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on his free and independent will. From this it follows, of course, that there is no such thing as a
moral development of the individual. Good and evil are located in the separate actions of man.
From this fundamental position the doctrinal teaching of Pelagius respecting sin naturally
follows. Sin consists only in the separate acts of the will. There is no such thing as a sinful
nature, neither are there sinful dispositions. Sin is always a deliberate choice of evil by a will
which is perfectly free, and can just as well choose and follow the good. But if this is so, then
the conclusion inevitably follows that Adam was not created in a state of positive holiness, but
in a state of moral equilibrium. His condition was one of moral neutrality. He was neither good
nor bad, and therefore had no moral character; but he chose the course of evil, and thus
became sinful. Inasmuch as sin consists only in separate acts of the will, the idea of its
propagation by procreation is absurd. A sinful nature, if such a thing should exist, might be
passed on from father to son, but sinful acts cannot be so propagated. This is in the nature of
the case an impossibility. Adam was the first sinner, but his sin was in no sense passed on to his
descendants. There is no such thing as original sin. Children are born in a state of neutrality,
beginning exactly where Adam began, except that they are handicapped by the evil examples
which they see round about them. Their future course must be determined by their own free
choice. The universality of sin is admitted, because all experience testifies to it. It is due to
imitation and to the habit of sinning that is gradually formed. Strictly speaking, there are, on the
Pelagian standpoint, no sinners, but only separate sinful acts. This makes a religious conception
of the history of the race utterly impossible.
2. OBJECTIONS TO THE PELAGIAN VIEW.
There are several weighty objections to the Pelagian
view of sin, of which the following are the most important:
a. The fundamental position that man is held responsible by God only for what he is able to do,
is absolutely contrary to the testimony of conscience and to the Word of God. It is an
undeniable fact that, as a man increases in sin, his ability to do good decreases. He becomes in
an ever greater measure the slave of sin. According to the theory under consideration this
would also involve a lessening of his responsibility. But this is equivalent to saying that sin itself
gradually redeems its victims by relieving them of their responsibility. The more sinful a man,
the less responsible he is. Against this position conscience registers a loud protest. Paul does
not say that the hardened sinners, which he describes in Rom. 1:18-32 were virtually without
responsibility, but regards them as worthy of death. Jesus said of the wicked Jews who gloried
in their freedom, but manifested their extreme wickedness by seeking to kill Him, that they
were bond-servants of sin, did not understand His speech, because they could not hear His
word, and would die in their sins, John 8:21,22,34,43. Though slaves of sin, they were yet
responsible.