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effect or to permit, and which are therefore absolutely fixed. The revealed will prescribes the
duties of man, and represents the way in which he can enjoy the blessings of God.
c. The freedom of God’s will.
The question is frequently debated whether God, in the exercise
of His will, acts necessarily or freely. The answer to this question requires careful
discrimination. Just as there is a scientia necessaria and a scientia libera, there is also a voluntas
necessaria (necessary will) and a voluntas libera (free will) in God. God Himself is the object of
the former. He necessarily wills Himself, His holy nature, and the personal distinctions in the
Godhead. This means that He necessarily loves Himself and takes delight in the contemplation
of His own perfections. Yet He is under no compulsion, but acts according to the law of His
Being; and this, while necessary, is also the highest freedom. It is quite evident that the idea of
causation is absent here, and that the thought of complacency or self-approval is in the
foreground. God’s creatures, however, are the objects of His voluntas libera. God determines
voluntarily what and whom He will create, and the times, places, and circumstances, of their
lives. He marks out the path of all His rational creatures, determines their destiny, and uses
them for His purposes. And though He endows them with freedom, yet His will controls their
actions. The Bible speaks of this freedom of God’s will in the most absolute terms, Job 11:10;
33:13; Ps. 115:3; Prov. 21:1; Isa. 10:15; 29:16; 45:9; Matt. 20:15; Rom. 9:15-18,20,21; I Cor.
12:11; Rev. 4:11. The Church always defended this freedom, but also emphasized the fact that
it may not be regarded as absolute indifference. Duns Scotus applied the idea of a will in no
sense determined to God; but this idea of a blind will, acting with perfect indifference, was
rejected by the Church. The freedom of God is not pure indifference, but rational self-
determination. God has reasons for willing as He does, which induce Him to choose one end
rather than another, and one set of means to accomplish one end in preference to others.
There is in each case a prevailing motive, which makes the end chosen and the means selected
the most pleasing to Him, though we may not be able to determine what this motive is. In
general it may be said that God cannot will anything that is contrary to His nature, to His
wisdom or love, to His righteousness or holiness. Dr. Bavinck points out that we can seldom
discern why God willed one thing rather than another, and that it is not possible nor even
permissible for us to look for some deeper ground of things than the will of God, because all
such attempts result in seeking a ground for the creature in the very Being of God, in robbing it
of its contingent character, and in making it necessary, eternal, divine.[Geref. Dogm. II, p. 241.]
d. God’s will in relation to sin.
The doctrine of the will of God often gives rise to serious
questions. Problems arise here which have never yet been solved and which are probably
incapable of solution by man.