by land in a few days.
When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the
Euphrates, maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest
with the races of the North of Europe, which began after the
division of the empire, gave employment to the Roman armies on
the sides of Germany and Thrace. The eastern fraction of the
empire still maintained a powerful navy, which the possession of
the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while at the
same time it afforded the means.
The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few
events of interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having
acquired Spain, landed in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under
Genseric. They were defeated by Belisarius; but, holding the
Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled the Mediterranean for
a time.
At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe,
the Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their
operations are little better known than those of the barbarians:
they are hidden in the mysteries of Odin.
The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred
vessels to Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and
seventy to the Danes and three hundred to Norway: these
frequently acted in concert.
The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the
Baltic, and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more
favorably situated with respect to the North Sea, directed their
course toward the coasts of France and England.
If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part
of these vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned
by a score of rowers. There were also snekars, with twenty
banks or forty rowers. The largest had thirty-four banks of
rowers. The incursions of the Danes, who had long [Pg 367]before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to
infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small.
However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported
five thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,—which
would go to show that there were then also large vessels, or that
the marine of the Elbe was superior to that of the
Scandinavians.
Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under
Ida and Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it
into seven kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had
elapsed (833) that they were again united under the authority of
Egbert.
The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe.
In 712, the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the
lead of Tarik. They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation
of Count Julian; and, far from meeting great resistance, they
were welcomed by the numerous enemies of the Visigoths. This was
the happy era of the Caliphs, and the Arabs might well pass for
liberators in comparison with the tyrants of the North. Tarik's
army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated Rodrigo at
Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several
millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and
settled in Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be
regarded as descents, still, they form one of the most curious
and interesting scenes in history, occurring between the
incursions of the Vandals in Africa and the Crusades in the
East.
A revolution not less important, and one which has left more
durable traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast
empire now known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the
Novgorodians, of whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized
themselves by great expeditions.
In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in
two thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the
river and debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry
followed the banks. They proceeded to Constantinople, and forced
Leo the Philosopher to pay tribute.
Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a
[Pg 368]fleet said to have consisted of ten thousand
boats. Near Constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of
the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of Asia, where the force
was disembarked. It was defeated, and the expedition returned
home.
Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and
descended to the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus
I. sent to renew the tribute and ask for peace, (943.)
In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with
the King of Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into
the Black Sea, ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled
by the Petchenegs, who were menacing Kiew, he entered into
alliance with them and returned into Bulgaria, broke his alliance
with the Greeks, and, being reinforced by the Hungarians, crossed
the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople. The throne of
Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his position.
Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his
predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed
a respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged
him to retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of
the Bulgarians. The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave
battle not far from Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the
place, where he sustained one of the most memorable sieges
recorded in history.
In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians
performed prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield
to numbers. Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an
advantageous treaty.
About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the
hope of pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king,
Ogier, to France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success
of these pirates increased their fondness for this sort of
adventure, and for five or six years their bands swarmed on the
coasts of France and Britain and devastated the country. Ogier,
Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted them sometimes to the
mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the [Pg
369]mouths of the
Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted
that Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to
Avignon; but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of
their fleets is not known: the largest seems to have been of
three hundred sail.
In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed
in England, but, finding little chance of success against Alfred,
he entered into alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and
advanced from Rouen on Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on
Chartres. Repulsed here, Rollo overran and ravaged the
neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple saw no better means of
delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing scourge than to
offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition that he
would marry his daughter and turn Christian,—an offer which
was eagerly accepted.
Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the
successors of Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The
latter landed in considerable force, defeated the French, took
the king prisoner, and assured Rollo's son in the possession of
Normandy.
During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even
greater hostility toward England than to France, although they
were much more assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in
language and customs. Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom,
established his family in Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at
first beaten by Ivar's successors, succeeded in regaining his
throne and in compelling the submission of the Danes.
The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more
fortunate than Ivar, after conquering and devastating England,
granted peace on condition that a sum of money should be paid,
and returned to Denmark, leaving a part of his army behind
him.
Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of
the Saxon power, thought he could not do better to free himself
from his importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre
of all the Danes in the kingdom, [Pg
370](1002.) But Sweyn
reappeared in the following year at the head of an imposing
force, and between 1003 and 1007 three successive fleets effected
disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate England was ravaged
anew.
In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again
swept over the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of
obedience to kings who could not defend them, recognized him as
king of the North. His son, Canute the Great, had to contend with
a rival more worthy of him, (Edmund Ironside.) Returning from
Denmark at the head of a considerable force, and aided by the
perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern part of England and
threatened London. A new division of the kingdom resulted; but,
Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was finally
recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to conquer
Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When
he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children,
according to the usage of the times.
Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the
crown to their Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell,
was better fitted to be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to
such commotions. He died in 1066, leaving to Harold a crown which
the chief of the Normans settled in France contested with him,
and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a cession of the
kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great and
ambitious man.
The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions.
While William the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a
formidable armament against Harold, the brother of the latter,
having been driven from Northumberland for his crimes, sought
support in Norway, and, with the King of Norway, set out with
thirty thousand men on five hundred vessels, and landed at the
mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely destroyed this force
in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more formidable storm
was about to burst upon his head. William took advantage of the
time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the Norwegians,
[Pg 371]to sail from St. Valery with a very large
armament. Hume asserts that he had three thousand transports;
while other authorities reduce the number to twelve hundred,
carrying from sixty to seventy thousand men. Harold hastened from
York, and fought a decisive battle near Hastings, in which he met
an honorable death, and his fortunate rival soon reduced the
country to submission.
At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer,
Robert Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and
Sicily with a handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)
Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an
enthusiastic priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and
precipitated large forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land.
At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by
two hundred thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great
part under the attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks,
Peter the Hermit succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived
before Nice with from fifty to sixty thousand men, who were
either killed or captured by the Saracens.
An expedition more military in its character succeeded this
campaign of religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men,
composed of French, Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of
Lorraine, under Godfrey of Bouillon, marched through Austria on
Constantinople; an equal number, under the Count of Toulouse,
marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and Macedonia; and Bohemond,
Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of Normans, Sicilians,
and Italians, and took the route by Greece on Gallipolis.
This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous
expeditions of Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets
were chartered to transport these swarms of Crusaders by the
Bosporus or Dardanelles to Asia. More than four hundred thousand
men were concentrated on the plains of Nice, where they avenged
the defeat of their predecessors. Godfrey afterward led them
across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem, where he founded a
kingdom.
[Pg 372]All the maritime resources of Greece and the
flourishing republics of Italy were required to transport these
masses across the Bosporus and in provisioning them during the
siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus given to the coast
states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous result of the
Crusades.
This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of
great disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among
themselves, united to resist the infidel, and divisions began to
appear in the Christian camps. A new expedition was necessary to
aid the kingdom which the brave Noureddin was threatening. Louis
VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at the head of one hundred
thousand Crusaders, marched, as their predecessors had done, by
the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the Greeks, frightened
by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, plotted their
destruction.
Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps
laid for him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in
several battles by the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate,
defeated the Turks on the banks of the Mender; but, being
deprived of the support of Conrad, and his army being annoyed and
partially beaten by the enemy in the passage of defiles, and
being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia, on the
coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The
means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more
than fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the
king: the remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the
Saracens.
This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks
of the climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although
they were continually aided by small bodies brought over from
Europe by the Italian ships; and they were again about to yield
under the attacks of Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in
effecting an alliance between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa
and the Kings of France and England to save the Holy Land.
The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one
[Pg 373]hundred thousand Germans, he opened a passage
through Thrace in spite of the formal resistance of the Greeks,
now governed by Isaac Angelus. He marched to Gallipolis, crossed
the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He died in consequence of an
imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been pretended, was the
Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the Mussulmans
and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six
thousand men.
At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion[58] and Philip Augustus more
judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from
Marseilles and Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first
seized Cyprus, and both landed in Syria,—where they would
probably have triumphed but for the rivalry which sprang up
between them, in consequence of which Philip returned to
France.
Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.)
Part of the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others,
led by the Count of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat,
proceeded to Venice, with the intention of embarking there. The
party last mentioned were persuaded by the skillful Dandolo to
aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon the pretext of
upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac Angelus,
who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of
those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the
armies of Conrad and Louis VII.
Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient
capital of the world, which had at least two hundred thousand
defenders. They assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The
usurper fled, and Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was
unable to retain his seat: the Greeks made an insurrection in
favor of Murzupha, but the Latins took possession of
Constantinople after a more bloody [Pg
374]assault than the
first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of
Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the
Greeks took refuge at Nice and Trebizond.
A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of
Brienne, who, notwithstanding the successful issue of the
horrible siege of Damietta, was obliged to give way before the
constantly-increasing efforts of the Mussulman population. The
remains of his splendid army, after a narrow escape from drowning
in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in being able to
purchase permission to re-embark for Europe.
The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal
of Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the
fruits, encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering
realm at Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of
Hesse embarked at Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty
thousand chosen soldiers. The landgrave, and afterward Frederick
himself, fell sick, and the fleet put in at Tarentum, from which
port the emperor, irritated by the presumption of Gregory IX.,
who excommunicated him because he was too slow in the
gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with ten
thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the
pontifical thunders.
Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled,
if we may credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set
out from Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty
large vessels, and fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the
Genoese, the Venetians and the Catalans; for France was at that
time without a navy, although washed by two seas. This king
proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there collected a still larger
force, set out, according to Joinville's statement, with more
than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent into Egypt. His
army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, although
half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of
Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty
thousand fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should
be stated [Pg 375]that the Count of Poictiers had arrived also
with troops from France.
The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not
prevent the same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty
years later, (1270.) He disembarked upon that occasion at the
ruins of Carthage, and besieged Tunis. The plague swept off half
his army in a few months, and himself was one of its victims. The
King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful reinforcements at
the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back the remains
of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest which
caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This
prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the
conquest of the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed
a prize of greater value and more readily obtained. Philip, the
son and successor of Saint Louis, being anxious to return to
France, would have nothing to do with that project. This was the
last effort. The Christians who were abandoned in Syria were
destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and Ptolemais: some of
the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at Cyprus and
established themselves at Rhodes.
