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b. To deny that man has by nature a moral character, is simply bringing him down to the level of
the animal. According to this view everything in the life of man that is not a conscious choice of
the will, is deprived of all moral quality. But the consciousness of men in general testifies to the
fact that the contrast between good and evil also applies to man’s tendencies, desires, moods,
and affections, and that these also have a moral character. In Pelagianism sin and virtue are
reduced to superficial appendages of man, in no way connected with his inner life. That the
estimate of Scripture is quite different appears from the following passages: Jer. 17:9; Ps.
51:6,10; Matt. 15:19; Jas. 4:1,2.
c. A choice of the will that is in no way determined by man’s character, is not only
psychologically unthinkable, but also ethically worthless. If a good deed of man simply happens
to fall out as it does, and no reason can be given why it did not turn out to be the opposite, in
other words, if the deed is not an expression of man’s character, it lacks all moral value. It is
only as an exponent of character that a deed has the moral value that is ascribed to it.
d. The Pelagian theory can give no satisfactory account of the universality of sin. The bad
example of parents and grandparents offers no real explanation. The mere abstract possibility
of man’s sinning, even when strengthened by the evil example, does not explain how it came to
pass that all men actually sinned. How can it be accounted for that the will invariably turned in
the direction of sin, and never in the opposite direction? It is far more natural to think of a
general disposition to sin.
D. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW OF SIN.
Though the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent are somewhat ambigious in the
doctrine of sin, the prevailing Roman Catholic view of sin may be expressed as follows: Real sin
always consists in a conscious act of the will. It is true that the dispositions and habits that are
not in accord with the will of God, are of a sinful character; yet they cannot be called sins in the
strict sense of the word. The indwelling concupiscence, which lies back of sin, gained the upper
hand in man in paradise, and thus precipitated the loss of the donum superadditum of original
righteousness, cannot be regarded as sin, but only as the fomes or fuel of sin. The sinfulness of
Adam’s descendants is primarily only a negative condition, consisting in the absence of
something that ought to be present, that is, of original righteousness, which is not essential to
human nature. Something essential is wanting only if, as some hold, the justitia naturalis was
also lost.
The objections to this view are perfectly evident from what was said in connection with the
Pelagian theory. A bare reminder of them would seem to be quite sufficient. In so far as it holds
that real sin consists only in a deliberate choice of the will and in overt acts, the objections