Basic HTML Version
163
Since it does not terminate on the creature, it can in the abstract be interpreted as having no
ethical bearings. This explains that the Jesuits taught that the divine concurrence was
simultaneous only, and not previous and pre-determining, and that some Reformed theologians
limited the previous concurrence to the good deeds of men, and for the rest satisfied
themselves with teaching a simultaneous concurrence.
c. It is, finally, an immediate concurrence.
In His government of the world God employs all
kinds of means for the realization of His ends; but He does not so work in the divine
concurrence. When He destroys the cities of the plain by fire, this is an act of divine
government in which He employs means. But at the same time it is His immediate concurrence
by which He enables the fire to fall, to burn, and to destroy. So God also works in man in
endowing him with power, in the determination of his actions, and in sustaining his activities all
along the line.
4. THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SIN.
Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Arminians raise a
serious objection to this doctrine of providence. They maintain that a previous concurrence,
which is not merely general but predetermines man to specific actions, makes God the
responsible author of sin. Reformed theologians are well aware of the difficulty that presents
itself here, but do not feel free to circumvent it by denying God’s absolute control over the free
actions of His moral creatures, since this is clearly taught in Scripture, Gen. 45:5; 50:19,20; Ex.
10:1,20; II Sam. 16:10.11; Isa. 10:5-7; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28. They feel constrained to teach: (a) that
sinful acts are under divine control and occur according to God’s pre-determination and
purpose, but only by divine permission, so that He does not efficiently cause men to sin, Gen.
45:5; 50:20; Ex. 14:17; Isa. 66:4; Rom. 9:22; II Thess. 2:11; (b) that God often restrains the sinful
works of the sinner, Gen. 3:6; Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 76:10; Isa. 10:15; Acts 7:51; and (c) that God in
behalf of His own purpose overrules evil for good, Gen. 50:20; Ps. 76:10; Acts. 3:13.
This does not mean, however, that they all agree in answering the question. whether there is a
direct, immediate and physical energizing of the active power of the creature, disposing and
pre-determining it efficaciously to the specific act, and also enabling it to do that act. Dabney,
for instance, while admitting such a physical concurrence in the lower creation, denies it with
respect to free agents. The great majority, however, maintain it also in the case of free moral
beings. Even Dabney agrees that God’s control over all of the acts of His creatures is certain,
sovereign, and efficacious; and therefore must, along with the others, face the question as to
the responsibility of God for sin. He gives his conclusion in the following words: “This, then, is
my picture of the providential evolution of God’s purpose as to sinful acts; so to arrange and
group events and objects around free agents by his manifold wisdom and power, as to place
each soul, at every step, in the presence of those circumstances, which, He knows, will be a