The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at
Gallipolis in 1355, and took possession, one after the other, of
the European provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins
had themselves given the fatal blow.
Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said
to have had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing
it in the canal and closing the port: it is stated to have been
large enough to be manned by twenty thousand select
foot-soldiers. After the capture of this capital, Mohammed found
his means increased by all those of the Greek navy, and in a
short time his empire attained the first rank of maritime powers.
He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon Otranto on
the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of a
more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at
Belgrade, the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet,
brought that city to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a
fleet of four hun[Pg 376]dred sail to make a landing upon the
island of Negropont, which he carried by assault. A second
attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the head of a
hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a
failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to
go to that point himself with an immense army assembled on the
shores of Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand
men; but death closed his career, and the project was not carried
into effect.
About the same period England began to be formidable to her
neighbors on land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also,
reclaiming their country from the inroads of the sea, were laying
the foundations of a power more extraordinary even than that of
Venice.
Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight
hundred ships and forty thousand men.
Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is
stated, fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of
whom six thousand were cavalry.
All the events we have described as taking place, up to this
period, and including the capture of Constantinople, were before
the invention of gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at
Agincourt, as is claimed by some writers, they were certainly not
used in naval warfare. From that time all the combinations of
naval armaments were entirely changed; and this revolution took
place—if I may use that expression—at the time when
the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of
America and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the
maritime commerce of the world into new channels and to establish
an entirely new system of colonial dependencies.
I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards
to America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to
India by doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their
great influence upon the commerce of the
world,—notwithstanding the genius of Gama, Albuquerque, and
Cortez,—these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies of
two or three thousand men against tribes who knew [Pg 377]nothing of fire-arms, are of no interest in a
military point of view.
The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by
this discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor
in the reign of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition
to Tunis, which was conquered by this prince at the head of
thirty thousand fine soldiers transported in five hundred Genoese
or Spanish vessels, was balanced by the disaster which befell a
similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,) undertaken when the
season was too far advanced and in opposition to the wise
counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way
when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight
thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved
by the skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where
Charles V. himself arrived, after encountering great difficulties
and peril.
While these events were transpiring, the successors of
Mohammed were not neglecting the advantages given them by the
possession of so many fine maritime provinces, which taught them
at once the importance of the control of the sea and furnished
means for obtaining it. At this period the Turks were quite as
well informed with reference to artillery and the military art in
general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of their
greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes
(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one
hundred and forty thousand men,—which was still formidable
even upon the supposition of its strength being exaggerated by
one-half.
In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent
upon Malta, where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new
establishment; they carried over thirty-two thousand Janissaries,
with one hundred and forty ships. John of Valetta, as is well
known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing them.
A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred
vessels and fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle
of Cyprus, where Nicosia was taken and Famagosta [Pg 378]besieged. The horrible cruelties practiced by
Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. Spain,
Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor
Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding
the heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed
alive by Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand
Turks that had perished in the space of two years spent on the
island.
The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of
Austria, brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the
Turkish fleet at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the
promontory of Actium, where Antony and Augustus once fought for
the empire of the world. The Turkish fleet was almost entirely
destroyed: more than two hundred vessels and thirty thousand
Turks were captured or perished, (1571.) This victory did not put
an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a great check in
their career of greatness. However, they made such vigorous
efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea
during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which
such enormous losses were sustained.
The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against
Algiers did not deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to
attempt the conquest of Morocco, where he was invited by a
Moorish prince who had been deprived of his estates. Having
disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the head of twenty
thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army cut to
pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578.
Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle
of Lepanto on account of the success he had gained in France by
his diplomacy and by the folly of the adherents of the League,
deemed his arms irresistible. He thought to bring England to his
feet. The invincible Armada intended to produce this effect,
which has been so famous, was composed of an expeditionary force
proceeding from Cadiz, including, according to Hume's narrative,
one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, armed with two thousand six
hundred [Pg 379]and thirty bronze cannon, and carrying twenty
thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand sailors. To
these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand men
which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by
way of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused
the failure of this expedition, which, although of considerable
magnitude for the period when it appeared, was by no means
entitled to the high-sounding name it received: it lost thirteen
thousand men and half the vessels before it even came near the
English coast.
After this expedition comes in chronological order that of
Gustavus Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from
fifteen to eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and
was manned by nine thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however,
be mistaken in stating that it carried eight thousand cannon. The
debarkation in Pomerania received little opposition from the
Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a strong party among
the German people. His successor was the leader of a very
extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other
example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X.
of Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving
from Sleswick upon Copenhagen by way of the island of
Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five thousand men, of whom nine
thousand were cavalry, and artillery in proportion. This
undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice was unsafe,
several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage
having broken through and been lost.
After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and
the Turks recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of
fifty-five thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to
Candia, and gained possession of the important post of Canea
before the republic thought of sending succor. Although the
people of Venice began to lose the spirit which made her great,
she still numbered among her citizens some noble souls: Morosini,
Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against the Turks,
who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority and
the possession of Canea. [Pg
380]The Venetian
fleet had, nevertheless, gained a marked ascendency under the
orders of Grimani, when a third of it was destroyed by a
frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself perished.
In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city
furiously at the head of thirty thousand men: after being
repulsed in two assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by
a large breach being made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo
rushed to meet them, expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant
victory was the reward of his heroic conduct: the enemy were
repulsed and the ditches filled with their dead bodies.
Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty
thousand men to Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble
support, and she had already called into active service all the
men fit for war she could produce.
The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of
Troy, and each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part
of the Turks to carry succor to their army and by naval victories
gained by the Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the
advance of naval tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly
superior to the Mussulmans, who adhered to the old customs, and
were made to pay dearly for every attempt to issue from the
Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of Morosini, and several
Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this protracted
struggle.
Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the
head of the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal
direction of this war which had lasted so long: he accordingly
proceeded to the island, where transports had landed fifty
thousand men, at whose head he conducted the attack in a vigorous
manner.(1667.)
In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than
previously: their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well
served, and, for the first time, they made use of trenches, which
were the invention of an Italian engineer.
The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of
defense by mines. Never had there been seen such furious
[Pg 381]zeal exhibited in mutual destruction by combats,
mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance enabled the garrison
to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice sent
reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds
of French volunteers.
The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and
redoubled their efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when
six thousand Frenchmen came to the assistance of the garrison
under the leadership of the Duke of Beaufort and
Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged these
presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the
sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at
the end of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back
to France. Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men
to defend a place which was open on all sides, finally consented
to evacuate it, and a truce was agreed upon, which led to a
formal treaty of peace. Candia had cost the Turks twenty-five
years of efforts and more than one hundred thousand men killed in
eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It is estimated
that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations
perished in the glorious defense of the place.
The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives
examples of great maritime operations, but no remarkable
descents. That of James II. in Ireland (1690) was composed of
only six thousand Frenchmen, although De Tourville's fleet
contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying five thousand
eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A grave
fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men
into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later,
De Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue,
and the remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to
return through the instrumentality of a treaty which required
their evacuation of the island.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and
Russians undertook two expeditions very different in
character.
[Pg 382]Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein,
made a descent upon Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men,
transported by two hundred vessels and protected by a strong
squadron. He was really assisted by the English and Dutch navies,
but the expedition was not for that reason the less remarkable in
the details of the disembarkation. The same prince effected a
descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his troops at a
Swedish port.
Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the
Persians, and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions,
embarked (in 1722) upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea
with two hundred and seventy vessels, carrying twenty thousand
foot-soldiers, and descended to Agrakhan, at the mouths of the
Koisou, where he expected to meet his cavalry. This force,
numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand Cossacks,
joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar
then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty
with one of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled
with discord the empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession
of Astrabad, the key of the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of
the whole Persian empire.
The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary
expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca,
which was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as
a descent.
[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was
joined by a portion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole
amounted to nineteen ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels
of war, and one hundred and fifty transports, carrying ten
thousand men. The expedition besieged and captured
Havana.—TRS.]
The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen
or sixteen thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing
those rovers of the sea for their bold piracies; but the
expedition, for want of harmonious action between the squadron
and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on account of the
murderous fire which the troops received from [Pg 383]the
Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth
surrounding the city. The troops returned to their vessels after
having two thousand men placed hors de combat.
The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime
efforts upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see
this power send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships
of the line, while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a
Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-five ships of the line, was to
cover a descent to be effected with three hundred transports and
forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and St. Malo.
This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but
accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to
port.
D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the
superiority in the Antilles and in landing in the United States
six thousand Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a
later date, by another division, and assisted in investing the
English army under Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the
independence of America was thus secured. France would perhaps
have gained a triumph over her implacable rival more lasting in
its effects, had she, in addition to the display made in the
English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand men
more to India with Admiral Suffren.
During the French Revolution, there were few examples of
descents: the fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of
Ushant had greatly injured the French navy.
Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand
men was scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that
quarter were made. (1796.)
At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting
of twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates,
and four hundred transports, obtained great successes at first,
which were followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of
expelling him, landed fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were
all captured or driven into the sea, [Pg
384]notwithstanding
the advantages this peninsula gave them of intrenching themselves
and waiting for reinforcements. This is an excellent example for
imitation by the party on the defensive under similar
circumstances.
The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in
1802 to St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on
account of the ravages of yellow fever.
Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given
their attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the
subjugation of colonies than to great descents. The attempts made
in the eighteenth century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies
of ten or twelve thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of
a powerful state like France. The remarkable conquests which
procured them their Indian empire occurred in succession. Having
obtained possession of Calcutta, and then of Bengal, they
strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of troops in
small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to
the number of one hundred and fifty thousand.
The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed
of forty thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the
study of the details of the operations is, however, quite
interesting.
In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz,
effected a descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen.
The results of this expedition are well known.
General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some
successes at Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession
of Sicily. That against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its
results, and was terminated by a capitulation.
In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five
thousand men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained
possession of the Danish fleet, which was his object.
In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand
men. After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the
general rising of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the
kingdom. The same army, increased in numbers to twenty-five
thousand and placed under Moore's [Pg
385]command, while
making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a view of relieving
Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there re-embark,
after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected
another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an
army of thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with
which he avenged Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at
Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then beating Joseph at Talavera, under
the very gates of his capital.
