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VI. The Incommunicable Attributes
(God as the Absolute Being)
It has been quite common in theology to speak of God as the absolute Being. At the same time
the term “absolute” is more characteristic of philosophy than it is of theology. In metaphysics
the term “the Absolute” is a designation of the ultimate ground of all existence; and because
the theist also speaks of God as the ultimate ground of all existence, it is sometimes thought
that the Absolute of philosophy and the God of theism are one and the same. But that is not
necessarily so. In fact the usual conception of the Absolute renders it impossible to equate it
with the God of the Bible and of Christian theology. The term “Absolute” is derived from the
Latin absolutus, a compound of ab (from) and solvere (to loosen), and thus means free as to
condition, or free from limitation or restraint. This fundamental thought was worked out in
various ways, so that the Absolute was regarded as that which is free from all conditions (the
Unconditioned or Self-Existent), from all relations (the (Unrelated), from all imperfections (the
Perfect), or free from all phenomenal differences or distinctions, such as matter and spirit,
being and attributes, subject and object, appearance and reality (the Real, or Ultimate Reality).
The answer to the question, whether the Absolute of philosophy can be identified with the God
of theology, depends on the conception one has of the Absolute. If Spinoza conceives of the
Absolute as the one Self-subsistent Being of which all particular things are but transient modes,
thus identifying God and the world, we cannot share his view of this Absolute as God. When
Hegel views the Absolute as the unity of thought and being, as the totality of all things, which
includes all relations, and in which all the discords of the present are resolved in perfect unity,
we again find it impossible to follow him in regarding this Absolute as God. And when Bradley
says that his Absolute is related to nothing, and that there cannot be any practical relation
between it and the finite will, we agree with him that his Absolute cannot be the God of the
Christian religion, for this God does enter into relations with finite creatures. Bradley cannot
conceive of the God of religion as other than a finite God. But when the Absolute is defined as
the First Cause of all existing things, or as the ultimate ground of all reality, or as the one self-
existent Being, it can be considered as identical with the God of theology. He is the Infinite One,
who does not exist in any necessary relations, because He is self-sufficient, but at the same
time can freely enter into various relations with His creation as a whole and with His creatures.
While the incommunicable attributes emphasize the absolute Being of God, the communicable
attributes stress the fact that He enters into various relations with His creatures. In the present
chapter the following perfections of God come into consideration.