Page 162 - Systematic Theology - Louis Berkhof

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to the creature, while self-subsistence and self-sustenation are incommunicable properties,
which characterize only the Creator. The creature can never be self-sustaining, but must be
upheld from day to day by the almighty power of the Creator. Hence it would not require a
positive act of omnipotence on the part of God to annihilate created existences. A simple
withdrawal of support would naturally result in destruction. — This view is irreligious, because
it removes God so far from His creation that communion with Him becomes a practical
impossibility. History plainly testifies to the fact that it uniformly spells death for religion. — It is
also un-Biblical, since it puts God altogether outside of His creation, while the Bible teaches us
in many passages that He is not only transcendent but also immanent in the works of His hands.
(b) That it is a continuous creation. Pantheism represents preservation as a continuous
creation, so that the creatures or second causes are conceived as having no real or continuous
existence, but as emanating in every successive moment out of that mysterious Absolute which
is the hidden ground of all things. Some who were not Pantheists had a similar view of
preservation. Descartes laid the basis for such a conception of it, and Malebranche pushed this
to the farthest extreme consistent with theism. Even Jonathan Edwards teaches it incidentally
in his work on Original Sin, and thus comes dangerously near to teaching Pantheism. Such a
view of preservation leaves no room for second causes, and therefore necessarily leads to
Pantheism. It is contrary to our original and necessary intuitions, which assure us that we are
real, self-determining causes of action, and consequently moral agents. Moreover, it strikes at
the very root of free agency, moral accountability, moral government, and therefore of religion
itself. Some Reformed theologians also use the term “continuous creation,”[Bavinck, Geref.
Dogm. II, p. 654; Heppe, Dogm., p. 190; McPherson, Chr. Dogm., p. 177.] but do not thereby
mean to teach the doctrine under consideration. They simply desire to stress the fact that the
world is maintained by the same power which created it. In view of the the fact that the
expression is liable to misunderstanding, it is better to avoid it.
C. Concurrence.
1. THE IDEA OF DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SCRIPTURAL PROOF FOR IT.
a. Definition and explanation.
Concurrence may be defined as the co-operation of the divine
power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of their operation,
causing them to act and to act precisely as they do. Some are inclined to limit its operation, as
far as man is concerned. to human actions that are morally good and therefore commendable;
others. more logically, extend it to actions of every kind. It should be noted at the outset that
this doctrine implies two things: (1) That the powers of nature do not work by themselves, that
is, simply by their own inherent power, but that God is immediately operative in every act of
the creature. This must be maintained in opposition to the deistic position. (2) That second