The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the
largest England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was
composed of not less than seventy thousand men in
all,—forty thousand land-forces and thirty thousand
sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the incapacity of the
leader.
A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X.
of Sweden was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the
Gulf of Bothnia on the ice in five columns, with their artillery.
Their object was to take possession of the islands of Aland and
spread a feeling of apprehension to the very gates of Stockholm.
Another division passed the gulf to Umeå, (March,
1809.)
General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent
in the neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of
cutting Suchet off from Valencia: however, after some successful
operations, he thought best to re-embark.
The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after
his return from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the
great mass of matériel landed at Ostend and
Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army contained sixty thousand men,
but some came by land and others were disembarked at a friendly
port.
The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which
may be regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on
the capital of the United States. The world was astonished to see
a handful of seven or eight thousand Englishmen making their
appearance in the midst of a state embracing ten millions of
people, taking possession of its capital, and destroying all the
public buildings,—results [Pg
386]unparalleled in
history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and
unmilitary spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same
militia had not risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and
Switzerland, to defend their homes against still more powerful
attacks, and if, in the same year, an English expedition more
extensive than the other had not been entirely defeated by the
militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders of General
Jackson.
If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of
Xerxes and the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind
which has been actually carried out, especially since fleets have
been armed with powerful artillery, can at all be compared with
the gigantic project and proportionate preparations made by
Napoleon for throwing one hundred and fifty thousand veterans
upon the shores of England by the use of three thousand launches
or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the line[59].
From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a
difference there is in point of difficulty and probability of
success between descents attempted across a narrow arm of the
sea, a few miles only in width, and those in which the troops and
matériel are to be transported long distances over
the open sea. This fact gives the reason why so many operations
of this kind have been executed by way of the Bosporus.
[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic
data:—
In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers,
composed of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and
one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery. More than five
hundred vessels of war and transports were employed. The fleet
sailed from Toulon.
In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera
Cruz. The castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after
a short bombardment. A small force of about one thou[Pg 387]sand men, in three columns, took the city of Vera
Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight.
In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon
the coast of Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen
thousand men, under the command of General Scott. One hundred and
fifty vessels were employed, including men-of-war and transports.
The city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily
fell into the possession of the forces of the United States. This
important post became the secondary base of operations for the
brilliant campaign which terminated with the capture of the city
of Mexico.
In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between
Russia on the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey
on the other. Several descents were made by the allied forces at
different points of the Russian coast: of these the first was in
the Baltic Sea. An English fleet sailed from Spithead, under the
command of Sir Charles Napier, on the 12th of March, and a French
fleet from Brest, under the command of Vice-Admiral Parseval
Deschênes, on the 19th of April. They effected a junction
in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet
numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other
vessels. The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of
Bomarsund, on one of the Aland Isles, but, after a
reconnoissance, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary
to have land-forces. A French corps of ten thousand men was at
once dispatched to Bomarsund under General Baraguay-d'Hilliers,
and the place was speedily reduced.
Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was
executed; and with reference to it the following facts are
mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude:—
September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five
hundred men and two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near
Eupatoria, composed of thirty thousand French, twenty-one
thousand five hundred English, and seven thousand Turks. They
were transported from Varna to the place of landing by three
hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and transports. This
force fought and gained the battle of the Alma,
(Septem[Pg 388]ber 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol.
The English took possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the
French of Kamiesch: these were the points to which subsequent
reinforcements and supplies for the army in the Crimea were
sent.
November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army
numbered seventy-one thousand men.
At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five
thousand men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the
English had sent fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only
fifteen thousand were alive, present, and fit for duty.
February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the
English, twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks,
twenty-five thousand.
May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with
fifteen thousand Sardinians.
In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand
men was sent to Kertch.
In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one
hundred and twenty thousand men.
September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in
the evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then
in battery more than eight hundred pieces of artillery.
The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the
artillery attack of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five
ships. There were present and prepared to attack in September,
1855, thirty-four ships.
October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was
sent to Kinburn, which place was captured.
Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the
French emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria
three hundred and ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of
which two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men returned to
France and Algeria.
The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he
refers only to French operations:-)
The artillery matériel at the disposal of the
Army of the [Pg 389]East comprised one thousand seven
hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, two thousand seven
hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine million
pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand tons
of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred
and seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight
thousand war-rockets.
On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and
eighteen batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven
million pounds of powder. They required one million sand-bags and
fifty thousand gabions.
Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The
engineers executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand
gabions, sixty thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags.
Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons
were sent.
Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand
tons.
Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons.
Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight
thousand tons.
In all, about six hundred thousand tons.
It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the
English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies.
In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a
force of forty thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry,
and eighty pieces of artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war
with three hundred and twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four
gun-boats and numerous transports.
In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast
of China, whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of
peace. This expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the
numbers which ventured, at such a great distance from their
sources of supply and succor, to land upon a hostile shore and
penetrate into the midst of the most populous empire in the
world.
[Pg 390]The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small
in numbers, and presented no remarkable features.
Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the
United States sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port
Royal, on the coast of South Carolina, one of the seceding
States. The fleet of war-vessels and transports sailed from
Hampton Roads, under command of Captain Dupont, and was dispersed
by a violent gale: the losses of men and matériel
were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the
rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by
the naval forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took
place, General Sherman being in command.
England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged
in an expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations
were the capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its
defenses: the Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The
future will develop the plans of the allies; but the ultimate
result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted by the
Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three of the most powerful
states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and tottering
republic of Mexico.]
FOOTNOTES:
[58]
Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot and five
thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded by
land to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to
transport his troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian
ships, and with a force at least as large as that of Richard.
[59]
See the account of the expedition to the
Crimea.—TRANSLATORS.
[Pg
391]
INDEX
A.
Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384.
Accidental lines, 103.
Action, concert of, how secured, 259.
Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152.
Advanced guard, 261, 262.
attack of the enemy's, in
retreats, 243.
in armies meeting unexpectedly,
208.
in battle, 288, 289.
Advance, line of, how determined, 71.
Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17.
of elevated points for
observation, 276.
Aggressive wars for conquest, 22.
Agincourt, order of battle at, 192.
Albis, position of, 181.
Alcazar, battle of, 378.
Alexander the Great, 173, 362.
Alfred the Great, 369.
Algiers, French descent on, in 1830>, 386.
Spanish descent on, 382.
Alise, investment of, by Cæsar, 153.
Allies, at Bautzen, 187.
defeat of, at Zurich, 112.
error of, in 1793, 107, 108.
failure of diversion of, in 1805,
219.
in war, 18.
march of, upon Leipsic, 123.
Alps, passage of, by Francis I., 168.
American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383.
Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384.
Angoulême, Duke of, expedition of, 28.
Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233.
Antwerp, English expedition to, 385.
Archduke Charles, 294.
concentric retreat of, in 1796,
238.
interior lines of, 136.
opinion of, as to small-column
formation, 350.
opinion of, as to the valley of
the Danube, 162.
success of, 110, 111.
Archduke Ferdinand, 53.
Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379.
Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47.
superior, importance of, 47, 48.
Armies, auxiliary, 170.
central, observations on,
126.
command of, 52.
French, in the Revolution,
135.
how to act, 75.
in intrenchments, 154.
in peace, how preserved, 47.
large, fitness of central lines
for, 125.
large, organization of, 286.
meeting unexpectedly, advanced
guard in, 208.
morale of, 60, 178, 322.
movements of, points to be
attended to in, 254-256.
of French Revolution, how
subsisted, 142.
of Louis XIV. and Frederick II.,
how subsisted, 142.
of Napoleon, operations of,
136.
promotions in, 47.
standing, effect of, on distant
invasions, 171.
surprises of, 209.
two, on interior lines, 117.
two, on the same frontier,
116.
unexpected meeting of two,
207.
Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308.
Arms and organization of cavalry, 307,
308.
Arms for irregular cavalry, 313.
Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59.
Army corps, system of, 279.
Army, defensive, proper course for, 324.
defensive, when it has the
advantage, 202.
head-quarters of, when the most
important point, 107.
how perfected, 43.
importance of a good, 44.
number of men in, often
determines battle-formation for, 285.
Army of Boulogne, 280.
[Pg 392] of four corps,
281.
of seven corps, 281.
offensive, proper course for,
324.
of invasion, line of defense
important to, 99.
of the Rhine in 1800, 115.
permanent, necessary condition
of, 49.
proportion of cavalry in,
304.
pursuing, has the advantage,
241.
Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317.
Artillery, concentration of fire of,
in offensive line of battle,
290.
employment of, 315-318.
heavy, in defensive line of
battle, 290.
importance of, to infantry,
290.
matériel of the French
army in the Crimea, 388.
Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316.
post of, in line of battle,
289.
proportion of, 318.
protection of infantry from the
enemy's, 303.
rules for use of, in battle,
316-318.
use of, in the offensive,
316.
who should command, 318.
Art of war, definition of, 13.
principal parts of, 66.
Assailant, advantages of, 186.
Assailant's best means of victory, 202.
Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298.
of field-works, instances of
well-arranged, 212.
Athens, naval power of, 361.
Attack, cavalry column of, 310.
close, formation for, 301.
column of, in two lines, 292.
columns of, 293, 356.
columns of, of single battalions,
298.
five methods of forming troops
for, 292.
formation for, at Turin, 213.
in columns, order of, 194.
in front, 201.
in rear, 207.
of field-works, directions for,
211, 212.
of fortified places, 210.
of intrenched lines, 214.
on flank, 203.
on Sank, cavalry, 310.
when order in squares suitable
for, 297.
Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258.
in half-deep order, 302.
Audenarde, battle of, 53.
Augustus, armament of, 365.
Aulic Council, 59.
Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106.
force of, in the French
Revolution, 106.
fortresses of, 149.
interest of, in the French
Revolution, 105.
intervention of, in 1813,
21.
Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112.
camp before Mayence, 157.
order at Essling and Fleurus,
200.
Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246.
why victorious in 1753, 107.
Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240.
