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causes are real, and not to be regarded simply as the operative power of God. It is only on
condition that second causes are real, that we can properly speak of a concurrence or co-
operation of the First Cause with secondary causes. This should be stressed over against the
pantheistic idea that God is the only agent working in the world.
b. Scripture proof for divine concurrence.
The Bible clearly teaches that the providence of God
pertains not only to the being but also to the actions or operations of the creature. The general
truth that men do not work independently, but are controlled by the will of God, appears from
several passages of Scripture. Joseph says in Gen. 45:5 that God rather than his brethren had
sent him to Egypt. In Ex. 4:11,12 the Lord says that He will be with Moses’ mouth and teach him
what to say; and in Jos. 11:6 He gives Joshua the assurance that He will deliver the enemies to
Israel. Proverbs 21:1 teaches us that “the king’s heart is in the hand of Jehovah. . . . He turneth
it whithersoever He will”; and Ezra 6:22, that Jehovah “had turned the heart of the king of
Assyria” unto Israel. In Deut 8:18 Israel is reminded of the fact that it was Jehovah that gave it
power to get wealth. More particularly, it is also evident from Scripture that there is some kind
of divine co-operation in that which is evil. According to II Sam. 16:11 Jehovah bade Shimei to
curse David. The Lord also calls the Assyrian “the rod of mine anger, the staff in whose hand is
mine indignation,” Isa. 10:5. Moreover, He provided for a lying spirit in the mouth of the
prophets of Ahab, I Kings 22:20-23.
2. ERRORS THAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED.
There are several errors against which we should guard
in connection with this doctrine.
a. That it consists merely in a general communication of power, without determining the
specific action in any way. Jesuits, Socinians, and Arminians maintain that the divine
concurrence is only a general and indifferent co-operation, so that it is the second cause that
directs the action to its particular end. It is common alike to all causes, quickening them into
action, but in a way that is entirely indeterminate. While it stimulates the second cause, it
leaves this to determine its own particular kind and mode of action. But if this were the
situation, it would be in the power of man to frustrate the plan of God, and the First Cause
would become subservient to the second. Man would be in control, and there would be no
divine providence.
b. That it is of such a nature that man does part of the work and God a part. The co-operation of
God and man is sometimes represented as if it were something like the joint efforts of a team
of horses pulling together, each one doing his part. This is a mistaken view of the distribution of
the work. As a matter of fact each deed is in its entirety both a deed of God and a deed of the
creature. It is a deed of God in so far as there is nothing that is independent of the divine will,
and in so far as it is determined from moment to moment by the will of God. And it is a deed of