Authority of counselors, 53.
B.
Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275,
276.
how they might be useful,
275.
used at Fleurus, 275.
Barbarossa, 373.
Bard, fort of, 152, 167.
importance of defile of, 87.
Base of operations, where to be established, 84.
Bases of operations, definition of, 77
of operations, how to be chosen,
79, 80.
of operations, plurality of,
78.
on the sea, 83, 84.
temporary or eventual, 84.
temporary, when necessary,
132.
with two faces, 83.
Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131.
Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301.
Battalion squares, 296.
Batteries, 317.
Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289.
calculation of distances in,
334.
classification of orders of,
useful, 197.
combinations of, 187.
concave order of, 191.
convex order of, 192.
critical moment of, 203.
decisive moment of, 334.
defensive arrangements for,
201.
Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186.
decisive point of, 187.
strategic point of, when
important, 187.
Battle-formation in small columns, 350.
influence of topography upon,
299.
[Pg 393]
Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360.
influence of orders of, on result
of engagements, 197.
line of, arrangement of cavalry
in, 288.
line of, before the French
Revolution, 277.
line of, definition of, 179.
line of, distribution of troops
in, 287.
line of, post of artillery in,
289.
lines of, for two infantry corps,
different formations of, 282-284.
oblique order of, 190.
of Agincourt, 192.
of Alcazar, 378.
of Audenarde, 53.
of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206.
of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317.
of Blenheim, 303.
of Cannæ, 191.
of Crécy, 192.
of Ecnomos, 363.
of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
of Fossano, 168.
of Jena, 90, 198, 305.
of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305.
of Lepanto, 378.
of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342.
of Millesimo, 111.
of Mollwitz, 348.
of Prague, 189, 205.
of Ramillies, 312.
of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205.
of Torgau, 205.
of Turin, 53.
of Ulm, 53, 90.
of Ulm, won by strategy, 198.
of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295, 303-306, 354, 358, 359.
offensive, object of, 188.
offensive order of, 200.
order of, 186.
order of, at Leipsic, 193.
order of, definition of, 180.
orders of, 188.
parallel order of, 188.
reinforced, 189.
when suitable, 189.
with crotchet, 189.
perpendicular order of, 190.
position for, 341.
posting troops in line of,
277.
results of, depend on what,
178.
rules for use of artillery in,
316-318.
Battle-order for cavalry, 312.
Battle-orders, various, 349.
Battles, 178.
defensive, 179.
elements of uncertainty
regarding, 197.
great difficulty of tactics of,
196.
influence of musketry-fire in,
348.
offensive, 186.
of Napoleon, orders of, 198.
rules for scientific, 200.
success in, depends on
maneuvering, 360.
three kinds of, 179.
what may interfere with success
of, 196.
Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317.
French at, 196.
Bellegarde, 166.
Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109.
Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289.
base on Königsberg in 1807,
152.
position in 1807, 171.
mixed system at Eylau, 352.
Beresina, passage of, 226, 245.
Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212.
Berthier at Leipsic, 267.
Berthier's error at Wagram, 267.
error in campaign of 1809,
265.
Blenheim, battle of, 303.
Blücher, 53, 130.
"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194.
Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111.
expedition to Egypt, 383.
Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Boulogne, army of, 280.
camp of, 279.
Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345.
Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., 245.
in retreats, 244.
means of destroying, 245.
protection of, after passage,
229.
Bridge-trains, importance of, 121.
Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154.
Burgundy, Duke of, 53.
C.
Cæsar's investment of Alise, 153.
maritime expeditions, 365.
Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137.
of 1793, 107.
of 1799, 111.
of 1800, 112.
of 1812, Napoleon's error in,
172.
of the Spaniards in Flanders,
171.
of the Swedes in Germany,
171.
Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169.
[Pg 394] in winter,
68.
of 1799 and 1800, 162.
Camp at Kehl, 167.
intrenched, influence of,
155.
intrenched, on which side of a
river, 157.
intrenched, on river, 156.
of Boulogne, 279.
of Drissa, 157.
Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215.
fortified, 154.
intrenched, connection of, with
strategy, 154.
intrenched, instances of,
210, 211.
intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156.
intrenched, Prussian system of,
158.
intrenched, use of, 156.
intrenched, where to be
established, 155.
strategic square for, 99.
Candia, siege of, 380, 381.
Turkish descent on, 379.
Cannæ, order of battle at, 191.
Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247.
Cantonments, 246.
duty of staff officers in,
256.
rules for establishing, 246.
selection of positions for,
247.
Canute, 370.
Capitals as strategic points, 87.
Capital, when the center of power, 107.
Capture of posts, means for, 216.
when important, 216.
Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306.
Carnot, 59.
operations of, 136.
Carthage, destruction of, 364.
Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361,
362.
Cavalry, 303.
advantages of large corps of,
309.
arms and organization of,
307, 308.
arrangement of, in line of
battle, 288.
at Ramillies, 312.
battle-order for, 312.
best formation of infantry
against, 294.
charge at Hohenfriedberg,
305.
charge, general, 305.
charges, four kinds of, 306.
charges of the Turks, 307.
defensive armor for, 308.
divisions of five regiments,
311.
duties of, 304.
encounters of, against cavalry,
311.
flank charges of, 307.
formations of, 309-311.
importance of, in retreats,
243.
importance of, to infantry,
290.
influence of, in a war, 313, 314.
in the defensive, 306.
irregular, 313.
light, advantages of, 314.
militia as, 314, 315.
morale of, 312.
must be supported by infantry,
304.
proportion of, in an army,
304.
reserves, 288, 311.
when it should charge a line of
infantry, 305.
Center, when proper point of attack, 187.
Central armies, 126.
line of Napoleon in Saxony,
124.
lines, application of, to large
masses, 125.
position, when untenable,
331.
Chæronea, 365.
Charges, irregular cavalry, 313.
Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, 377.
VIII., retreat of, to Naples,
233.
X. of Sweden, expedition of,
379.
XII. of Sweden, descent of, on
Denmark, 382.
Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310.
order, infantry, 301.
Chief of staff, 57, 253.
China, English and French expedition to, 389.
Choice of objective points, 90.
Circumvallation, lines of, 152.
Civil wars, 35.
Clairfayt, victories of, 110.
Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178.
opinion of, as to movements in
mountainous countries, 166.
Coalition against France in 1793, 37.
Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
Louis XIV., 36.
Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251.
Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158.
towers of, 159.
Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193.
Column of attack, cavalry, 310.
of attack in two lines, 292.
Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356.
of attack of single battalions,
298.
of four divisions in three ranks,
294.
Combinations of battle, 187.
strategic, 72.
Combined use of the three arms, 203,
319, 320.
Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55.
essential qualities for a,
55.
importance of, 54.
Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66.
[Pg 395] of artillery,
duties of, 319.
Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59.
of armies, 52.
Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141.
of Louis XIV. and Frederick II.,
142.
the, and strategy, 141.
Committee of Public Safety, 136.
Concave order of battle, 191.
Concentration of artillery-fire, 290.
in retreat, advantages of,
238.
Concentric lines, 102.
retreats, instances of, 238, 239.
system, 126.
Concert of action, how secured, 259.
in action, importance of,
42.
Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34.
wars for, instances of, 22.
Conrad III., Crusade of, 372.
Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368.
siege of, by the Crusaders,
373.
siege of, by Mohammed II.,
375.
Contempt for the enemy, 63.
Contravallation, lines of, 152.
Control of operations, 52.
Convergent operations, 126.
Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118.
Continuous intrenched lines, 213.
Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30.
Convex order of battle, 192.
Copenhagen, siege of, 384.
Cordon system, 165.
Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287.
organization of an army in four,
281.
organization of an army in seven,
281.
system of, 279.
two, one behind the other,
285.
Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314.
Council of war at seat of government, 59.
Councils of war, value of, 58.
Counselors, authority of, 53.
Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345.
Coups de main, 215.
instances of, 216, 223.
Crécy, order of battle at, 192.
Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389.
Crimean War, 387.
Critical moment of battles, 203.
Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120.
Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189.
Crotchets, danger of, 182.
Crusade of 1203, 373.
Crusades, 25, 371-375.
Cuirass, 47, 308.
Cuirassiers, 308.
Culm, 221.
Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377.
D.
Danes, incursions of, 368, 369.
Danger of two wars at once, 36.
Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170.
Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226.
valley of, key of Southern
Germany, 162.
Decisive direction, 328.
moment of battle, 334.
point at Bautzen, 187.
point, how affected by
arrangement of forces, 187.
point of battle-field, 187.
point of battle-field, how
determined, 88, 186.
points, 337.
points, defiles as, 87.
points of the theater of war,
85.
Deep columns, 356.
at Waterloo, 359.
masses, 298, 302.
order, disadvantages of, 298.
Defeat, 68.
of the French at Waterloo, causes
of, 359.
Defense, in mountainous countries, 163.
line of, important to an army of
invasion, 99.
line of, should be short,
98.
of frontiers, 146.
of intrenched camps and lines,
215.
rivers, mountains, and defiles as
eventual lines of, 96.
second lines of, 147.
should not be passive, 185.
tactical, of Switzerland,
169.
maxims for frontier, 148, 149.
Defensive armor for cavalry, 308.
army has the advantage, when,
202.
army, proper course for, 324.
arrangements for battle, 201.
battles, 179.
best formation of infantry for,
298.
cavalry in, 306.
characteristics of infantry
formation for, 297.
in descents, duty of, 251.
line of battle, heavy artillery
in, 290.
Defensive movements, when advised, 124.
[Pg 396] -offensive war,
74.
or offensive system, either may
be employed, 185.
the, in a level country, 164.
war, 72,
73.
Defiles as decisive points, 87.
as eventual lines of defense,
96.
in retreats, 243.
Definitive lines, 103.
Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130.
Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301.
lines in two ranks, 294.
lines, two, formation of infantry
in, 292.
Depots, establishment of, on march, 262.
command of, 263.
lines of, 263.
of supplies, 141.
of supplies, general maxims,
143.
secondary, 262, 263.
Descents, 248.
cases where made, 250.
difficulties of, 250.
duty of defensive in, 251.
effect of modern inventions on,
248.
more extensive in ancient times,
248.
precautions after landing,
252.
rules for conducting, 251.
D'Estaing's fleet, 383.
Detached orders of Napoleon, 259.
works, importance of, 154.
Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220.
four kinds of, 217.
great, 217, 219, 334.
great, instances of, 221, 222.
great, why made, 220, 221.
multiplication of, must be
avoided, 221.
necessary when there is a double
strategic front, 220.
of Napoleon in 1805, 222.
precise rules for, cannot be laid
down, 222.
requisites in officers of,
224.
small, how useful, 224.
Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219.
Détours, 197, 204.
Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269.
Diplomacy in invasions, 24.
Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116.
of lines of operations, 115.
Discipline, importance of, 42.
importance of, in retreats,
242.
Distances in battle, calculation of, 334.
Distant expeditions, 169.
invasions across extensive
territories, 171.
invasions, maxim for, 173.
invasions to aid an ally,
170.
Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287.
Divergent lines, 103.
Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91.
to Holland in 1799, 91.
Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106,
107.
Dunkirk, expedition to, 91.
Duties of cavalry, 304.
of staff officers, 254-256.
Duty of a general, 324.
of statesmen in offensive wars,
17.
Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222.
Division, improper use of the term, 351.
Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311.
defects of system of, 278.
remedied by Napoleon, 278.
formation by, when preferable,
286.
organization of, 279, 280.
system of, 278.
Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273.
Double line of operations, when applicable, 117.
when necessary, 116.
lines of operations, 102, 110.
when advantageous, 123.
lines to be avoided, 330.
passages of rivers, 230.
strategic front, 95.
wars, 36.
wars of Napoleon, 37.
Dragoons, 308.
concentration of, by
Emperor
Nicholas, 309.
Drepanum, 363.
Dresden, 305.
intrenched camp at, 155, 211.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
victory at, 124.
Drissa, camp of, 155, 157.
Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118.
operations, 126.
retreats, when admissible,
239.
Diversions, 218.
instances of, 218.
when useful, 218.
E.
Eccentric lines, 237.
retreat. Bulow's use of the
term,
237.
Eccentric system, 126.
[Pg 397]
Echelon, order of battle by, 193.
Echelons, order in, 193.
squares in, 297.
Ecnomos, victory of, 363.
Edward III. of England, 376.
Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374.
Ehrenbreitstein, 158.
Elchingen, Ney at, 182.
Elective governments, weakness of, 46.
Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276.
Elongated squares, 296, 297.
Employment of artillery, 315-318.
Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311.
Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67.
contempt for, 63.
how dislodged, 188.
how to drive from his position,
201, 202.
should not be paid to leave a
country, 242.
Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268.
England controls the sea, 173.
invasion of, by Sweyn, 370.
projected invasion of, by
Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385.
English and French expedition to China, 389.
English, descents of, on France, 376.
expedition against Napoleon in
1815, 385.
expedition in 1762 against
Havana, 382.
maritime expeditions, 384-390.
squares at Waterloo, 294.
Enthusiasm, importance of, 41.
not military spirit, 62.
Epaminondas, 190.
Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172.
Error of the allies in 1793, 107,
108.
Errors in strategy, 91.
Essential bases of military policy, 49.
Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
Napoleon at, 158.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
order of battle at, 192, 193.
Eugene at Turin, 153.
march of, 141.
Eventual bases, 84.
lines of defense, 96.
Expediency, wars of, 18.
Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273.
to the Crimea, details of,
387-389.
Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174.
distant, 169.
marine, in modern times, 249.
maritime, 361-390.
of the ancients, 248.
of the Middle Ages, 171.
partly on land, partly by sea,
173.
Extended movements, when dangerous, 204.
Exterior lines of operations, 102.
Extermination, wars of, 34.
Eylau, 305, 306,
318, 352.
French armament at, 47.
Napoleon's march on, 94.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Russian artillery reserve at,
289.
Russian order at, 295.
F.
Famous retreats, instances of, 233.
Field, strategic, of 1806, 113.
Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212.
instances of well-arranged
assaults on, 212.
Final reserves, 203.
Financial considerations, 50.
Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359.
Fire-signals, how used, 276.
Flank attack, 203.
attack, cavalry, 310.
charges of cavalry, 307.
marches, 139, 140.
marches, where inadmissible,
140.
tactical maneuver by, 140.
Flanks of companies, movement by, 300,
301.
protection of, in tactical
positions, 182.
Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174.
Fleurus, 136, 193, 200.
balloons used at, 275.
order of battle at, 192.
Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289.
in the offensive, 316.
Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183.
Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286.
for attack at Turin, 213.
for battle in small columns,
350.
for battle, Napoleon's system,
278, 279.
for battle often determined by
size of army, 285.
for battle, Prussian and Austrian
system, 354.
for close attack, 301.
of infantry for attack, five
methods of, 292.
in two ranks, 356.
[Pg 398] of troops for
battle, 347-350.
Formations of cavalry, 309-311.
of lines of battle for two
infantry corps, 282-284.
various, for infantry, 285.
Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158.
Fortifications, remark upon, 151.
Fortified camps, 154.
places, attack of, 210.
places on the sea-coast,
importance of, 152.
places, when a misfortune,
152.
Fortresses at Mayence, 150.
greatest advantages of, 150.
large, when preferable, 150.
number and position of, 149.
of France and Austria, 149.
on frontiers, 148.
relation of, to strategy,
148, 150.
Forts in a mountainous country, 151.
purposes of, 146.
Fossano, battle of, 168.
Four-rank formation of infantry, 291.
France adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
coalition against, in 1793,
37.
course and error of, in 1792,
105.
fortresses of, 149.
intention of, when declaring war
in 1792, 105.
invasions of, by the English,
376.
Francis I., passage of the Alps by, 168.
Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
at Leuthen, 229.
at Prague, 205.
at Torgau, 206.
commissariat of, 142.
defensive-offensive operations
of, 74.
maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141.
military genius of, 16.
Frederick II., Crusade of, 374.
French and English expedition to China, 389.
French armies in the Revolution, 135.
armies, situation of, in 1800,
112.
at Bautzen, 196.
at Fleurus, why successful,
193.
at Waterloo, 196.
capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838,
386.
causes of defeat of, at Waterloo,
359.
cavalry, 313.
columns at Waterloo, 351.
defeat of, at Stockach, 111.
descent on Algiers in 1830,
386.
errors in 1795, 136.
expedition to Syria, 390.
in Bohemia in 1742, 171.
invasions of 1766 and 1795,
120.
French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383.
operations in Italy, 112.
operations of, at close of 1793,
331-333.
operations of, in 1794, 108.
order at Essling and Fleurus,
200.
order at Minden, 278.
plan in 1799, error of, 110.
Revolution, 26-28.
Revolution, armies of, how
subsisted, 142.
Revolution, course of Austria in,
106.
Revolution, course of Prussia in,
105, 106.
Revolution, interest of Austria
in, 105.
Revolution, lines of operations
in the wars of, 104.
Revolution, relation of Italy to,
104.
Revolution, relation of Prussia
and Austria to, 104.
Revolution, theater of operations
in, 104.
Revolution, zones of operations
in, 105.
Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148,
149.
when a permanent line of defense,
96.
Frontiers, defense of, 146.
disadvantage of fortresses on,
148.
how to be fortified, 152.
mountains as, 146.
rivers as, 147.
Front of operations, 330, 338.
of operations, extent of,
98.
of operations, how varied,
93.
strategic, change of, 94.
strategic, not to be too
extended, 98.
Fronts of operations, 92.
Fronts, strategic, 92.
Fundamental principle of war, 66.
maxims of, 70.
principles for employment of
troops, 328.
G.
Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
General advanced guard, how composed, 262.
cavalry charge, 305.
General, essential qualities of a, 55.
importance of a skillful,
43.
one of the greatest talents of,
74.
qualities of a skillful, 334.
what constitutes a, 327.
General principle of war, manner of applying, 175.
[Pg 399] staff, employment
of, in time of peace, 49.
staff, usefulness of, 57.
Genoa, panic at siege of, 64.
Geography, military, 39.
Geographical objective points, 88.
Germanicus, expedition of, 366.
Girondists, 26, 37.
Gosa, French charge on, 305.
Governments, elective, weakness of, 46.
should not be unprepared for war,
46.
Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178.
principles of, 360.
Great detachments, 217, 219, 334.
instances of, 221, 222.
why made, 220, 221.
Grouchy, 127.
Guard, advanced, 261, 262.
in battle, 288, 289.
in unexpected battles, 208.
Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171.
Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375.
H.
Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295.
attacks in, 302.
Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236.
Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236.
Hannibal at Cannæ, 191.
at Zama, 179.
Harold, 370, 371.
Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point,
107.
Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167.
Hengist, 367.
Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, 376.
Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383.
Hochkirch, 303.
surprise of, 209.
Hohenfriedberg, 305.
Hohenlinden, 183, 206.
Holland, expedition to, 91.
Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289.
in the offensive, 316.
Houchard, 333.
Hougoumont, 303.
Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161.
Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270.
Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271.
how events justified them,
272.
I.
Igor, expeditions of, 368.
Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268.
Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations,
299.
effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359.
Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61.
Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287.
best formation of, for assault,
298.
best formation of, for the
defensive, 298.
cavalry must be supported by,
304.
checkerwise formation, 310.
formation of, in two deployed
lines, 292.
formations, effect of
improvements in fire-arms on, 299.
importance of, 290.
in three-rank formation, 293.
in what movements should be
exercised, 300.
lines of battle for, 282-284.
mixed order, 295.
mounted, 308.
needs support of cavalry and
artillery, 290.
protection of, from enemy's
artillery, 303.
squares, 294, 296.
supports of artillery, 316, 317.
three-rank formation of, 291.
various formations for, 285.
when a line of, should be charged
by cavalry, 305.
Information from partisans, 270.
of enemy's movements, rules for
gaining, 273, 274.
of the enemy's movements, four
means of acquiring, 269.
Initiative, advantages of, 184.
Institutions, military, 43.
Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114.
Interior lines, observations on, 123.
of Archduke Charles, 136.
of operations, 102.
of operations, why preferable,
127.
should not be too much extended,
117.
two armies on, 117.
Intervention, instances of, 20-22.
kinds of, 19.
reasons for, 19.
wars of, 19.
wars of, essentials in, 21.
Intestine wars, 35.
[Pg 400]
Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157.
Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215.
connection of, with strategy,
154.
how differ from têtes
deponts, 160.
influence of, 155.
instances of, 210, 211.
maxims on, 155, 156.
on river, 156.
Prussian system of. 158.
use of, 156.
where to be established, 155.
Intrenched lines, 146, 153.
attack of, 214.
continuous, 213.
Intrenched positions, 181.
Intrenchments, armies in, 154
Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142.
Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72.
advantages of awaiting, 17.
army of, line of defense
important to, 99.
control of the sea important in,
30.
difficult in national wars,
144.
how rendered feasible, 106.
of a mountainous country,
169.
of England contemplated by
Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
of Turkey by Russia, 23.
two kinds of, 22.
wars of, when advantageous,
17.
Invasions, diplomacy in, 24.
distant, across extensive
territories, 171.
distant, effect of standing
armies on, 171.
distant, how affected by
invention of gunpowder, 171.
distant, maxim for, 173.
distant, to aid an ally, 170.
how to be carried on, 24.
neutrality of states adjoining
the theater of war important in, 174.
of neighboring states, 174.
of Spain, 23.
when excusable, 23.
Investing a city, false system of, 152.
force, how strengthened, 153.
Irregular cavalry, 313.
arms for, 313.
Islamism, wars of, 25.
Italy, operations of the French in, 111,
112.
parallel retreats in, 241.
relation of, in the French
Revolution, 104.
Ivar, expedition of, 369.
J.
James II., expedition of, in Ireland, 381.
Jemmapes, 342.
Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198.
maneuvers at, 90.
Napoleon's march on, 94.
Ney's charge at, 305.
Jourdan, 229.
at Stockach, 205.
balloons used by, at Fleurus,
275.
Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233.
K.
Kagoul, panic at, 64.
Katzbach, 124.
Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211.
Kolin, 303.
Koudacheff's expedition, 273.
Koutousoff, 170.
Krasnoi, combination at, 342.
Kray, 87.
Kunnersdorf, 304.
L.
Lance, importance of, 47.
when best for cavalry, 307.
when useful, 306.
Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345.
League, wars of the, 25.
Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87.
battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305.
march of the allies upon,
123.
march on, modified, 140.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
order of battle at, 193.
Lepanto, battle of, 378.
Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342.
maneuver of Frederick at,
140.
Level country, defensive in, 164
Light cavalry, advantages of, 314.
Ligny, 195.
Line of advance, how determined, 71.
of battle, arrangement of cavalry
in, 288.
of battle before the French
Revolution, 277.
of battle, definition of,
179.
of battle, defensive, heavy
artillery in, 290.
of battle, distribution of troops
in, 287.
of battle, offensive,
concentration of artillery fire in, 290.
of battle, posting troops in,
277.
Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289.
[Pg 401] of defense
important to an army of invasion, 99.
of defense should be short,
98.
of operations, double, when
necessary, 116.
of operations, how protected,
132.
of operations, single, when
advantageous, 116.
of retreat, 261, 341-343.
Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215.
and points, strategic, 85.
central, application of, to large
masses, 125.
deployed, in two ranks, 294.
double, to be avoided, 330.
eccentric, 237.
interior, observations on,
123.
interior, two armies on, 117.
intrenched, 146, 153.
intrenched, attack of, 214.
of battle for two infantry corps,
different formations of, 282-284.
of circumvallation, 152.
of contravallation, 152.
of defense, second, 147.
of defense, eventual, 96.
of defense, permanent, 95.
of defense, strategical and
tactical, 95.
of depots, 263.
of direction, importance of,
illustrated, 116.
of maneuver, importance of,
114.
of operations, 100-103.
of operations at home and in
hostile countries, contrasted, 121.
of operations, best direction of,
115.
of operations, change of,
118.
of operations, converging and
divergent, 118.
of operations, double, 110.
of operations, double, when
advantageous, 123.
of operations, great art of
directing, 120.
of operations, how established,
114.
of operations, how influenced,
119.
of operations, illustration of,
by strategic field of 1806, 113.
of operations in fertile and
barren countries, contrasted, 122.
of operations in the wars of the
French Revolution, 104.
of operations, maxims on,
114.
of operations, rivers as,
76.
of operations, selecting of,
80.
Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic
direction, 115.
of Stollhofen, 154.
of Turin, 153.
of Turin, capture of, 213.
parallel, 200.
strategic, 128, 129.
strategic, of Napoleon in 1796,
131.
Linz, towers of, 158.
Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291.
Logistics, 69, 252-268.
derivation of the term, 253.
faulty, instances of, 265-267.
illustration of importance of,
263-268.
of battle of Leipsic, 267.
principal points of, 254-256.
Louis VII., Crusade of, 372.
IX., Crusade of, 374.
IX., expedition of, to Tunis,
375.
XIV., coalition against, 36.
XIV., commissariat of, 142.
Louvois, 59.
Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87.
M.
Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295,
296.
error at Katzbach, 124.
Mack, 164, 170.
at Ulm, 53.
Magnesia, victory of, 364.
Malplaquet, 183.
Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377.
Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360.
Maneuver line, 114, 115.
lines, 103.
lines of, their importance,
114.
objective points of, 88.
pivots of, 98.
tactical, by flank, 140.
turning, 179, 206.
Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207.
at Ulm and Jena, 90.
for breaking through a line,
197.
must conform to strategic
principles, 333.
objective points of, 89.
of Napoleon in
1814,118.
simplest, most likely to be
successful, 196.
strategic lines of, 128.
sudden, generally better than
predetermined, 196.
transversal, 163.
Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204.
[Pg 402]
Mantua, siege of, 111.
Wurmser at, 156.
March, establishment of depots on, 262.
Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258.
effects of systems of, 138.
flank, 139.
instructions to generals
commanding corps in, 260, 261.
particulars to be considered in,
260.
system of, 135, 138.
rapid, 176.
rules for, 257-263.
transversal, in mountainous
countries, 163.
two kinds of, 260.
Marengo, French armament at, 47.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Maritime expeditions, 361-390.
Marmont at Salamanca, 206.
Marsin, 53.
Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by,
158.
Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, 166.
Massena's position of the Albis, 181.
Matériel of war, 49.
should be inspected by staff
officers, 257.
Maurice of Saxony, 22.
Maxim for distant invasions, 173.
Maxims for frontier defenses, 148,
152.
of fundamental principle of war,
70.
on intrenched camps, 155, 156.
on lines of operations, 114-122.
on operations in mountainous
countries, 163.
on strategic fronts, 98, 99.
on strategic operations, 90.
relative to supplies, 143-146.
Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157.
fortresses at, 150.
intrenched camp at, 211.
Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390.
Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171.
Military education important to a ruler, 49.
geography and statistics,
importance
of a knowledge of, 40.
geography, Lloyd's essay on,
40.
institutions, 43.
institutions of Rome, 61.
instruments, signals by, 276.
operations influenced by a
cabinet, 42.
policy, 38.
policy, essential bases of,
49.
sciences, study of. 49.
spirit, how encouraged, 61.
spirit, how maintained, 63.
spirit of nations, 60.
statistics and geography,
39.
Militia as cavalry, 314, 315.
Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111.
Minden, French order at, 278.
Mithridates, 364, 365.
Mixed order, infantry formation, 295.
system of Benningsen at Eylau,
352.
Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments,
376.
marine expeditions, 249.
Mohammed II., 375.
Molitor, General, 167.
Mollwitz, battle of, 348.
Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125.
Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367.
Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322.
of cavalry, 312.
Moreau at Engen, 203.
base of operations of, in 1800,
82.
retreat of, in 1796, 233.
Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222.
passage of the Rhine in 1800,
224, 225.
Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389.
Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233.
Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169.
Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162.
countries, cavalry in, 304.
countries, defense in, 163.
countries, heights to be secured
in, 167.
countries, strategic defense in,
164.
countries, strategic positions
of, 76.
countries, the offensive in,
167.
countries, transversal marches
in, 163.
country, character of a war in,
169.
country, forts in a, 151.
country, invasion of a, 169.
Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96.
as frontiers, 146.
campaigns in, 169.
importance of, when secondary,
161, 162.
of European countries, relation
of, to warlike operations, 161.
strategic operations in, 160.
Mounted infantry, 308.
militia, 315.
Movement by flanks of companies, 300,
301.
[Pg 403]
Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204.
in which infantry should be
exercised, 300.
of armies, points to be attended
to, 254-256.
of the enemy, rules for gaining
information of, 273, 274.
Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209.
Murray's descent in 1813, 385.
Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203.
influence of, in battles,
348.
N.
Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212.
Naples, French army at, 112.
Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218.
and Grouchy at Waterloo, 127,130.
at Austerlitz, 206.
at Essling, 158.
at Ligny, 195.
at Ratisbon, 274.
at Wagram, 195.
double wars of, 37.
English expedition against, in
1815, 385.
his own chief staff officer,
264.
operations of the armies of,
136.
Napoleon's artillery, 318.
artillery at Wagram, 316.
base of operations in 1806,
80-82.
battles, orders of, 198.
bold maneuvers in 1814, 118.
campaign of 1800, 137.
cantonment on the Passarge,
247.
central lines in Saxony, 124.
central position in 1813, why
disastrous, 123.
changes of line of operations,
118.
choice of objective points,
89.
concentric retreat in 1796,
238.
defense in Champagne in 1814,
125.
detachments in 1805, 222.
error after his victory at
Dresden, 124.
error in the campaign of 1812,
172.
favorite objective, 330.
front of operations in 1796,
93.
front of operations in 1813,
93.
infantry, panic of, at Wagram,
64.
line of defense in 1813, 93.
logistics in 1806 and 1815,
264, 265.
march on Bassano, 131.
Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94.
march on Jena in 1806, 94.
march on Naumburg in 1806,
94.
march to Königsberg,
20.
mode of issuing orders, 259.
motives and necessities, 22.
operations, comments on, 116.
order at the Tagliamento,
295.
passages of the Danube, 226, 266.
passage of the Saint-Bernard,
168.
passage of the Po in 1800,
225.
projected invasion of England,
249, 250,
386.
reserves, 133.
retreat from Smolensk, 235.
return from Egypt in 1800,
112.
rule for the passage of an army,
147.
strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131.
strategic positions, 97.
system of formation for battle,
278, 279.
system of marches, 137.
victories and disasters, lesson
taught by them, 23.
National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167.
wars, definition of, 29.
wars, difficulties of conquest
in, 31-34.
wars, effect of the nature of the
country in, 30.
wars, how prevented, 33, 34.
wars, how success attained in,
33.
wars, invasion difficult in,
144.
wars, military precepts for,
27.
Nations, military spirit of, 60.
Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14.
Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94.
Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376.
Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in
invasions, 174.
Ney, 31, 168,
196.
at Bautzen, 317.
at Dennewitz, 130.
at Elchingen, 182.
at Jena, 305.
Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, 309.
O.
Objective point, how held, 67.
point, manner of approach to,
67.
point of Napoleon in 1800,
87.
point, selection of, 66.
points, geographical, 88.
points, how chosen, 90.
Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88.
[Pg 404] points of
maneuver, 88, 89.
points of operations, 85.
points, political, 91.
Objectives of operations, 329, 330.
Objects of war, 14.
Oblique order, 199, 200.
order, antiquity of, 199.
order assumed by Napoleon at
Marengo, 198.
order of battle, 190.
Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184.
army, proper course for, 324.
battle, object of, 188.
battles, 186.
characteristics of infantry
formation for, 297.
line of battle, concentration of
artillery-fire in, 290.
movements, when advised, 124.
or defensive system, either may
be employed, 185.
order of battle, 200.
system to be followed in,
176.
the, disadvantages of, in
tactical operations, 184.
the, in mountainous countries,
167.
use of artillery in, 316.
war, 72,
73.
war, duty of staff officers in,
258.
war, reserves, how posted in,
133, 135.
wars, duty of statesmen in,
17.
wars, how conducted, 16.
wars to reclaim rights, 16.
Oleg, expedition of, 367.
Open positions, 181.
Operations, base of, where to be established, 84.
bases of, definition of, 77.
how to be chosen, 79, 80.
plurality of, 78.
change of lines of, 118.
control of, 52.
divergent and convergent,
126, 127.
double lines of, 102, 110, 123.
exterior lines of, 102.
fronts of, 92, 330, 338.
in mountainous countries, maxims
on, 163.
interior lines of, 102.
line of, how protected, 132.
lines of, 100, 120.
lines of, converging and
divergent, 118.
lines of, how established,
114.
lines of, how influenced,
119.
lines of, maxims on, 114.
military, influenced by a
cabinet, 42.
objective points of, 85.
objectives of, 329, 330.
of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177.
of the French at the close of
1793, 331-333.
pivots of, 98.
simple lines of, 101.
system of, 72.
system of, how to be judged,
125.
system of, necessary in war,
50.
theater of, 74, 75.
theater of, between the Rhine and
the North Sea, 338-340.
theater of, how divided, 71.
zone of, 66.
zone of, how to select, 329.
zones of, 100, 338.
Opinion, public, danger of, 55.
wars of, 25.
Orchomenus, 365.
Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301.
half-deep, attacks in, 302.
half-deep, infantry formation,
295.
importance of, 42.
in deep masses, infantry
formation, 295, 296.
in echelons, 193.
in squares, when suitable for
attack, 297.
mixed, infantry formation,
295,
oblique, 199, 200.
of attack in columns, 194.
of battle, 186.
of battle at Agincourt, 192.
at Cannæ, 189.
at Crécy, 192.
at Essling, 192, 193.
at Fleurus, 192.
at Leipsic, 193.
at Mollwitz, 348.
at passage of a river, 192.
by echelon, 193.
convex, 192.
definition of, 180.
oblique, 190.
offensive, 200.
of the generals of the Republic,
349.
of infantry as skirmishers,
292.
shallow, infantry, 292.
Orders, best mode of issuing, 259.
how issued by Napoleon, 259.
inaccurate transmission of,
196.
of battle, 188.
of battle, classification of,
useful, 197.
Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements,
197.
[Pg 405] of Napoleon's
battles, 198.
should be clear, 258.
two methods of issuing, 258, 259.
Organization and arms of cavalry, 307,
308.
by corps, likely to be permanent,
287.
of an army in four corps,
281.
in seven corps, 281.
of divisions, 279, 280.
of very large armies, 286.
P.
Panics, cause and remedy of, 65.
instances of, 64.
officers and troops to be warned
against, 63.
Parallel lines, 200.
order of battle, 188.
order of battle reinforced,
189.
order of battle, when suitable,
189.
order of battle with crotchet,
189.
retreat, 237.
retreats, countries adapted to,
240, 241.
retreats, when preferable,
239.
Partisans, information from, 270.
Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273.
Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120.
Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147.
of a river, best position for,
226.
of the Beresina, 226, 245.
of the Danube by Napoleon,
266.
of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon,
168.
of rivers, 224, 343.
of rivers, double, 230.
of rivers, famous modern,
226.
of rivers in retreats, 243, 244.
of rivers in retreats, rules for,
245.
of rivers, rules for, 227.
of rivers, rules for preventing,
228.
Peninsular War, 32.
Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43.
Permanent lines of defense, 95.
Perpendicular order of battle, 190.
Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382.
Peter the Hermit, 371.
Peterwardein, panic at, 64.
Philip II. of Spain, 378.
Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109.
Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306.
Pivots of maneuver, 98.
Pivots of operations, 98.
Points, decisive, 337.
decisive and objective, 86.
decisive geographic, 87.
decisive, how affected by
arrangement of forces, 187.
decisive, of battle-field, now
determined, 186.
decisive strategic, 86.
of operations, objective,
85.
Political objective points, 91.
objective points subordinate to
strategy, 91.
wars, 26.
Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225.
Portable telegraphs, 275.
Port Mahon, assault of, 212.
Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, 390.
Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in,
183.
for battle, 341.
how to drive an enemy from,
201, 202.
strong, essentials for, 181.
system of wars of, 135.
tactical, protection of flanks
in, 182.
Positions, 179.
for cantonments, selection of,
247.
intrenched, 181.
open, 181.
strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331.
tactical, 181.
tactical, rules for selecting,
181.
two kinds of, 180, 181.
Post, capture of, when important, 216.
Posting troops in line of battle, 277.
Posts, means for capture of, 216.
Prague, battle of, 189, 205.
Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47.
Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54.
Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213.
of Coburg, error of, in 1794,
109.
Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88.
Principles of strategy, 331.
of strategy always the same,
17.
Promotions in armies, 47.
Protection by trees and brushwood, 303.
Provisional lines, 103.
Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106.
parallel retreat in, 241.
relation of, in the French
Revolution, 104.
Prussian army at Waterloo, 129.
reserves in 1806, 134.
system of forming columns,
294.
system of intrenched camps,
158.
[Pg 406]
Public opinion, danger of, 55.
Punic wars, 363, 364.
Pursuit, rules for, 242.
Pursuits, 241.
Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362.
Q.
Qualities of a skillful general, 334.
R.
Ramillies, 312.
Ramrods, 348.
Rapid marches, 176.
Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Rear, attack in, 207.
Rear-guard in retreat, 243.
Rear-guards in retreat, 234.
Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244.
Reconnoissances, 268.
give but limited information,
269.
to gain information of the
enemy's movements, 268.
Religion, wars of, 35.
Reports of prisoners, 269.
Reserve, cavalry, 311.
final, 203.
horse-artillery, advantages of,
289.
Reserves, cavalry, 288.
importance of, 133, 134.
in offensive war, how posted,
133, 135.
nature of, 133.
of Napoleon, 133.
Prussian, in 1806, 134.
strategic, 67, 133.
Retreat along converging roads, 236
along diverging roads, 237.
along parallel roads, 236.
by several corps, 235.
difficulty of deciding method of,
231.
five methods of arranging,
234.
in single mass, when preferable,
234.
line of, 261, 341-343.
means of, to be considered in a
defensive position, 183.
parallel, 237.
well effected, should be
rewarded, 63.
Retreats, 230.
at night, 231.
attack of the enemy's advanced
guard in, 243.
bridges in, 244.
by diverging roads, danger of,
238.
cavalry in, 243.
circumstances influencing,
232, 233.
concentration in, 238.
concentric, instances of,
238, 239.
defiles in, 243.
divergent, when admissible,
239.
duty of staff officers in,
256.
firmness of Russians in, 64.
halts in, to relieve rear-guard,
236.
hours of departures and halts in,
236.
in daylight, 231.
instances of famous, 233.
measures to insure success of,
242, 243.
parallel, countries adapted to,
240, 241.
parallel, when preferable,
239.
passage of rivers in, 243, 244.
Prince de Ligne's remark on,
230.
rear-guard in, 234, 243.
should be slow, 232.
various kinds of, 231.
Reverse fire, 317.
Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226.
Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377.
Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373.
Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382.
River, best position for passage of, 226.
crossing of, in presence of an
enemy, 120.
order of battle at passage of,
192.
Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96.
as frontiers, 147.
as lines of operations, 76.
double passage of, 230.
famous modern passages of,
226.
passage of, 224, 343.
passage of, in retreats, 243, 244.
rules for, 245.
points of passage of, in presence
of an enemy, 121.
rules for passage of, 227.
rules for preventing passage of,
228.
Rivoli 179, 205.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Rocket-batteries, use of, 318.
Rollo, 369.
Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63.
nation, cause of the decline of,
60.
Romans, naval expeditions of, 363.
Rome, military institutions of, 61.
Rossbach, 207.
Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328.
[Pg 407]
Rules for conducting descents, 251.
for fighting battles
scientifically, 203.
for gaining information of
enemy's movements, 273, 274.
for offensive or defensive
operations, 185.
for passage of rivers, 227.
for passage of a river in
retreat, 245.
for pursuit, 242.
for preventing passage of rivers,
228.
for use of artillery in battle,
316-318.
to be observed in selecting
tactical positions, 181.
Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64.
army, skirmishers in, 293.
base in 1828 and 1829, 84.
cavalry, 314.
expeditions in 1809, 385.
order at Eylau, 295.
retreat in 1812, 233.
system of forming columns,
294.
Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369.
S.
Saber, when best for cavalry, 308.
when useful, 306.
Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168.
Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205.
Saxons, expedition of, 367.
Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124.
Savoy, Duke of, 22.
Scandinavians, 366.
Science of marches, essential point in, 139.
of marches, includes what,
138.
Sciences, military, study of, 49.
Scipio, 364.
Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83,
84.
Sea, control of, held by England, 173.
control of, important in an
invasion, 30.
Secondary lines, 103.
Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378.
Sebastopol, 347.
Secondary depots, 262, 263.
Shallow order, 298.
order, infantry, 292.
Shumla, camp of, 155.
Siege, how covered, 153.
of Candia, 380, 381.
of Copenhagen, 384.
of Mantua, 111.
Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112.
duty of staff officers in,
256.
wars of, 146.
Signaling by fires, 276.
Signals by military instruments, 276.
simultaneous shouts as, 277.
system of, 274.
Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114.
lines of operations, 101.
Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277.
Single line of operations, when preferable, 116.
Sizeboli, capture of, 223.
Skill, superiority in, 42.
Skirmishers, 359, 360.
Skirmishing-order, 292.
Small detachments, how useful, 224.
Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235.
Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of,
162.
Sovereign as commander, 52.
Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
and Portugal, Wellington's
tactics in, 358.
invasions of, 23.
war in, in 1823, 27.
Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379.
capture of Vera Cruz by, 390.
descent on Algiers, 382.
descent on Morocco in 1859,
389.
Spies, 269.
best course for, 270.
difficulties in their way,
270.
use of, neglected in many modern
armies, 270.
when especially useful, 270.
Squares in echelons, 297.
infantry, 294, 296, 297.
in two ranks, 294.
Staff, chief of, 253,
chief of, how selected, 57.
general, usefulness of, 57.
officers and general must act in
concert, 257.
officers, duties of, should be
defined, 253.
officers, duty of, in offensive
war, 258.
officers should inspect
matériel, 257.
officers, summary of duties of,
254-256.
Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
State, how rendered secure, 138.
Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14.
Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17.
Statistics, military, 39.
[Pg 408]
St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384.
Stockach, 179, 205.
defeat of the French at, 111.
Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164.
Stollhofen, lines of, 152.
Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95.
Strategic combinations, 72.
combinations, when better than
tactical, 179.
coup-d'oeil, 337-345.
field of 1806, 113.
front and line of defense may
coincide, 92.
front, change of, 94.
front, double, 95.
front not to be too extended,
98.
front of Napoleon in his march on
Eylau, 94.
fronts, 92.
fronts, maxims on, 98.
lines, 128, 129.
lines and points, 85.
lines at Waterloo, 130.
lines of maneuvers, 128.
lines of Napoleon in 1796,
130, 131.
operations in mountains, 160.
operations, maxims on, 90.
point, Leipsic as a, 87.
Lyons as a, 87.
point of a battle-field, when
important, 187.
points, capitals as, 87.
position, essential conditions
for, 99.
positions, 66, 97, 330, 331.
positions of mountainous
countries, 76.
positions of Napoleon, 97.
reserves, 67, 133.
square for camps, 99.
Strategy, 322, 337.
advantage of the offensive in,
184.
and the commissariat, 141.
battles of Ulm and Jena won by,
198.
connection of intrenched camps
with, 154.
connection of têtes de
ponts with, 154.
definition of, 66.
directs movements, tactics
executes them, 175.
errors in, 91.
how it should be studied,
337.
illustration of, by operations of
1793, 331-333.
illustrations of, 339-341.
in what it consists, 328.
objective points in, how
determined, 88.
one great end of, 177.
points embraced by, 68.
political objective points
subordinate to, 91.
principles of, 331.
principles of, always the same,
17.
province of, 178.
relation of fortresses to,
148, 150.
science of marches in, 138.
system of, developed in 1800,
137.
the art of, 69.
Strong position, essentials for a, 181.
Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337.
Successful retreat, how to insure, 242,
243.
Surprises of armies, 209.
difficulty of, 209.
Suwaroff, 55, 170.
Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166.
Supplies, depots of, 141, 143.
Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168.
Svatoslav, expedition of, 308.
Sweyn, 369, 370.
Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162.
Massena in, in 1799, 165.
Suwaroff in, 166.
tactical defense of, 169.
Syria, French expedition to, 390.
System, concentric or eccentric, 126.
of corps, 279.
of divisions, 278.
of marches, 135.
of marches, effects of, 138.
of marches, includes what,
138.
of marches, relation of, to
commissariat, 141.
of marches the result of
circumstances, 135.
of operations, 72.
of operations, how to be judged,
125.
of signals, 274.
of strategy developed in 1800,
137.
of wars, change of, 135.
of wars of position, 135.
Systems modified by forms of government, 45.
T.
Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178.
defense of Switzerland, 169.
operations, disadvantages of the
offensive in, 184.
position, protection of flanks
in, 182.
Tactical positions, 181.
[Pg 409] positions, rules
for selecting, 181.
Tactics, 322.
executes movements, strategy
directs them, 175.
grand, 69,
70.
of battles, great difficulty of,
196.
of Wellington in Spain and
Portugal, 358.
Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295.
Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209.
Telegraphs, portable, 275.
Temporary bases, 84.
bases, when necessary, 132.
Têtes de ponts, 160.
connection of, with strategy,
154.
how differ from intrenched camps,
160.
Theater of operations, 74, 75.
of operations between the Rhine
and North Sea, 338-340.
of operations, how composed,
75.
of operations, how divided,
71.
of operations in the French
Revolution, 104.
of war, border of the, 80, 81.
of war, decisive points of the,
85.
of war, definition of, 74.
Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269.
use of, in war, 323.
Thirty Years' War, 25.
Three-rank formation of infantry, 291,
293.
Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268.
Torgau, battle of, 205.
Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155.
intrenched camp at, 83.
Towers, masonry, 158.
of Coblentz, 159.
of Linz, 158.
Transversal maneuvers, 163.
marches in mountainous countries,
163.
Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303.
Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287.
employment of, 328.
Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306,
307.
Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246.
Turin, battle of, 53.
intrenched camp at, 211.
lines of, 153, 213.
Turkey, invasion of, 23.
Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84.
wars, squares in, 296, 297.
Turks, cavalry charge of, 307.
naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380.
Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206.
maneuver, rules for, 204.
Two corps, one behind the other, 285.
Two-rank formation, 346.
Two wars at once, danger of, 36.
U.
Ulm, battle of, 53.
battle of, won by strategy,
198.
camp of, 154.
maneuvers at, 90.
Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197.
Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208.
meeting of two armies, 207.
United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387.
English expeditions against, in
1814 and 1815, 385, 386.
expedition to Port Royal,
390.
Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272.
of the three arms combined,
203.
V.
Vandals, 366.
Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221.
Venice, 379, 380.
Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390.
taken by the French, 386.
taken by the United States,
387.
Vessels, Roman, 363.
Scandinavian, 366.
Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333.
Victory, assailant's best means of, 202.
on what it depends, 309, 310.
when it may be expected, 360.
Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303.
Villars's infantry, panic among, 64.
Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120.
W.
Wagram, 195, 206,
266, 317,
343, 350.
Macdonald's column at, 295, 296.
Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
panic at, 64.
War an art, 321.
border of the theater of,
80, 81.
character of, from Middle Ages to
French Revolution, 135.
circumstances which influence
result of, 321.
council of, at seat of
government, 59.
[Pg 410] councils of,
58.
decisive points of the theater
of, 85.
defensive-offensive, 74.
definition of the art of,
13.
fundamental principle of,
66, 70.
governments should not be
unprepared for, 46.
how to be conducted, 15.
influence of cavalry in a,
313, 314.
influence of improvements in
fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359.
manner of applying general
principle of, 175.
matériel of, 49.
maxims of fundamental principles
of, 70.
nature and extent of, how
influenced, 14.
not an exact science, 344, 350.
objects of, 14.
of the Crimea, 387.
offensive and defensive,
definition of, 72.
offensive, duty of staff officers
in, 258.
operations of, how directed,
150.
principal parts of the art of,
66.
relation of statesmanship to,
14.
theater of, definition, 74.
use of theories in, 323.
Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211.
Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22.
change of system of, 135.
civil, 35.
defensive politically, offensive
militarily, 17.
double, 36.
for conquest, instances of,
22.
intestine, 35.
natural character of, in
mountainous countries, 167.
national, definition of, 29.
national, difficulties of
conquest in, 31-34.
national, effect of nature of the
country on, 30.
national, how prevented, 33, 34.
national, invasion difficult in,
144.
offensive, how conducted,
16.
offensive, to reclaim rights,
16.
of expediency, 18.
kinds of, 18.
of extermination, 34.
of intervention, 19.
of intervention, essentials in
wars of, 21.
of intervention, military chances
in, 20.
of invasion, when advantageous,
17.
of opinion, 25.
of opinion, character of,
26.
of opinion, instances of,
25.
of opinion, military precepts
for, 27.
of position, system of, 135.
of religion, 35.
of sieges, 146.
political, 26.
political part of, how modified,
17.
Punic, 363, 364.
Turkish, squares in, 296, 297.
when most just, 16.
with or without allies, 18.
Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354.
Blücher at, 130.
campaign of, 129, 130.
English squares at,
294
formations at, 351.
French at, 196.
Napoleon's order of battle at,
198.
Ney at, 182,183.
strategic lines at, 130.
Wellington's position at,
181, 388.
Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385.
and Blücher at Waterloo,
127, 130.
at Salamanca, 206.
at Torres-Vedras, 83.
defensive-offensive operations
of, 74.
Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181.
Weyrother, 205, 206.
William the Conqueror, 370, 371.
Winkelried, column of, 194.
Winter campaigns, 68.
quarters, countries adapted to,
246.
quarters, when dangerous,
247.
quarters, when strategic,
97.
Woods, importance of possession of, 303.
Wurmser at Mantua, 156.
eccentric retreat of, in 1796,
238.
error of, 111.
X.
Xerxes, 173.
army of, 362.
Z.
Zama, battle of, 364.
Zimisces, 368.
Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338.
of operations, how to select,
329.
of operations in 1813, 101.
Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105.
Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112.
[Pg 411]
[Map 1]
Map of portions of Germany, Switzerland &
Italy.
[Map 2]
[Map
3]
End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron
Henri de Jomini